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Abstract
The Carolina Corps were both a product and driver of British military zeal during
the Age of Revolution. Created in South Carolina in the final years of the American
Revolutionary War, the unit was the only black fighting force that survived the conflict on
the British side. Evacuated at the end of the conflict as free men, the Carolina Corps
straddled the boundaries of military–civil society in the highly racialized eighteenth
century British Caribbean. Although former slaves, the men of the Corps were
nonetheless crucial to the defense of the region. This gave the men opportunities and
legal standing that was unattainable to most other blacks in the British West Indies. The
Carolina Corps leveraged their position to ensure they achieved the greatest possible level
of social advancement. In addition, these black troops helped to change the racial
perceptions of many white commanders, laying the groundwork for the later expansion
of black units within the British Caribbean.
This dissertation looks at the career of this revolutionary regiment, from its initial
inception to its incorporation in the brand new West India Regiments in 1797. The study
looks at the ways that the Carolina Corps interacted with the diverse populations they
encountered, and dealt with complex societal issues such as ethnicity and nationalism. It
will also show how the unit was successful in using a unique set of temporal circumstances
and their own understanding of their military worth to attain a unique, liminal situation
in the British Caribbean. White attitudes and perceptions towards the soldiers will also be
vii

assessed. Overall, this dissertation will show how a relatively-unstudied group of 300
former slaves were critical to the evolution of the British military establishment in the
West Indies during the final decades of the eighteenth century.
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Introduction

On December 14, 1782, the British Army evacuated their final major post in South
Carolina. The flotilla of ships that tacked their way to sea from Charlestown Harbor that
December day contained the flotsam and jetsam of the losing side in the American
Revolutionary War. British regulars and Hessian mercenaries stood on decks of ships next
to loyalist refugees, all trying to find a safe port in the shrinking territory of British North
America. Below decks, thousands of loyalist-owned slaves fled Charlestown the same way
so many had arrived, in the dank, crowded hold of a ship, their status in bondage much
more certain than the futures of their owners.
Aboard the HMS Symmetry, a unique group of men watched as the South Carolina
mainland faded into the distance. The men of the Black Pioneers had earned their
freedom from bondage during the Revolutionary War and now stood on the deck of the
ship as provincial soldiers in the British Army.1 It must have been with supreme irony that
the freemen watched the shadow of Sullivan’s Island, the “Ellis Island of African
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The HMS Symmetry, a 333-ton Royal Navy supply ship, was the largest of five British ships bound for the
island of Saint Lucia. Most the Charlestown evacuation fleet sailed to either East Florida or Jamaica. Only
military personnel of the Carolina Corps, and parts of the 19th and 30th Regiments, along with their equipage,
sailed for Saint Lucia. No Loyalists from South Carolina evacuated to that island. List of Ships bound to St
Lucia, under Convoy of the Hornet, ca. 12 December 1782, WO 36-2, National Archives.
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Americans,” fade into the distant twilight.2 The men of the pioneer unit, and of the
famous Black Dragoons, were bound to continue service in the British Caribbean. Indeed,
the horses of the dragoons sailed from Charlestown in the same naval convoy as their
riders. Upon Saint Lucia, the island where the Symmetry was sailing, the men would form
part of a unique black unit in the British Caribbean. Their geographical heritage meant
that this revolutionary British regiment would become known as the Carolina Corps.
The men of the Carolina Corps hold a unique position in the history of the British
Caribbean. While black troops were a colonial fixture throughout the Atlantic during times
of war, the Carolina Corps became the first free all-black peacetime unit in the British
Army.3 As such, the unit recorded many historic firsts for black troops in the British
military. The soldiers of the Carolina Corps became the first black troops in the British
military to receive regular pensions upon their retirement, starting in 1793. As well as this,
the unit supplied some of the original companies of the First West India Regiment in 1798.

2

The term “Ellis Island of African-Americans,” coined by Peter H. Wood, is on the South Carolina historical
marker presently located on Sullivan’s Island. It is estimated that 40 percent of African Americans today can
trace their lineage through the island, which acted as a quarantine facility for slaves imported into the port
of Charlestown from Africa. At least 89,000 slaves spent time in quarantine at Sullivan’s Island during
colonial British rule in South Carolina. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670
through the Stono Rebellion (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1975), xiv; Peter McCandless, Slavery,
Disease and Suffering in the Southern Lowcountry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6.
3

As early as the 1770s, the British had used a force of some 1000 men, known as the “King’s Negroes,” in
the Caribbean. This fatigue unit, unlike the Carolina Corps, were slaves owned by the Crown, and thus
remained in bondage throughout their service. The unit was officially freed, and disbanded, in 1831 – some
24 years after the slaves of the West India Regiments were freed. Roger N. Buckley, “The British Army’s
African Recruitment Policy, 1790-1807,” Contributions in Slave Studies 5 (September 2008): 6.

2

Despite their unique position in the history of the British Caribbean, the Carolina Corps
have mostly fallen through the pages of history.4
The Carolina Corps were not the first black unit that the British employed in a
military capacity, but their position was nonetheless unique. While the British had
employed slaves as soldiers in the siege of Havana during the Seven Years War, and in
various other conflicts, none of these units were considered a true part of the military
establishment, considered auxiliary troops that were utilized at times of need. The British
had also dealt with the maroons on Jamaica, giving them land in exchange for loyalty and
peace at the end of the First Maroon War in 1739.5 However, all of these relationships
were made in an exclusionary imperial context, as none of the black troops previously
used were considered truly British subjects with all the rights that this concept entailed.
The Carolina Corps, as free men and troops in the British Army, came to be
considered British subjects and encountered a shift in thinking regarding blacks in the
wake of the Revolutionary War. The moral and structural changes wrought by this conflict
among both military and political figures within the British Empire meant that the men of
the unit were among the first to benefit from a more inclusive imperial model. Before the
war, the British only used black troops in times of desperation, often treating those it

4

Despite many passing references in works relating to the British military in the Post-Revolutionary War
Caribbean, only one published work has been dedicated to the Carolina Corps as a unit. George F. Tyson,
Jr., “The Carolina Black Corps: Legacy of Revolution, 1782-1798,” Revista/Review Interamericana 5 (Winter
1975/76): 648-64.
5

Michael Craton, Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1982), 89-90.
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freed from slavery or those members of black autonomous groups they encountered as
outside of the imperial model. Throughout the pre-Revolutionary War period, the slave
trade continued largely unchallenged, and groups such as the Maroons on Jamaica and
the Caribs on Saint Vincent were dealt with as separate entities, rather than within the
imperial British model. The Revolutionary War created a schism in feelings towards the
slave trade, with moral arguments being used against it in ever increasing numbers. As
well as this, slaves freed during the war became British subjects, both in Nova Scotia and,
in the case of the Carolina Corps, in other parts of the British Empire. This new inclusion
of blacks within the imperial fold was not simply socio-political, but also military, as shown
by the Carolina Corps’ retention in the decade of peace that followed the Treaty of Paris.
This change in imperial thinking between the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783 and
the creation of the West India Regiments, beginning in 1795, underrides this entire
dissertation, and the Carolina Corps were one of the transformative groups that provide
an insight into this major imperial moment in British history.
There have been excellent books written on the British military establishment in
the West Indies in the past several decades, and it is these works that this study adds to.
These previous works have often looked in detail at specific regiments in the British
Caribbean, particularly the West India Regiments.6 While this makes sense, as the units
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The most detailed histories of the British military in the West Indies were both written by Roger Norman
Buckley. His first work on the region focused exclusively on the West India Regiments during the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The second, more recent work focuses on the wider British military in
the region, including the black soldiers of the West India Regiments. The Carolina Corps are referred to in
passing in both works. Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats: The British West India Regiments, 1795-1815 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) and The British Army in the West Indies: Society and the Military in the
Revolutionary Age (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1998).
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are much better known and lasted longer, a focus on the West India Regiments exclusively
leaves a broad gap in British military historiography when it comes to the recruitment of
black soldiers. In Slaves in Red Coats, one of the few books to look exclusively at the black
regiments in the British Caribbean during the Revolutionary Era, Roger Buckley comments
on the Carolina Corps that “The importance of this contingent, which was under the
command of regular army officers, was recognized all over the West Indies.”7 Despite this,
Buckley simply uses the Carolina Corps as a foundation block upon which to rest his
subsequent study of the West India Regiments. In a chapter of Arming Slaves, a
compilation of essays that looks at the arming of enslaved persons throughout history,
David Geggus explains of the British recruitment of blacks during the Revolutionary era:
“Given the numbers involved and the survival of at least the Carolina Corps, transferred
in 1783 to the West Indies, they constitute another step forward in the developing use of
slaves as soldiers.”8 It seems that while many historians use the unit as a touchstone,
there remain a lack of detailed studies of the men of the Carolina Corps and their position
within the British Caribbean.
There is good reason for this neglect of the Carolina Corps in some modern
histories of the British Atlantic. Firstly, while critics could be dismissive of Buckley, Geggus,
et al. for their casual mentions of the unit in their wider works, this should certainly not
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Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 6.

8

David Geggus, “The Arming of Slaves in the Haitian Revolution,” in Arming Slaves: From Classical Times to
the Modern Age, Christopher Leslie Brown and Philip D. Morgan, eds. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2006), 211.

5

be the case. Indeed, it is testament to the scholarship of these historians that, while
working on broader projects with different chronological and geographic focuses, they
have discovered the unit and used the Corps as an example to mention. The archival
situation in Grenada, the headquarters of the Carolina Corps during their tenure in the
West Indies, has meant that many rich sources regarding the unit were lost to historians
in recent years.9 This has encouraged scholars to turn their attention to other military
units, and race relations within the wider Caribbean region.10 While this study is indebted
to these works, which have created a historiographical space in which to situate it, certain
regions of the British Caribbean have suffered neglect at a time when others are
thriving.11
Unfortunately, as with many of the works on the British Caribbean, those that
mention the soon-to-be Carolina Corps only do so in passing, and often these references
are sloppy. In his otherwise excellent book, Death or Liberty, Douglas Egerton suggests
the black pioneers in New York and those in South Carolina, the latter becoming the

9

Various hurricanes, flooding, and a lack of funds have meant that many documents in the Grenadian
National Archives have been destroyed or are inaccessible to historians. This includes all the governor’s
messages, and those of the Grenada Assembly.
10

Many historians have found great success looking at civil-military relations, and wider race relations
relating to nationalism and ethnicity, in Latin American nations around the Caribbean rim. Ben Vinson III,
Bearing Arms for His Majesty: The Free-Colored Militia in Colonial Mexico (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2001); Maria Elena Diaz, The Virgin, the King, and the Royal Slaves of El Cobre: Negotiating Freedom
in Colonial Cuba, 1670-1780 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the
New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); James H.
Sweet, Domingos Àlvares, African Healing, and the Intellectual History of the Atlantic World (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2011).
11

Barbados and Jamaica, due to their wealth of easily accessible archival sources, are the main points of
focus for studies of the British Caribbean during the Colonial and Revolutionary Eras.
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largest part of the Carolina Corps, were one and the same unit.12 This simply is not the
case. Likewise, Todd Braisted suggests erroneously that “The Black Dragoons, a part of
the South Carolina militia establishment, would soon pass into history, disbanded along
with all Loyalist militia in the province upon its evacuation.”13 While it may seem pedantic
to bring up these small points in what are larger works, it is this jigsaw of misconceptions
in these larger publications that have resulted in so many misconceptions about some of
the black units in the Revolutionary War. “Black Men, Red Coats” intends to correct some
of these fallacies relating to the units that would later comprise the Carolina Corps.
This study uses the history of the Carolina Corps in both North America and the
West Indies as a prism through which to analyze the intersection of race, society and the
military in the Revolutionary Era British Atlantic world. It will show that Grenada,
Dominica, Saint Vincent and the other Windward Islands were the center of British civilmilitary interactions based on race but are often overshadowed by the revolutions in the
American colonies and Haiti that bookend the era. Such analysis allows for an insight into
the ways that the men of the Carolina Corps, as the only black provincial unit in the British
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Douglas R. Egerton suggests that Harry Washington, a slave of the famous general, fought in South
Carolina against Francis Marion after the black pioneers from New York who went south in 1780, and that
he was evacuated from Charlestown in 1782. This is not true, as it was the locally-raised black dragoons
who fought Marion in South Carolina, and it was from New York City that Washington sailed to Nova Scotia.
Such errors are not solely Egerton’s but pervade works that reference the men of the Carolina Corps during
their initial service with the British in North America. Egerton, Death or Liberty: African Americans and
Revolutionary America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 195.
13

Of course, this was not the case, with the entire unit and their horses evacuating to Saint Lucia and
becoming a part of the Carolina Corps after the fall of Charlestown in 1782. Todd W. Braisted, “The Black
Pioneers and Others: The Military Role of Black Loyalists in the American War for Independence,” in Moving
On: Black Loyalists in the Afro-Atlantic World, John W. Pulis, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999),
23.

7

Caribbean military during the peacetime, advanced their position within a highly
racialized society. This study seeks to place the experiences of the Carolina Corps
alongside those of more oft-written about units in the Atlantic region, to give a more
holistic view of the role of black troops in civil-military relations in the West Indies during
the Revolutionary Era. It shows that the Carolina Corps were more than simply a black
unit within the West Indies. The unit was fundamental to the wider British use of black
troops during the French Revolutionary Wars and later, a conclusion that both expands
and better explains the current historiography on the British military in the Caribbean
region.
Unlike many works on Latin American nations, which focus heavily on society,
most studies that focus on civil-military relations in the British Caribbean adopt a
traditional military history style. This style, heavy on military jargon, troop movements,
maps, and battles, is a top-down approach that often misses the experience of individual
soldiers on the ground. While “Black Men, Red Coats” is indebted to Norman Buckley,
whose work on the West Indian Regiments is heavily cited hereafter, his approach
borrows heavily from the traditional military history approach.14 The present work forms
part of the “new military history,” using a methodology that focuses less on the tactical
movements and deployments of the Carolina Corps, although these will still be included

14

Peter Voelz’s unpublished dissertation is another fantastic source of information, but, like Buckley, Voelz
uses the traditional approach regularly adopted by military historians in the years before the cultural turn
in History. Therefore, while containing interesting information regarding the units within it, there is scant
analysis of civil-military relations. Peter Michael Voelz, “Slave and Soldier: The Military Impact of Blacks in
the Colonial Americas” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1978).

8

where necessary, and more on the socio-cultural impact of the unit.15 In this way, “Black
Men, Red Coats” is not simply a unit history in the traditional sense, but a work that uses
a unique regiment to give insight into the intersection between the military, race, and
society that is currently lacking for the British Windward Islands.
Three main arguments will be advanced throughout the course of the study, while
each chapter will also have its own arguments dealing with the Carolina Corps and its
effect on the British Atlantic world. The first major argument chain seeks to understand
the impact that the Corps had on white attitudes towards the arming of the blacks
throughout their service in the Revolutionary era. This study will show how the men of
the unit substantially changed the perspective of many whites in the British military
through their interactions with officers. This change in perception is best seen in the
evolving positive arguments of whites towards the unit, which was one of the reasons
that the Corps survived for such a long time. It will also show that the white men they
interacted with, particularly their officers, felt honor-bound and compelled by
paternalistic racism to protect the unit, while ironically driving it to the brink of

15

The break from traditional military history has been heralded by scholars who have engaged more
effectively with historical fields. These new military history works, prevalent since the 1970s, have covered
every major global conflict and most new military histories written for an academic audience fall within its
remit. Such works include: James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The American Civil War Era (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1988); John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the
Somme (New York: Viking Press, 1976); Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1976). For military history works more pertinent to this study, and not otherwise cited
within the main body of this study, include: John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the
Military Struggle for American Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); Holger Hoock, Scars
of Independence: America’s Violent Birth (New York: Crown Books, 2017); Daniel J. Tortora, Carolina in
Crisis: Cherokees, Colonists and Slaves in the American Southeast, 1756-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2015); John Whiteclay Chambers, “The New Military History: Myth and Reality,”
Journal of Military History 55, no. 3 (July 1991): 395-406.

9

destruction due to their biological misconceptions regarding black bodies. Ultimately,
however, the influence of the Corps on their white commanders helped to change the
entire makeup of the British Army in the Caribbean.
The second major argument looks at how the men of the Corps interacted with
the people of the West Indies. The unique status enjoyed by the Corps meant that they
negotiated relationships with not only whites in the British Caribbean, but also blacks,
both free and enslaved. This study will show that through their actions and behavior, the
men of the Corps were adept at portraying Britishness in order to advance in white
society. Through their understanding and cultural flexibility, the soldiers also formed
intimate relationships with blacks from various groups throughout the Caribbean region.
Also, it will show how the men of the Corps used their positions within the British Army
to enhance their own social position, and to gain whatever spoils they could from the
establishment for their service, including pensions and enhanced legal standing. Due to
the fluidity of identity within the Caribbean, the men of the unit carved a unique niche for
themselves that allowed them to keep a foot in both black and white society, flourishing
in both as far as their race and status would allow. This position was exceptional in the
British controlled areas of the region prior to the creation of the West India Regiments.
The final argumentative thread looks at the specific impact that the Corps had on
the British military establishment, and particularly their role in the creation of the West
India Regiments. The first two arguments, looking at the attitudes of whites and the
negotiation of identity, converge here, with both combining to create a prevailing attitude
towards the further arming of blacks. The perceived loyalty of the Corps during their long
10

service, and the change in attitudes of whites, meant the creation of a strong faction
advocating the arming of blacks occurred at precisely the time that the British needed
men in the Caribbean region during the French Revolutionary Wars. This study will show
that the Corps were critical to convincing the British high command in London to recruit
further black troops, and that without the unit the creation of the West India Regiments
would have been delayed or might never have taken place. Overall, this study will show
that despite their limited appearance in Caribbean historiography, the men of the
Carolina Corps played a pivotal role as the foundational black unit in a new era of
multiracial soldiering in the British Caribbean.
The component parts that would create the Carolina Corps are frequently
characters in the extensive works on black Loyalists in the American Revolutionary War
released in recent years. While more prevalent in works that focus explicitly on South
Carolina during the war, especially Jim Piecuch’s Three Peoples, One King, the men
evacuated to the Caribbean as the Carolina Corps also make passing appearances in many
other works on the wider black experience in the Revolutionary War.16 As with many
similar works that cover vast topics, the contributions of the various black units are often
amalgamated into a larger synthesis of the black struggle for freedom during the conflict.
By specifically looking at the single regiment that survived the war as a fighting force on

16

Jim Piecuch, Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775-1782
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2008); Alan Gilbert, Black Patriots and Loyalists: Fighting
for Emancipation in the War for Independence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Sylvia Frey,
Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
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the British side, this work seeks to show how the war affected black emancipation on a
more individualized level.17
Arguments rage throughout the historiography of black participation in the
American Revolution about the reasons why the British emancipated slaves during the
Revolutionary War. Some argue that blacks manipulated British commanders to gain their
freedom, speaking with their feet by fleeing to British lines and forcing the situation on
otherwise unwilling British officers. Other historians have seen the recruitment of blacks
as being born out of basic military expediency, the blacks obviously providing the British
with much-needed manpower during the war.18 Both are likely true in different situations
during the Revolutionary War, and certainly affected the history of the Carolina Corps.
The Carolina Corps existed in a truly liminal position within the British Caribbean.
Being the first black peacetime unit in the British Army made them essential for the

17

While the personal histories unearthed by Cassandra Pybus and Maya Jasanoff are amazing to read, it is
important to note that neither track the men of the Corps or the reverse black diaspora that led free people
of color into the Caribbean. Instead, most of their black migrant subjects travel to Sierra Leone, Nova Scotia,
and Great Britain. Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles, American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 2012); Pybus, Epic Journeys of Freedom: Runaway Slaves of the American Revolution and Their
Global Quest for Liberty (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2006).
18

The different perspectives are largely born out of the individual focus of historians. The largest
proponents of the theory that slaves used the Revolutionary War as a mass slave rebellion and thus
manipulated their own freedom are Gary Nash and Sylvia Frey, who specifically looked at the conflict from
the black viewpoint. Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy and Philip D. Morgan in their essay in Arming Slaves
look at the situation from the British standpoint and thus see the recruitment as a purely military move
born out of desperation. Nash, The Forgotten Fifth: African Americans in the Age of Revolutions (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); O’Shaughnessy and Morgan, “Arming Slaves in the American
Revolution,” in Brown and Morgan, eds., Arming Slaves; Edward Countryman, Enjoy the Same Liberty: Black
Americans and the Revolutionary War (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012); Simon Schama, Rough
Crossings: Britain, the Slaves and the American Revolution (London: BBC Books, 2005).
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defense of the Windward Islands from enemies, both foreign and domestic. 19 This role
gave them an elevated position within black society in the eyes of whites, but it also
created levels of difference between the unit and their fellow black islanders. Such a
societal position could only exist in the unique conditions provided by the hybridity of
cultures caused by the geographic isolation of the region from the metropole. Put bluntly,
while the white population needed them for protection in the Caribbean, the same unit
would not have survived in any other regions within the British Atlantic. The Carolina
Corps helped ingratiate themselves with white colonists by performing acts of Britishness,
while simultaneously using African survivals to keep from entirely alienating the much
larger black populations on the island. It was also the unique timing of the arrival of the
Carolina Corps, as the first peacetime black unit, before the creation of the much larger
West India Regiments, and during the first major Parliamentary debates on abolition, that
allowed this unique position to occur. Richard White argues that his concept of a “Middle
Ground” could only occur in the pays d’en haut for a short period in the eighteenth
century.20 This study will show that the unique form of social liminality experienced by
19

Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969).
Turner argued that there were three liminal periods: the first stage (separation) requires a group to break
from an earlier fixed point in a social structure. In the case of the Carolina Corps, this break came after their
emancipation from their previous position in bondage. The second stage (liminality), is the one that is the
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the Carolina Corps could only exist in the Windward Islands during the limited period that
the unit existed, based on conditions created by their own entrance into the West Indies.
This unique position could only exist because of the white colonists need for protection,
which trumped their racial biases when judging the men of the Corps. Also, the limited
size of the Corps (roughly 300 men) meant that they were easily hidden from sight by the
British authorities when this was required. Their race, however, did limit their inclusion
into British society, hence creating a liminal space which they were forced to occupy. The
same was also true with the black inhabitants on the various islands. This temporal period
was ended in 1795, when the creation of the West India Regiments meant thousands of
black soldiers entered the British Army. This forced white colonists, and the British
authorities, to make a space for this group of men in society, an accommodation they did
not necessarily need to make previously for the much smaller Carolina Corps.
Due to the lack of sources available in Grenada, this analysis of the Carolina Corps
is largely told using documents written by military officers and the staff of the Colonial
Office at Whitehall. Reading against the grain of the sources, however, allows for an
analysis of the men of the unit itself as many of these official government documents
provide insights into the life and times of the men of the Carolina Corps. Consequently,
while using top-down sources, this work will incorporate the methodologies of most
current cultural histories to view the Carolina Corps from the bottom up. Thus, while few

entered the British Caribbean. Thus, while over a much shorter period, the Carolina Corps found themselves
in a liminal position based on a series of unique factors just as geographically unique societal factors allowed
for the creation of White’s “middle ground.” White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in
the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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words put on paper by members of the Corps survive, those who observed the men,
including their officers, produced more than sufficient documentation to allow for a deep
analysis of the actions and interactions of the men. As well as this, there has been a real
focus on the men of the West India Regiments, with several books written on these units.
While later than the Carolina Corps, it is possible to use some of the experiences of the
West India troops to better understand those of the Corps by using an anthropological
technique known as “upstreaming,” which allows historians to use better documented
periods to cast light on those more difficult to access.21 In this case, the well-documented
history of the West India Regiments will be used to analyze the earlier, but superficially
similar, experiences of the Carolina Corps.
While recent historiographies bring long-neglected subalterns into academic
focus, it is critical to remember that the agency of whites, particularly white men, is also
important. As in this study, it is often only through the writings of these men that the
stories of subalterns may be told. However, they are also often important members of
the story in their own right. This study analyzes the intersection of race by looking at the

21

“Upstreaming” can be used to assess the ways in which the lives of the later West India Regiments
reflected those of the Carolina Corps. As the regiments were in many ways the cultural survivals of the
Corps, and have a much wider literature about them, it is useful to use the later units as a lens through
which to fill in some of the gaps present in the historical record regarding the Carolina Corps. The technique,
coined by William N. Fenton, has been used extensively by anthropologists to study less-documented
groups in history, including many American Indian and African groups. While broadly conceived as using the
present to understand the past, and thus working in the opposite direction to most historians, this study
uses the concepts of “upstreaming,” when used, more narrowly by starting at the West India Regiment era
and working backwards into the Carolina Corps period. A selection of the many studies that use
“upstreaming,” include: William N. Fenton, American Indian and White Relations to 1830: Needs and
Opportunities for Study (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957); John K. Chance,
“Mesoamerica’s Ethnographic Past,” Ethnohistory 43, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 379-403; Kathryn M. de Luna,
Jeffrey B. Fleisher and Susan Keech McIntosh, “Thinking Across the African Past: Interdisciplinarity and Early
History,” African Archaeological Review 29, no. 2,3 (Sept. 2012): 75-94.

15

ways that both races interacted with each other, thus not neglecting the agency of either
party. In this way, this project will emulate John Shy’s A People Numerous and Armed,
which was one of the first works on the Revolutionary War to look at the conflict from a
social, cultural and political angle.22 This dissertation will emulate Shy’s focus on the
entangled societies that the Carolina Corps entered and influenced, revealing the impact
that this unique unit had on a wide swathe of the British Atlantic world.
This dissertation will also draw on the impressive scholarship of Julius S. Scott,
whose dissertation identified the ways that cultural ideas spread throughout the enslaved
spaces of the Caribbean.23 Using Scott, this study will show how the men of the Carolina
Corps were both the facilitators and receivers of ideas regarding British society in the
Revolutionary Caribbean. The Corps used these ideas to develop complex understandings
of their unique situation and to navigate their existence in the region.
Throughout this study, I will be referring to the main regiment studied as the
Carolina Corps. Edward Mathew, Commander in Chief of the Windward Islands,
designated the unit as such several years after their arrival in the Caribbean, in the early
1790s. It was not, however, the only moniker attached to the unit by other officers, or the
politicians in London. As such, the historical record refers to the same unit
interchangeably as the Black Corps, the American Negroes, the Carolina Black Corps, the
Carolina Negroes, in addition to the Carolina Corps. Before the unit’s evacuation to the
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Caribbean from Charlestown and their amalgamation into a single regiment, they were
known as the American Dragoons and the Black Pioneers. These were two separate units,
and their treatment in chapters looking at the Revolutionary War in South Carolina
reflects this. However, in later chapters, the nom de guerre Carolina Corps refers to the
Caribbean unit, as it was the one most frequently used by General Mathew and because
it shows the more liminal racialized status that the group achieved during its service in
the region.
Additionally, some other terms in “Black Men, Red Coats” also warrant definition.
In certain sections, particularly when discussing ethnicity, both the terms whiteness and
blackness will be used. In this context, whiteness is a catch-all term for the societal norms
normally reserved for white people in colonial society. While the lines between racial
groups in the British Caribbean were often ambiguous, as will be seen throughout this
work, there were certain cultural and societal positions, particularly legal ones, which
were largely reserved for the white population. For this essay, it is these positions that
will fall under the umbrella of whiteness, or being white. This is different, however, from
the definition of Britishness, found at the beginning of chapter two, as there was a large
white population in the British Caribbean who were non-British. Like whiteness, blackness
in this case refers to the cultural and societal positions held by the black populations of
the Greater British Caribbean, inclusive of South Carolina. Many African survivals
continued to flourish in the region. Creolization, the mixing of these two cultures, is
featured throughout “Black Men, Red Coats”.
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This dissertation is organized chronologically, with two clear chronological
bookends in 1782 and 1798. The first chapter looks at the creation of the units that would
become the Carolina Corps during the Revolutionary War. Particularly, it will look at the
unique factors at play in the final years of the conflict in South Carolina that led to the
creation of the units. This chapter will show that it was pure desperation on the part of
the British commanders that led to the arming of black troops. It will also contend that a
combination of foresight on the part of the British, and excellent military performance on
the part of the black troops, was equally responsible for the evacuation of the black units
from Charlestown. This chapter also shows how disease, or at least British perceptions of
disease, both helped and hindered the unit throughout its years of service. Smallpox in
South Carolina during the Revolutionary War almost destroyed the unit before its
formation. Finally, this chapter will reveal how concepts of honor on the part of certain
British leaders helped save the troops from a return to bondage.
The second chapter looks in greater detail at the men of the Corps, their ethnic
background, and how they interacted with the local black population. The African
retentions and creolization displayed by the soldiers of the unit will be analyzed to see
how these factors impacted their relationships with other black islanders, both enslaved
and free. The analysis in this chapter includes an exploration of the dynamic relationships
between the men of the Corps and the Black Caribs on Saint Vincent. This chapter will
show that the ethnicity of the Corps, as well as their role as soldiers in a peaceful period,
placed the group in a position between racial groups during their Caribbean service.
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The third chapter focuses on how the men of the Carolina Corps, once
amalgamated into a single unit in the Caribbean, knowingly performed acts of Britishness
to advance in British colonial society. Using the British legal and political systems, the men
of the Carolina Corps leveraged their unique position in colonial society to attain a
position that was normally out of reach for blacks in the region. It also argues that in
choosing to remain in the British military, and in the case of certain troops their
willingness to join the service, the men of the Corps showed considerable agency in their
choice of master. This chapter also looks at the perceptions of the white colonists and
military officers towards the Carolina Corps, particularly in the case of loyalty to the British
Crown. This chapter will show that irrespective of personal loyalty to the British cause,
the unit was loyal, and this imbued the local white population, both civil and military, with
a sense of faith in the unit’s abilities and worth.
The final chapter, the chronological bookend of this piece, shows how the Carolina
Corps were instrumental to the forming of the West India Regiments in 1795. The
significance of the unit on the future incorporation of the blacks within the British military
was its most enduring imperial legacy. Not only were members of the Corps among the
first troops in these later units, but the unit’s excellent performance in the Caribbean
provided the very basis for the West India Regiments. This chapter also challenges the
current historiography of the West India Regiments, which suggests almost universally
that the unit was a product of the French Revolutionary Wars, by showing that Edward
Mathew attempted to enlarge the Carolina Corps into a full regiment before that conflict
even began. With the Haitian Revolution in full flow by 1795, it is highly unlikely the British
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would have adopted the wholesale arming of black units if it was not for the example set
by earlier units, including the Carolina Corps.
The Carolina Corps were a groundbreaking unit in the British military during a
revolutionary era in Atlantic History. This project reveals the complex intersection
between race, the military, and society encapsulated within the experience of the unit. It
will show how the unit helped to completely change British attitudes towards the arming
of blacks in the Atlantic world. Also, “Black Men, Red Coats” shows the astute ways that
the men of the Corps used their military status in the Caribbean to advance societally. In
short, it will show how important 300 ex-slaves were to the armed forces of an entire
empire.
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Chapter 1
“It is surprising the proficiency they have already made”:
The Creation of the Carolina Corps

On June 11, 1782, Alexander Leslie received orders from Sir Guy Carleton, the
British commander in chief in America, to evacuate the coastal enclaves that he still
controlled in the southern mainland provinces of that continent.24 The American forces
under Nathanael Greene had slowly but surely pushed the British from the colonial
heartland to the port cities, where the most powerful navy in the world provided their
only protection against the Patriot onslaught. Into the coastal safe havens poured a
menagerie of British imperial subjects; red coated regulars, Hessian mercenaries, white
Loyalists of every age and gender, and tens of thousands of runaway slaves who had
risked everything for the chance of freedom offered by the British.25 Now, with the fall of
Charlestown and Savannah imminent, the race to find safety on a British transport began.
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The story of the final months of the Southern Campaign of the American
Revolution is one of American success and British defeat. It is also one of new beginnings,
not only for the tens of thousands of white Loyalists who sought new homes within a
vastly diminished British Empire, but also for thousands of slaves. While many bondsmen
confronted the possibility of transportation as the property of white Loyalists, to remain
in perpetual bondage, thousands of others would find freedom in an evolving imperial
experiment.26 Thousands more faced abandonment by their would-be saviors and reenslavement by their Patriot former masters. It was also this crucible of desperate
humanity that led to the formation of the Carolina Corps.
Even more than a narrative of success, victory and new beginnings, however, the
final months of the Southern Campaign is a survival story. This is particularly true for the
runaway slaves, whose entire future seemed to depend on British success, now relied on
the white officers’ sense of justice to survive. Despite their actions for the British cause in
the preceding years, the plight of the formerly enslaved individuals at Charlestown
depended entirely on whether the British would honor their wartime contract with them.
Simply put, the British controlled the ships and in the grand hierarchy of evacuation, the
runaways formed the bottom tier. In these critical months a shift in British policy,
reinforced by the actions of armed slaves, helped change British perceptions towards the
plight of some of the slaves within their enclaves. While thousands of fugitive slaves
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would still face desertion by the royal army in December 1782, this shift allowed for some
who served in the military to escape.27 This chapter will tell the story of this evolution,
and how certain slaves managed to negotiate it successfully.
In his book, Moral Capital, Christopher Leslie Brown argues that, “For too long,
the antislavery movement in Britain has been described as the consequence of shifts in
moral perception, as if the mere recognition of a moral duty must have led men and
women to act.”28 Brown sees an evolution in the minds of whites towards morality
regarding abolition in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, yet it was precisely this
process that developed during the conflict itself, particularly in the final stages of the
British evacuation from Charlestown. White British officers, some of them plantation
owners with large slave holdings, argued for the moral imperative to evacuate at least
some of the slaves to freedom. One focus in this chapter will therefore be the white British
commanders in Charlestown who, in the midst of organizing one of the largest
evacuations in British history, began to have a shift in perception towards the evacuation
of slaves. It is important to make clear from the outset that while this chapter will argue
that certain British commanders began to feel morally compelled through a sense of
contracturalism and honor to evacuate slaves, other motives, particularly military
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expediency and their own paternal, egotistical worldview, also drove them. These were
military men whose main goal was martial success, with humanitarianism a distant
second relative to the plight of slaves, yet these enslaved individuals managed to exploit
this area to ensure their survival after the end of the war.
Brown recognized the moral bind that many British officers felt at the end of the
war towards the slaves they promised freedom too, but he solely casts his focus to Guy
Carleton and the Black Loyalists in Nova Scotia. This chapter will show that while
Carleton’s long shadow spread as far as South Carolina, the officers in the province faced
similar moral dilemmas regarding black Loyalists. Brown argues persuasively that “once
they (Britain) cast themselves as liberators, they became less willing to compromise selfimposed commitments.”29 In this way, Brown shows how British emancipation policy
during the Revolutionary War moved the ministry in London closer to abolitionism, an
argument supported by several other scholars.30 However, by looking almost exclusively
at the actions of the white officers and politicians, the close actions of the black
population is largely hidden from view. This chapter therefore seeks to add to the
excellent scholarship on black Loyalists in the American Revolution by showing how their
actions, in addition to the moral compasses of their white commanders, ensured their
perpetual freedom at the war’s end.
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Juxtaposed to the changing abolitionist perceptions of the British were the
steadfast beliefs of the American conquerors. On the verge of gaining independence and
retaking the colonies that had been under British military control for years, the Patriots
in the south wanted their enslaved property returned to them. Their plan, above all else,
was to retake as many of the slaves who had found refuge within British lines as possible.
Therefore, amid the combat in the final weeks and months of the Southern Campaign,
the focus of the Americans switched from their inevitable military victory, to the
perpetuation of slavery in the new republic.
The final group that will be the focus of this chapter are the most important for
this project, the slaves who would become the Carolina Corps. Caught between an ocean
and a host of vengeful masters, the men relied on a thin red line of British troops to stand
between them and oblivion. However, at this desperate stage of the conflict, as British
defeat seemed unavoidable, the men who would become the Carolina Corps put their
lives on the line to fight for a lost cause. This chapter, then, is truly the story of these men,
their families, and their struggle to survive against ever increasing odds. It was the military
actions of these men who changed the minds of many British commanders towards their
evacuation, and in this mental evolution these formerly enslaved men were sowing the
seeds that would grow into a new era of British military policy in the Greater Caribbean
region.
In Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon suggested that once a black man entered
the white colonial world outside of slavery, as the slaves who escaped to the British lines
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did, “He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness.”31 While this entire project
disagrees with Fanon’s premise that black people renounced their traditions to partake
in white society, it does support the notion that this was how whites perceived them.
Particularly in the slaveholding regions of the southern colonies, and later Caribbean, the
men who made up the Carolina Corps began to appear less traditionally “black” by their
very actions. As the war turned increasingly against them, the white Loyalists from South
Carolina and Georgia were militarily desperate, and thus willing to overlook race when it
came to those permitted to serve in the military. Indeed, with traditional plantation
slavery impossible to continue for most loyalist planters in the final year of the
Revolutionary War in South Carolina, the population intermingled with former slaves in a
much more visible way than before the conflict. No longer was the separation between
the house and field possible. All lived together, all trying to survive in the most trying of
situations. In such a condition both groups could conform to certain racial models at
different times to survive the extreme social situation they found themselves in. White
Loyalists could overlook armed blacks because the fear of slave rebellion was much less
real than the imminent threat of Patriot victory to their property and safety, while blacks
could partake in white culture while still practicing their traditional beliefs out of the view
of their white neighbors. The creolized nature of the southern lowcountry by 1782 would
also have aided in this process. Out of the chaos of Charlestown, the black men who would

31

Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles L. Markmann (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967),
18.

26

form the Carolina Corps got their first taste of the social liminality that they would use to
negotiate their unique positions in the post-Revolutionary War British Caribbean.
This chapter will explore the chain of events that began in 1781, ultimately leading
to the creation of the Carolina Corps. To keep the narrative focused on the men of the
Carolina Corps, this chapter will look entirely at the events of the final year of the war in
the final British bastions in South Carolina and Georgia, around the cities of Charlestown
and Savannah. Thus, while there are references to the Phillipsburg Proclamation and
Dunmore’s creation of the Ethiopian Regiment in 1775, these are narratives that require
their own telling, and that would take away from the important story of the creation of
the Carolina Corps.
In this narrative, these white voices will show how opinion changed within the
British ranks towards how officers viewed black soldiery, contrasting with the solidifying
effect that occurred within the Patriot leadership. This narrative shows change over time,
with the change very much driven by the actions of the black troops within the British
lines. By their very actions during the final years of the war, these black men in red coats
increased their odds of survival and convinced the British high command to create a new
black military unit that would contribute significantly to the evolution of British military
policy long after the final British ship had left Charlestown Harbor in 1782.
Following the chronology that allowed for the creation of the Carolina Corps, this
chapter will begin by analyzing the creation of the Black Dragoons, a unit that was unique
in British service during the Revolutionary War. It will also examine the Black Pioneers,
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the name given to the unit of black laborers who fell under the command of the Royal
Engineers during the war. Interspersed, the opinions, ideals and long-term goals of white
men, on both sides of the conflict will show the mix of emotions that these units
generated in the highly racialized society of the British Empire. These racialized concepts
included ideas of disease, which will be discussed herein to show how important British
understanding of black bodies and ailments played a pivotal role in the creation of the
Carolina Corps. The chapter will end by detailing how and why the idea for the Corps came
into existence.
***
South Carolina was the last place that Benjamin Thompson was meant to end up.
Until the disastrous Yorktown campaign, Thompson was working as an aide to Lord
George Germain, Secretary for the American Department in Whitehall. With the British
facing defeat, Germain had decided to send Thompson back to the colonies from whence
he had come as a loyalist in 1776. Granting him a commission as a Lieutenant Colonel of
provincial troops, Germain ordered Thompson to New York to help in the defense of that
British bastion in the northern colonies.32 Unfortunately, bad weather forced his ship into
Charlestown, where Alexander Leslie capitalized on the situation, ordering Thompson to
take command of the loyalist dragoons in the province. Thus it was that in December
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1781, Thompson took command of the hodgepodge unit, which counted amongst its
number a unit that would come to be known as the “Black Dragoons.”
By December 1781, the British cavalry were the only mobile force of any size left
in South Carolina. Nathanael Greene’s relentless assaults throughout the previous year
had forced the British army from the interior of the colony, and into the defenses around
Charlestown. Now, the cavalry almost exclusively struck out from Charlestown on raiding
sorties to gain supplies or plunder for the Loyalists who sought refuge in the city. The unit
that Thompson inherited was a mixed bag, which he described to Germain as; “Two
strong Troops of Mounted Militia and a Sepoy Troop (Gens de Couleurs) that will act with
us occasionally.”33
The “Black Dragoons” were raised by Leslie at a time when fighting men were in
short supply. In contrast to Charles Cornwallis, who did everything in his power to keep
weapons out of the hands of runaway slaves, Leslie was a man who was willing to throw
caution to the wind. Despite white loyalist opposition to the arming of blacks, he decided
it was necessary to make use of the manpower that he had left to defend Charlestown.34
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The unit was made up largely of South Carolinian slaves who knew the lowcountry region
over which they rode. There is a possibility that some of the men had experience as
horsemen in the colony, although some were likely to be novice equestrians at best.35
Still, their apparent skill as horsemen, whether newly acquired or not, was quickly
apparent to Thompson; “We are out twice a day for Exercise (when we are not obliged to
be out in good earnest) and it is surprising the proficiency they have already made in
Manoeuvring.”36
The men of the black dragoons were soon raiding the lowcountry properties
owned by Patriots both with the larger cavalry force and independently. Many members
of the unit specifically chose to return to their previous plantation homes to take
vengeance on the masters at whose hands they had previously suffered so cruelly. While
led superficially by a white officer, the unit was not a regular one, and thus often rode
into the field with its own black leadership. The freedom felt by the men of the dragoons
must have been euphoric, and within this euphoria the troops sometimes used their new
position to exact revenge on those who had wronged them, or the British cause, in the
past. For example, soon after their formation, in January 1782, the unit was led by another
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runaway slave to the home of a known Patriot named William Mathews. Mathews lived
on his plantation just outside of Charlestown, where they surrounded the building and
threatened to take the life of the occupant. Realizing Mathews to be an invalid and thus
no threat, they decided to let the man live, instead plundering his house for food and
drink before returning to the British lines.37
As a part of the larger detachment under Thompson, the Black Dragoons often
took part in the sorties that marked this stage of the conflict in South Carolina. While
alone, as a troop of between 30 and 50 horsemen, the black dragoons were simply a large
raiding party, as part of Thompson’s larger command they were a formidable foe to the
Continental cavalry and Patriot partisans who roamed the lowcountry.38 In late January,
Thompson took his force on a circuitous 40-mile raid that reached as far inland as the
town of Dorchester. Coming across a Patriot outpost of five men, the British forces quickly
overpowered them, killing or capturing the entire force without loss. During the raid, the
Black Dragoons formed the rear-guard of Thompson’s force, one of the most important
positions in the cavalry formation, showing the trust that he had already placed in the
former slaves.39 It is also important to note that during the incursion into Patriot territory,
Captain Smart, a white officer, took command of the Black Dragoons. It was Smart who
often commanded the unit during their official maneuvers. The January raid was a
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complete success for Thompson, who returned to Charlestown with forage and livestock
for the undersupplied Loyalists. The expedition also proved the worthiness of the black
dragoons as soldiers, as well as giving the unit invaluable combat experience within a
month of their initial formation.
The men of the Black Dragoons had attained a position higher than any other black
unit achieved in South Carolina during the entire Revolutionary War. By day, the men of
the unit had worked as part of a larger cavalry force, ably demonstrating their ability as
traditional horse soldiers. In the evenings, often without the consent of their white
officers, but still well within the remit of their formation, the same men became a terrorist
guerrilla force. No other unit of black men had been so well armed, trained and prepared
for combat as the dragoons were under Thompson. When he left for New York in late
February, however, the men of the Black Dragoons found even more freedom than they
had previously. Well trained and armed, the former slaves gained a fearsome reputation
as an irregular unit. 40
If there was one thing that white Americans feared more than a redcoated soldier,
it was an armed black man. The repugnance felt by Patriots to the possibility of the British
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arming runaway slaves had brought a hornet’s nest down upon Lord Dunmore in Virginia
at the very start of the Revolutionary War.41 The same outrage was felt by the white
planters of South Carolina as the Black Dragoons conducted raids on plantations
throughout the lowcountry around Charlestown, where many of the wealthiest Patriots
had homes. By summer, the unit had become such a threat to the property of white
Patriots that Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a planter and Continental Army officer, wrote
of them: “The black Dragoons which Leslie has around, are daily committing the most
horrible depredations and murders in the defenseless parts of our Country.”42 For William
Mathews, who had first-hand experience dealing with the unit, the fear of them returning
was always at the back of his mind, so much so that he remarked that “I cannot think
myself safe a single night.”43 Indeed, the unit must have had a seemingly immortal feel to
it, for like Xerxes’s unit during the Greco-Persian Wars two millennia earlier, the Black
Dragoons had a seemingly inexhaustible pool from where to replace their losses. By the
time of their first official return in the Caribbean in 1784, the company of Black Dragoons
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in the Carolina Corps numbered 45 men.44 Given that all of the men in the company had
come from South Carolina and that attrition due to the alien climate of the West Indies
killed on average one trooper a month, the return shows how large the unit was when it
left Charlestown despite its wartime losses.
For the Patriot armed forces throughout the South Carolina, the destruction of the
Black Dragoons, one of the few British units still active in combat operations by mid-1782,
became a priority. The famed Patriot militia commander Francis Marion had frequent
brushes with the Black Dragoons throughout the summer and fall of that year. In one
engagement, Marion’s forces came upon a detachment of 26 Black Dragoons and cut
them to pieces.45
Running afoul of Patriot blades was not the only thing that the men of the Black
Dragoons had to be fearful of when it came to confrontation with Marion. In October, the
“Swamp Fox” surprised another detachment of the unit and took several of them
prisoners. It was clear from his response to the capture that Marion, himself a plantation
owner whose slaves had fled to the British lines, saw the skin color of the men first, and
their military rights as a distant second. Instead of treating the black prisoners as
legitimate soldiers, he wrote to the Patriot governor of South Carolina, John Mathews,
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and asked him what he should do with them. Mathews replied that as the men had been
taken under arms “they must be tried by negro law; and if found guilty executed.”46
Despite the risks, the men of the Black Dragoons continued to venture away from
the safety of the Charlestown defenses on a regular basis. In fact, their numbers grew in
the months after their initial training, with presumably untrained men joining the ranks
as replacements. While many joined to get a share of retribution against former masters,
or at least the institution that had enabled their forced servitude, others joined for more
practical reasons. Being part of the Black Dragoons elevated the position of the troopers
within the black population in Charlestown, meaning a steady supply of food and shelter
that most runaways within the enclave simply lacked. The British offer of freedom was
solely that, and the slaves had to find their own ways to survive once within the redcoat
lines. Many resorted to renewed servitude, this time to redcoats in need of certain
services.47 It was freedom, however, which led most of the men of the Dragoons first to
the British lines, and then onto a horse’s back.
As the Patriots tightened the noose around Charlestown, Leslie began to reduce
the number of raids to limit British casualties. The one unit that continued to raid Patriot
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plantations until the very moment of evacuation were the Black Dragoons. The men of
the unit found their raids becoming increasingly perilous as summer turned to autumn in
1782. The dragoons continued to raid despite the threats that they faced from the
increasing numbers of Patriot troops near Charlestown, and it was likely that the unit was
following Leslie’s orders to capture rebel-owned slaves when ambushed by Marion’s men
in October.48 It is unknown whether the men of the dragoons knew what would become
of the slaves who they took to the British lines. Many who had found their own freedom
by joining British raiding parties like their own perhaps believed they were harbingers of
emancipation. On the other hand, as the evacuation got closer, and their own prospects
of withdrawal from South Carolina diminished, they must have realized the British already
had all the troops they needed to defend Charlestown and that any newcomers were part
of an ulterior plan by the British. Even so, the men of the dragoons knew their best chance
of survival rested on their usefulness for the British cause, and thus the raiding continued,
whatever moral conflicts may have arisen within the unit.
As the final months of the British occupation of Charlestown neared, the men of
the dragoons found that their targets also began to shift. The evacuation was one of the
biggest that the British had ever attempted, and if it failed hundreds, if not thousands
were in danger. While Loyalists, slaves, and British regulars had very little hope but for a
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successful departure, one group of British troops felt a better option lay with joining the
victorious American side. The Hessian mercenaries who had formed part of the British
force in South Carolina since the start of the Southern Campaign began deserting in
increasing numbers as fall turned into winter. To stop this exodus, which threatened to
sap the morale of all those remaining in Charlestown, Leslie ordered the Black Dragoons
to capture any Hessians who left the British enclave. Leslie’s resolve was such that he paid
the men of the dragoons two guineas for any deserter they returned to the lines, dead or
alive.49 The success of the dragoons was immediate, with the flow of deserters almost
stopping by the end of October 1782 due to their vigilant, and supposedly ruthless,
behavior. Thanks to the actions of the Black Dragoons, the remaining Hessians would see
the chaotic end of the British occupation of Charlestown first hand.
Unfortunately, regardless of the best efforts of the Black Dragoons, the British
were fighting a losing battle against Greene’s ever tightening noose around Charlestown
throughout the summer of 1782. By the fall, the dragoons rarely ventured more than a
few miles outside of the city, and even then, they ran afoul of Marion’s partisans in
October. The signs were now all pointing to a British withdrawal, and the Black Dragoons
found themselves in a perilous situation: to their front, the men of an army that had
already proved merciless towards them, and to their rear the Atlantic Ocean. Any
elevated position the Dragoons had achieved among their fellow slaves now diminished
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as they dissolved into a black population desperately seeking to prolong their brief
glimpse of freedom.
***
Formed even before the Black dragoons, the Black Pioneers were the first runaway
slaves who the British incorporated into their military machine during the Southern
Campaign. The commander throughout the entire period was the chief engineer attached
to the British Army at Charlestown, Colonel James Moncrief. From a bystander’s
viewpoint, James Moncrief would have seemed to be the last person to have championed
the rights of black troops. Before the war, Moncrief resided in British East Florida, where
he had settled after the end of the Seven Years War as chief engineer of the newlyacquired post at Saint Augustine. While employed in Florida, Moncrief acquired a large
plantation and slaves worth £10,000 in 1776.50 Yet, despite his interwar occupation as a
plantation owner, Moncrief became the most vocal advocate for the evacuation of
fugitive slaves within British service at the end of the Revolutionary War.
Moncrief’s experience commanding a large corps of black pioneers raised from
the large number of slaves who had fled to the British lines during the early stages of the
Southern Campaign in South Carolina and Georgia shaped his opinions. While this may
superficially be similar to the experience of Alexander Leslie, who had also campaigned

50

While Moncrief does not give a specific number of acres or slaves owned, the fact that it amounted to
£10,000 would have made his estate considerable. The valuation may be subjective, however, as it was part
of a compensation claim after the Revolutionary War. An estate of anywhere near this valuation would have
made him one of the larger planters in East Florida during the interwar years. Moncrief, Memorial, ca. 1783,
Moncrief Papers, box 4, Letterbook, Clements Library.

38

for black evacuation due to his experience with armed blacks during the conflict, a deeper
analysis proves this is not the case. Unlike Leslie, whose service in the Revolutionary War
was his first active command and thus provided his first view of blacks as soldiers,
Moncrief had used black troops before. During the British siege of Havana in 1762,
Moncrief served as an engineer at a time when both the Spanish and British used slaves
in a military capacity.51 However, at the end of that action, there was no major call by
Moncrief or any of his fellow officers to free the Caribbean slaves who had fought on their
side.
It is also important to remember that Moncrief met with the black Loyalists in the
southern colonies in a totally different context from those he had met in Cuba. In Cuba,
the composition of the men that the British used were mainly Spanish slaves, to whom
they did not promise freedom. This differed from the slaves who fled to the British during
the Revolutionary War, who the British promised emancipation in return for leaving their
rebellious masters.52 Moncrief therefore began to feel a deep moral obligation towards
his corps of Black Pioneers who, “naturally look up to me for every protection and
Support.”53 Moncrief’s paternalistic attitude towards the black men who served under
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him was one he shared with most British officers with similar commands, and may have
been honed on his Florida plantation even before the war began.
Also unlike Leslie, Moncrief had actively pursued the enslavement of blacks in the
years after his service alongside members of the race at Havana. Therefore, his actions at
the end of the Revolutionary War seem even more at odds with his previous character
than those of Leslie.54 Leslie’s actions were prompted by a combination of moral
convictions, based on contractualism, and military expediency in the wake of Carleton’s
order to create a black unit for Caribbean service. There is no evidence Moncrief
experienced any similar orders that led him to alter his views, and thus it was his
experience with his black troops alone that shaped his actions as the evacuation
approached.
One of the major differences between Moncrief’s experience with black troops in
Cuba and later during the Revolutionary War was the length of time that he served with
them during each conflict. In Cuba, Moncrief’s experience with black troops lasted only
the few months that the siege of Havana took. In the Revolutionary War, Moncrief’s
exposure to black troops through his biracial engineering units was much more extensive.
After serving in the northern colonies at the start of the conflict, where the slave
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population was relatively small, Moncrief was among the first officers sent to Georgia
after the commencement of the Southern Campaign in 1778, becoming the chief engineer
at Savannah. Here, he quickly enlisted blacks to bolster his forces. He recounted this to
Leslie in 1782, remembering the “Negroes who have followed me on every service since
the first period of my Arrival in the Province of Georgia.”55 As Moncrief described in his
appeal to Leslie in September 1782, fugitive slaves became laborers for the engineering
department of the army as soon as the British had arrived in Savannah. Indeed, during
the famous siege of that city in the fall of 1779, the outnumbered British placed muskets
in the hands of these pioneers to help repel the Franco-American assault.56 Despite their
success as infantrymen, the pioneers soon found their muskets replaced by their standard
laborers tools. Regardless of their lack of arms, however, the pioneers often found
themselves on the front lines during the British campaign. For example, during the siege
of Charlestown in 1780, some 154 blacks were members of the Royal Artillery.57 Most of
these pioneers worked on the front lines, constructing the batteries from where the
British heavy artillery could pound the city into submission, and thus often faced the fire
of the Patriot defenders.
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****
The British used the Black Pioneers in such important roles for two main reasons:
necessity and their perceived natural attributes. The necessity to use black laborers came
about due to the shortage of men that the British always seemed to have during the
Southern Campaign. Using the Black Pioneers, particularly to perform fatigue duties such
as the hauling of supplies or the construction of fortifications, freed up white troops for
use on the battlefield or in the many inland garrisons the British established throughout
the southern colonies. In addition to this, the British often found that the black men who
joined them were more likely to survive the humid climate of the colonies due to their
past lives in bondage in the region. This helped to prove British ideas of climatological
racism, namely that blacks survived better in warmer climates than whites, especially
when doing manual labor. Moncrief laid out this point of view in his post-war memorial:
“it was absolutely necessary for the success of the War and for the preservation of the
Lives of the Soldiers in that Climate, to employ a number of Slaves in the different Works
necessary for the Operations and defence of the Army.”58 This idea of black bodies being
different than white ones was not unique to the British, with slaveholders globally using
racism based on emerging sciences to explain their subjection of the race at a time when
moral arguments against slavery were beginning to surface.59
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The British Army’s racialization of disease almost destroyed the Carolina Corps
before its formation, ironically later becoming the unit’s salvation. Smallpox stalked not
only the men of the future Carolina Corps in South Carolina and Georgia, but all runaway
slaves who sought protection with the British. Killing thousands, the malady seriously
disrupted British policy towards slaves particularly during 1780 to 1781, the crucial
moment when the southern colonies were at their most susceptible to British control.
Indeed, to certain British commanders, smallpox threw the entire slave policy into doubt.
Later, it was the British belief in the immunity of black bodies to both fatigue and
mosquito-borne ailments that led to the creation of the Carolina Corps for post-war
service in the tropics.
Unlike the British military, who had faced exposure to smallpox prior to their
arrival in the Americas, the slaves who ran to their lines at Charlestown and Savannah had
no such immunity to the disease. As such, many of those who ran to the British in search
of freedom soon found themselves battling an invisible foe. David George, one of the few
fugitive slaves to leave a written account of his ordeal, explained he ““caught the smallpox
in the fall of the year and thought I should have died,” shortly after his arrival in Savannah
in 1780.60 The British did not know how to respond to the epidemic among the slaves,
which Charles Cornwallis, the commander of the Royal army, feared would spread among
the vulnerable white Loyalists who made up a sizeable portion of his military force. To
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maintain a semblance of order in Charlestown, Cornwallis directed the runaways who
made it to the British lines to a camp on the outskirts of the city. With no fresh water or
adequate shelter, the conditions in the camp soon became squalid. To make matters
worse, as more fugitives arrived, the confined conditions of the slave camp became even
more cramped and pox-ridden. Soon the dead became too many to bury, and so corpses
were moved into the nearby woods and left to nature’s disposition.61 The white
inhabitants of the city, afraid to approach the camp for fear of contagion, watched and
commented on the suffering of the blacks. Plantation mistress Eliza Lucas Pinckney
lamented that “As the smallpox was in the British camp thousands of Negroes dyed
miserably of it.”62
It was into this maelstrom of disease and fear that the men of the future Carolina
Corps entered during the chaotic first years of the Southern Campaign. Boston King,
another slave who fled to the British lines and left a written testimony, provides an
account of how black Loyalists who attached themselves to the army were treated upon
encountering smallpox: “I was seized with the small-pox, and suffered great hardships;
for all the Blacks affected with that disease, were ordered to be carried a mile from the
camp, lest the (white) soldiers should be infected, and disabled from marching…We lay
sometimes a whole day without any thing to eat or drink.”63 This was the kind of
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treatment that befell the afflicted of the Black Pioneers, due to the value differences
placed upon white and black lives by the officers of the British Army. It is important,
however, to mention that King survived due to the benevolence of a white officer whom
he had impressed in his short term of service at Charlestown.
It is almost certain that men from the future Carolina Corps contracted smallpox
at Charlestown. During the siege of the city in 1780, some of the pioneers found
themselves attached to the Royal Artillery. A total of 154 blacks were placed into the Royal
Artillery, yet by late April, less than a month into the siege, fewer than 100 remained fit
for duty. Of these, thirty, or one-fifth of the total number, were suffering from smallpox
specifically.64 It is hard to estimate how many slaves died within British lines due to
smallpox during the southern campaign of the Revolutionary War, but Elizabeth Fenn
suggests that at least 2000 black Loyalists succumbed around Charlestown alone.65
The arrival of smallpox amongst the slaves threw the very policy of sheltering
blacks within British lines into doubt due to the threats it posed to the white Loyalist
population. Henry Clinton wrote Cornwallis a letter on the slave situation, assuring his
subordinate that he would “leave such orders as I hope will prevent the Confusion that
would arise from a further desertion of them to us, and I will consider of some Scheme
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for placing those we have on Abandoned Plantations, on which they may subsist.”66
Clinton’s negative attitude towards black refugees increased as more reached his lines.
He even advised Cornwallis to “make such Arrangements as will discourage their joining
us.”67 Going against his own Phillipsburg proclamation, which was less than a year old,
Clinton now advocated a policy of dissuading slaves from escaping to the British lines.
Cornwallis was just as clinical as Clinton when it came to removing the threat of
smallpox from the white population. In addition to his quarantine procedure at
Charlestown, during the Yorktown Campaign in Virginia, after thousands more slaves had
attached themselves to his army, he engaged in a sinister exchange of letters with General
Charles O’Hara. Encouraging his friend O’Hara to desert a group of several hundred blacks
suffering from smallpox, Cornwallis told him that “we cannot bring a number of sick &
useless ones to this place; some flour must be left for them & some person of the County
appointed to take charge of them.”68 O’Hara protested but was chided by an angry
Cornwallis who described the black Loyalists as “an Evil which not only destroys a great
quantity of Provisions, but will certainly produce some fatal distemper in the Army.”69
It is highly unlikely that the formation of the Carolina Corps would have occurred
had Cornwallis remained in Charlestown, but fate would deliver Alexander Leslie to the
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city. Cornwallis’ early military successes meant that he did not believe he needed black
men to fight, while Leslie later needed as many men as possible to help defend his evershrinking perimeter at Charlestown. Leslie and his subordinates was not only more willing
to use black Loyalists in a military capacity, but rather than see black bodies as a conduit
for disease, as Cornwallis did, they saw black troops as vessels of immunity. Most of the
arguments that surrounded the formation of the Carolina Corps in 1782 related to black
immunity to malarial disease and ability to work in tropical climates. Moncrief, a veteran
of Caribbean warfare, wrote to a fellow engineer that “Should any service be going
forward, in America or the W. Indies, which may require the labour of those people, they
will certainly prove a valuable acquisition to Government, by saving the (white) Troops.”70
This statement reveals that Moncrief was not unbiased in his views of race and, while he
felt a moral contractual obligation to the men under his command, he would much rather
spare white lives at the expense of black ones if necessary. Indeed, mirroring Moncrief’s
beliefs, the entire concept of the Corps had been formed in New York after Carleton
received a letter from General Edward Mathew in the West Indies asking for a unit of
black troops to engage in fatigue duties in the region to reduce mortality among white
troops.71
White officers based their ideas of the British Army on the scientific doctrine of
the time. Dr. William Fergusson, the inspector-general of British hospitals and a veteran
of campaigns in the West Indies, underlines basic British racial understanding towards
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climatology and disease at the turn of the nineteenth century. He wrote of black soldiers
serving in the Caribbean: “he is a child of the sun, the climate is his own, and he is capable
of exertions in it of which we seem as yet to have had but little adequate idea.”72 In his
memoir, published in 1846, well after his service in the West Indies, Fergusson makes the
tacit acknowledgment that medicine had yet to determine a clinical difference between
black and white bodies. It was, however, this racialized idea of disease and climatology
that formed the basis for the creation of the Carolina Corps. Thus, British understanding
of disease played a pivotal role in the early military careers of the men of the Black
Pioneers and Dragoons who would later form the Carolina Corps.
****
While the British paid the men of the Black Pioneers for their service, the fact is
that there were not enough men in the unit to satisfy the full demands of the British
engineering department at Charlestown. While hundreds did join the unit, thousands of
other runaway slaves took up Clinton’s offer and followed whatever employment they
wished within the British lines. This forced Moncrief to rent slaves from Loyalists in the
enclave, likewise employing white overseers from this group, to ensure the construction
of the extensive system of defensive works around Charlestown and their maintenance.73
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The choices made by the black Loyalists under Moncrief’s command were critical
to their commander’s decision making and show the power dynamic did not flow in a
single direction at this stage of the war. The men who decided to take up arms for the
British, or picks and shovels in the case of Moncrief, did so of their own choosing. The
terms of the Phillipsburg Proclamation made it clear that slaves who made it to the British
lines could perform any occupation they chose.74 It is likely that many benefitted from
joining the unit as they were guaranteed clothing, food and a better quality of life than
many of their fugitive counterparts. Self-emancipation was an incredibly dangerous,
albeit courageous, decision even during a conflict where one side offered freedom.
Talking with their feet, the men of the Black Pioneers joined thousands of others in what
was the greatest slave rebellion in eighteenth-century North American history.
The number of Black Pioneers attached to the British army measured in the
hundreds almost from the beginning of the Southern Campaign. While the name of the
unit may suggest that the sole purpose of the men was to only perform labor intensive
pioneer duties, the knowledge and skills of some of the former slaves meant their white
commanders began to use them to perform different tasks. The men who received this
elevation formed a separate artificer unit with the Black Pioneers. As the commander of
the Black Pioneers, one of Moncrief’s major responsibilities was to supply the unit
throughout their service in Charlestown. From his meticulous records, it is clear that the
artificer unit of the Black Pioneers numbered as many as seventy-eight men in the final
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months of the British occupation of Charlestown.75 Extrapolating from the numbers of
men in the later Carolina Corps, this means that the number of laborers in the Black
Pioneers numbered at least 250 by the evacuation of Charlestown.76
Moncrief’s ledger is also revealing for another reason. It notes within its audited
columns not only men, but also women and children. For example, at the start of
December the ledger shows that Moncrief ordered rations given to 11 women and 9
children who were attached in some way to the Engineering department.77 While
Moncrief does not list the occupations that these women and children had within the
department it can be assumed that they served in support roles, perhaps as cooks,
servants and laundresses for the rest of the unit.78 It is also important to note that unlike
the black men in the artificer corps, the women and children served varying lengths of
time with the engineering department. This possibly indicates that the women, children

75
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and men listed in this ledger were slaves who were hired by the Engineering department
from local Loyalists. Otherwise, these part-time workers may simply have gained
employment for short-term, specific jobs from the hordes of runaway slaves, and given
subsistence rations rather than wages for their labor. Due to the lack of information given,
it is impossible to tell whether there were any kinship ties either between the women and
children, or with the men who served in the Black Pioneers. Whoever these women and
children were, however, one thing is clear, none boarded the ships for evacuation to the
Caribbean with the rest of the Black Pioneers when the British abandoned Charlestown
in December 1782.79
The presence of women on the ration list brings into focus the kinship and familial
ties that the men of the Black Dragoons and the Black Pioneers had before the
Revolutionary War. While it is not possible to track the routes and circumstances of the
specific men of these units to the British lines, it is known that slaves often fled their
plantations in family groups. For example, David George escaped to the British lines at
Savannah, Georgia with his entire family in tow.80 It would have been possible for those
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runaways who joined the British military around Charlestown to have continued familial
relationships within the city, with the black troops having free time, especially in the
evenings, to spend with their loved ones. This possibility makes the omission of women
from the manifests of the ships carrying the troops to the Caribbean, and from any
documentation of the later Carolina Corps even more tragic. It may very well have been
the case that in finding freedom for themselves in the Caribbean, the men of the Carolina
Corps had to leave behind their families to the risk of re-enslavement.
Moncrief’s meticulously kept ledgers provide a rich insight into the lives of the
black units he commanded at Charlestown during their active service for the crown. In
December 1781, the men of the Black Pioneers received new blankets, shoes and clothing
from Moncrief, which he paid local Charlestown merchants to furnish.81 The ledger
reveals that the men of the unit received the same sorts of subsistence materials as white
troops in the city, albeit without any uniforms or weapons. By calculating from the
numbers of supplies bought, particularly new pairs of shoes (320), it is possible to
estimate the size of the unit, including its artificer corps. However, while the Black
Pioneers did not receive a formal British Army uniform, the ledger does show that
Moncrief purchased 126 yards of red stroud cloth, along with the coarse material
oznaburgs and welsh plains wool more often associated with slave clothing at the
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period.82 This means that the men likely wore the same color tunics as their white
counterparts, even if they were designed differently and made of far inferior material.83
Simply by wearing a form of the red uniform of the British Army, the men of the Black
Pioneers would have been visibly different than the thousands of other slaves in the
Charlestown enclave, thus giving them a higher standing as evacuation neared (see Fig.
1.1). The black soldiers of the unit wearing red coats thus began a continuous tradition
that would continue in the British Army for over a century.
In addition to the subsistence supplies that the men of the Black Pioneers gained,
the men of the unit also received wages as free men for the first time in their lives.
Depending on the employment that the men had within the unit, the pay that they
received was often similar to that of white laborers within the British lines. For example,
Moncrief noted that the five black waggoneers within the unit received the exact same
pay as the sole white worker within the same employment.84 Of course, such parity in
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Fig. 1.1) A page from the ledger of James Moncrief. Note the ordering of oznaburgs, (Welsh)
plains, and red stroud cloth. The former items were both usual items used to make slave clothing,
but the latter was not. From these well-kept ledgers it is possible to understand much about the
provisioning men of Black Pioneers with while in Charlestown.
the ledger for all the waggoneers. Moncrief, Ledger for pay of Waggoneers, 31 December 1781, Moncrief
Papers, box 1, folder 29.
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wages was absent in most occupations, including the most critical, within the enclave. A
prime example of this is the black boatmen and pilots who were crucial to safe navigation
within the oft treacherous Charlestown Harbor, a haven notorious for its shifting
sandbars. While the waggoneers received a wage equivalent to their white counterparts,
white harbor pilots received more than black boatmen for doing the exact same
job.85Even with pay discrepancies, during their term of service, the men of the Black
Pioneers used their commander to leverage their position within the British lines at
Charlestown. By ably performing their duty, and by showing loyalty to the British cause,
the Pioneers showed Moncrief the worthiness of the unit. Moncrief became so enamored
of his men that in early 1782 he wrote Sir Henry Clinton that “great advantages may be
gained by Embodying a Brigade of Negros in this Country.”86 At this stage, while he had
raised the Black Dragoons, Leslie still had not told Clinton that he had armed the black
Loyalists, and it was still several months before Carleton’s forward-thinking proposal
reached South Carolina. While Carleton based his assessment on climatological racism,
however, there is no hint in Moncrief’s suggestion to Clinton of arming the men for
American service for any reason other than their worthiness as soldiers.
While there is no doubt that paternalistic ideas of race were influential to
Moncrief, his close association with the men meant he felt the same sorts of moral
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obligations towards them that Leslie felt by the beginning of the evacuation.87 However,
it was the actions of the men that most swayed his thinking, as he explained after the
conflict ended: “At the close of the War it was intended to have restored the slaves to
their former owners; but your Memorialist…had been a Witness to the exertions made by
them in forwarding and Assisting the Operations of the Army, and…on that Account could
not but object.”88 Further proof of Moncrief’s attachment to his unit is found in the fact
that while he actively petitioned both Clinton and Leslie to evacuate them, he made no
such remonstrations on behalf of the thousands of other black Loyalists who were soon
to find themselves re-enslaved.89
***
As soon as Leslie had received the orders to prepare for the evacuation of
Charlestown, he began putting the complicated maneuver into motion. However, while
his priority was the evacuation of his troops and the white loyalist population in the city,
he was unable to escape the daily visuals that reminded him of the plight of the thousands
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of runaway slaves within his lines. He wrote back to Guy Carleton within a month of
receiving the orders to abandon Charlestown asking what should happen to the slaves
that the British had offered to emancipate.90 Leslie certainly felt like he had some degree
of moral obligation to the blacks within the Charlestown perimeter, and yet he still
prioritized the white loyalist refugees within the enclave, even when considering the
runaways.
As big a concern for the Loyalists as finding a place on a British ship to escape
South Carolina, was the need to safeguard their property, a fact they made crystal clear
to Leslie. Despite the best efforts of the British authorities in Charlestown to capture and
re-enslave any loyalist-owned slaves that they found seeking freedom within their lines,
this was a forlorn hope. As a result, slaves with owners on both sides of the conflict sought
freedom in the city. Some Loyalists took it into their own hands to regain their property,
sometimes stealing slaves from their fellow Loyalists. Leslie felt the pressure so much over
this situation that he ordered all those who claimed to own slaves to submit lists of them
to the British authorities, who would then resolve disputes among Loyalists.91 That Leslie
was forced to issue such an order shows the sheer chaos that reigned within the British
lines as the evacuation date approached.
Leslie’s attempts to appease his loyal subjects regarding slave property did not
stop with the slaves within his own lines. As the Patriots advanced on Charlestown, they
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seized all loyalist property, both static and moveable, including slaves. Leslie felt it was
his within his mandated powers to get some of this property back for the refugee planters
within Charlestown. Throughout 1782, he sent raiding parties out of the British perimeter
to seize slaves to use as compensation for Loyalists.92 Francis Marion saw first-hand what
the British were doing, and on March 29 he wrote that the British had been “taking all the
negroes” from plantations throughout the lowcountry around Charlestown.93
The one factor that dominated the mind of Alexander Leslie at this stage of the
conflict was the evacuation of his troops, white loyalist refugees and as much of their
property as possible. Still, the free blacks already within his lines did occupy a central
position in Leslie’s mind. He wrote to Carleton in August that he felt a moral obligation to
protect at least some of the runaway slaves who had taken up arms, and could not leave
them “to the merciless resentment of their former masters.”94 The statement to Carleton
shows both that Leslie had begun to desire the evacuation of at least some of the blacks
within the British lines by the later summer of 1782, but also that he was prioritizing those
who had joined the British military.
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Leslie’s prioritization of those armed blacks over the countless thousands of
others who were laboring for the British in Charlestown is unsurprising. He would have
heard reports about the atrocities that the Patriots were committing against his troops,
including his Black Dragoons, and would therefore have been aware that a similar fate
would likely befall all similarly armed blacks whom the Patriots recaptured. As well as this,
the armed units were the ones that Leslie had had the most personal experience with,
and thus he was more inclined to look favorably on their evacuation than the hundreds
of nameless runaways who he saw daily.95
On the opposite side of the field of battle, the men of the Patriot forces closing in
on Charlestown retained their racial feelings towards black slaves. Despite the
experiments in the northern theatre of the war, where regiments openly recruited black
troops, the southern theatre had no such biracial units. This was despite the open
pleading of some officers, most famously John Laurens, who argued that blacks could
serve in exchange for freedom to bring the conflict to a speedy resolution.96 Blacks did
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serve in the Patriot forces during the southern campaign, but their limited number never
came close to matching those of their loyalist counterparts.
With racism still trumping military expediency in the minds of most white Patriot
planters throughout the southern colonies and victory seemingly imminent, the American
military started to focus on how best to secure the institution of slavery in the region.
Outraged by what they viewed as the theft of Patriot-owned slaves by the British forces,
including the Black Dragoons, the Patriots began their own campaign to seize loyalist
property. This was an easy task for the Patriots, who controlled almost all of the colony
outside of the Charlestown enclave, and so could easily confiscate any loyalist property,
human or other, from the region. Indeed, the number of slaves collected was such that
by 1782 the Patriot legislatures of both Georgia and South Carolina offered new recruits
a bounty paid not in cash, but in slaves.97
In the final months of the British occupation of Charlestown, the main objective
of the Patriot governments of South Carolina and Georgia became the re-enslavement of
all the slaves who had run to the British lines. While the Patriots were oblivious to the
details of the British evacuation plan, they were aware that shipments of Patriot-owned
slaves were leaving the harbor, either in British naval service or as compensation to
loyalist slaveholders who had lost property through confiscation. The two sides began to
treat with each other during the fall of 1782, and by October they had come to a tentative
agreement on the issue of Patriot-owned slaves within the enclave. The British agreed to
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return all the Patriot-owned slaves who had not served them in a military capacity, under
the agreement that no harm would come to them for escaping. The Patriots allowed the
vanquished loyalists to leave the colony with any property they had in the enclave,
including chattel, and to collect American debts still owed to them after the conclusion of
the war.98 Nowhere did Leslie attempt to deal with the thousands of non-military runaway
slaves to whom the British had promised freedom. 99 The unfortunates in this group were
forgotten by their would-be saviors, and forced to endure the horror of seeing their fragile
freedom stripped away once the final British vessels left Charlestown Harbor at the end
of 1782.
In the final weeks before the evacuation, conditions in Charlestown became even
more frantic. This prompted further pleas from James Moncrief to Alexander Leslie
relating to the troops under his command. On 27 September, Moncrief wrote to Leslie
that, “I must beg leave to mention, how anxious I am to know the fate of the Unfortunate
Negroes.”100 It is safe to assume Moncrief, as one of the senior British commanders in
South Carolina, had heard about the ongoing negotiations between the British and the
Patriot politicians regarding the fate of the slaves in Charlestown. As such, he specifically
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laid out his concerns by explaining, “Their present situation would not have given me so
much uneasiness, had I not been Authorised…to offer them every Assurance of not being
obliged to return to their former Masters and that they might depend upon me for a
fulfilment of the promises that were made to them.”101 Only a matter of days later, Leslie
stipulated that no slaves who had served the British in any military capacity during the
war would be exempt from any agreement that would have resulted in their reenslavement.
Now that the men of the Black Pioneers were safe from the Patriots as the
evacuation began, Moncrief actively began looking for ways to ensure that his men were
the ones on the ships scheduled to leave Charlestown. In early October, he wrote to his
subordinate, Lieutenant John Wilson, whom he had commanded while at Savannah. In
his letter he specifically asked after the small unit of black pioneers who had been present
in the city during its final evacuation by the British in July 1782. Moncrief enquired about
reports that “a Considerable number of Negros have been sent away from Georgia, to
East Florida at the Evacuation of Savannah, who were employed in the Engineer
department,” before asking Wilson to “Enquire into this matter, and send an exact list of
their number, names, and owners.”102 While Alexander Leslie may have used the list in
his negotiations with the Patriots over compensation claims, it is also likely that Moncrief
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was seeing if the reports on black evacuations were true to judge their feasibility for his
men in Charlestown. In his memorial, written after the evacuation, he makes it clear that
he considered his actions pivotal for the evacuation of the men.103
Whether or not Moncrief was vital to saving the Pioneers, their eventual
evacuation and the subsequent creation of the Carolina Corps is attributable to one man:
Guy Carleton. Carleton recommended in his September letter that Leslie raise a black
regiment in South Carolina and send it to the British Caribbean at the end of the war. For
this purpose, he asked Leslie to establish a unit of at least 200 men who were to serve in
the British West Indies for an undefined period.104 Furthermore, he suggested in the letter
that the men of the new unit would receive six pence a day, only slightly less than the pay
of white regulars in the British West Indies.105 Carleton wanted such a unit due to the
unforgiving climate of the region on white bodies, and because he had personally seen
the usefulness of black laborers while commanding in New York. By authorizing Leslie to
prioritize men capable of military service he saved a minute number of all those blacks in
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Charlestown, while condemning the majority to continued servitude.106 By issuing his
order, Carleton also laid the foundations for the creation of the Carolina Corps.
Alexander Leslie faced a difficult situation by the end of November, with the final
evacuation of Charlestown imminent. While ships had been spiriting away Loyalists,
troops, slaves, and animals from Charlestown for several weeks, he had not tried to
remove his black troops to the Caribbean, as per Carleton’s order. Part of the issue was
logistical; the black soldiers were not his main priority, and so space on ships was
allocated to other people, particularly white Loyalist refugees. The other issue was that,
when combined, the men of the Black Dragoons and the Black Pioneers, including their
artificer arm, numbered well above the 200 men that Carleton authorized for
evacuation.107
A final problem that faced Leslie was to keep his perimeter defended while the
Loyalists and his white troops evacuated Charlestown. In the event, the Patriots were
happy to sit back and have the British leave the city without further violence, but Leslie
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wished to remove the risk of the Patriots striking the British mid-embarkation. He
therefore placed guns in the hands of the Black Pioneers and had these troops provide
the final defense of the city.108 The move to use these men in combat roles could be
viewed as cynical by some, as Leslie may be seen to be using black lives to save white
ones. However, the move also underscores Leslie’s trust in the martial abilities of his black
troops, as their placement and steadfastness was crucial to the success of the evacuation.
The black dragoons and pioneers completed their evacuation in December 1782.
From the list of ships created by the British during this final phase of evacuation, it is
possible to detail some of the movements of the black units as they left Charlestown for
the last time. The men of the Black Pioneers and the Black Dragoons found themselves
combined for the first time as a cohesive unit and embarked to Saint Lucia on the HMS
Symmetry, the second largest ship in the convoy.109 Even given the size of the vessel, the
men lacked much space for a journey that would have taken weeks especially in the harsh
heart of winter. Testament to the rough passage of the troops to their new home in the
British West Indies is the fact that the mounts for the Black Dragoons, on a separate ship,
were all killed or too injured upon their arrival in the Caribbean to be used by the unit.110
Still, the first return of the troops taken after their arrival in Saint Lucia gave the number
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of troops who disembarked as 240 Black Pioneers and 70 Black Dragoons.111 Some 56
women and 20 children also appear on the return, although there is no evidence they
were evacuated from Charlestown, and they fade from the subsequent documentary
record of the unit. It is therefore likely that these were camp followers who attached
themselves to the unit during their one year stay on Saint Lucia.
What the documentary record does not reveal is the emotions that the men of the
Carolina Corps felt as they left South Carolina, for most of them the only home they had
ever known. The lack of documentation makes it difficult to imagine the scenes of the
night before the evacuation, or the fleeting farewells as the men left their friends and
families knowing full well that the odds of ever seeing them again were next to none. It
does not allow us to understand how the men must have felt as they stood aboard the
Symmetry as it passed Sullivan’s Island, the so-called Ellis Island of African Americans,
where their ancestors, and even some of the troops, had arrived in America in chains. The
Carolina Corps may have had its foundations in American slavery, but its members would
make their greatest societal and military contributions as free men.
***
By reliably performing their duty, the blacks who took up arms for the King during
the final two years of the Revolutionary War did much more than gain freedom at the
war’s conclusion. Throughout their period of service, the men of these units displayed so
much martial skill that the commanders of the British Army sought for the continuation
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of such units after the evacuation of Charlestown. From a grander military perspective,
men like Carleton certainly saw such men as resources for use in the British Imperial
machine, making plans to create a regiment without ever seeing the men involved in
realizing such a plan. However, on the more intimate level experienced by the British
officers in South Carolina and Georgia, who had daily interactions with such men, there
was a perceptible shift in the way they viewed them. Indeed, by the end of the conflict, it
was these white men who ensured that the troops of the Black Pioneers and Dragoons
survived.
The men of the black units were not simply pawns in the British strategy in the
southern colonies, however. Their critical usefulness to the British, particularly as the
number of white troops and Loyalists dwindled, made the black troops crucial cogs in the
redcoat machine in the final year of the Revolutionary War in South Carolina. The black
Loyalists made use of this, both negotiating their eventual freedom while also advancing
their position in British colonial society during the conflict. Their negotiation of the
societal space that they carved for themselves in the slave regimes of South Carolina and
Georgia, even during the crises of the final months in these British bastions, proved crucial
to their success in the Caribbean when they formed the Carolina Corps. Just as in their
future careers in the West Indies, the black troops in South Carolina saw how to
manipulate their usefulness to a desperate white population to outweigh the fear that
this group had towards armed black men, and their natural position in colonial slave
society. The men of the Carolina Corps applied their previous experience in South Carolina
to advance in the highly racialized society of the British West Indies.
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Throughout their short history, the men of the Carolina Corps had been both
helped and hindered by the British Military’s understanding of disease. Smallpox had
almost destroyed the unit before it had been created, ravaging the runaway slaves who
reached the British lines around Savannah and Charlestown during the Revolutionary
War. However, As British anxiety towards the disease abated, however, so British military
policy towards slaves shifted. It was ironically disease, or at least the British
understanding of it, which led to the creation of the Carolina Corps. Without the racial
biases regarding tropical diseases and black bodies that pervaded British medical thought
throughout the Revolutionary era, it is doubtful that the men of the Corps would ever
have been evacuated to the Caribbean in 1782.
Ironically, just as the British high command were starting to toy with the idea of
arming black units, even after the cessation of hostilities, the American forces were
drifting even further in the opposite direction. The American political leadership in the
southern colonies tried desperately to avoid schemes that upset the racial order of their
slave regimes, including the arming of slaves and the British plans to grant freedom to
those within their lines. Simultaneously, the armed forces and civilian population saw the
supposed outrages committed by black Loyalists as proof of the vindictive nature of the
race when weaponized, solidifying their own opinions on the future of the race. Indeed,
while their martial prowess saved the black Loyalists who served the British cause, these
exact same actions served to also condemn the majority who the British deserted at the
end of the war to the ever-stricter confines of a racially conservative regime.
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Many studies on the experience of slaves during the Revolutionary War focus on
specific aspects of the conflict and on how African Americans navigated it. This approach
allows for greater depth of analysis on certain aspects, and is not a negative way to
approach the topic. Nonetheless, by failing to see how these various topics align with each
other, and how these effected blacks who sought their independence with the British,
groups such as the Carolina Corps have been largely side-lined in Revolutionary War
historiography. The Revolutionary War was both a slave insurrection and a conflict that
forced the British to adopt measures towards arming blacks that they had seldom used
before. These two concepts were not mutually exclusive; blacks both forced the hands of
the white commanders, who in turn used the new resource they had to try and turn the
tables on the revolting colonists. The black troops in South Carolina exemplify this
situation perfectly, utilizing the unique position that the war created to ensure their
survival.
The situation in South Carolina, especially in the final months of the Revolutionary
War, remains one of the most under-developed areas of study relating to the conflict.
Even those historians who have focused on this region, such as Jim Piecuch, stop their
studies as the British troops sailed from Charlestown. This is understandable; most want
to culminate their works within the confines of the war itself, or to follow the extensive
paper trail left by the black Loyalists who made their way to Nova Scotia and beyond.
However, by neglecting to look at the creation of the Carolina Corps, these scholars not
fully explored how critical the southern campaign of the war was for the survival of the
men who sailed south rather than north at war’s end. It is highly likely that without their
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experiences in South Carolina, the men of the Carolina Corps would not have flourished
as they did in the West Indies.
Likewise, it is easy to neglect the effects that these men had on the white
population around them, in particular their commanders. While some argue that the
results of the Revolutionary War led to the gradual British move towards the abolition of
the slave trade, the planting of the seeds of the movement occurred within the conflict
itself. Men such as Moncrief and Leslie were certainly not abolitionists, but their changing
opinions towards the worth of black men as soldiers reveals an ideological shift in their
perceptions of race, even if only on a small scale. Furthermore, their advocacy for the
further integration of black troops within the British military certainly impacted abolition
as greatly as revolutionary rhetoric and increasing religious opposition to slavery.
Although it was white officers who experienced this evolution in thought, it was the words
and actions of their black troops who guided it. This changing perception of whites
towards blacks because of the arming of black troops did not end in South Carolina in
1782, but continued throughout the tenure of the Carolina Corps in the British West
Indies. This changing perception would ensure the survival of the men of the unit, and
help lay the foundation for British abolitionism in the later decades of the eighteenth
century.
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Chapter 2
“They are particularly formidable to the Charibs and Slaves”:
Racial Fluidity and the Carolina Corps

In 1791, the British Governor of the Caribbean island of Dominica, Sir John Orde,
wrote a desperate note to Edward Mathew, the Governor of Grenada and Commander in
Chief of the British forces in the Windward Isles. In it, he warned that a slave insurrection
could begin at any time and appealed for reinforcements to quell any such rebellion.
Mathew received this letter and responded, both to Orde and to the Colonial Office in
London. Orde no doubt expected to receive reinforcements from one of the white
garrisons in the Windward Islands, yet Edward Mathew chose to send him a detachment
of the Carolina Corps.
In detailing his decision to Lord William Grenville in Whitehall, Mathew explained
the logic of sending the Carolina Corps to Orde’s aid. “In case of an insurrection there or
on any of the Islands, I should rely much on their services, as they are particularly
formidable to the Charibs and Slaves, and much better qualified than Europeans for the
fatiguing duty of searching out the fugitives.”112 Edward Mathew was very aware of the
skills that the Carolina Corps had for hunting down runaway slaves as, by 1791, they had
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been performing the role for the preceding eight years. At a time when slave revolts were
occurring all over the Caribbean and the largest, in Saint Domingue, was only months from
breaking out, it is telling that Mathew had such faith in the Corps that he would make it
his first choice to deal with a slave uprising.
The Caribs that Mathew referred to were also the descendants of African slaves.
He dispatched a group of the Carolina Corps from Grenada to the island of Saint Vincent
to compel the Caribs, the indigenous group who had given the region its name, to obey
British rule.113 Unlike the rest of the Caribs found in the Windward Islands of the
Caribbean, those in Saint Vincent were a mixed-race group descended from relationships
between the local indigenous population and African slaves stretching back for over a
century. The “Black Caribs,” as they were known by the British, were a formidable
adversary and partook in numerous rebellions against European rule, often using imperial
wars to leverage their position with European powers.114
Mathew, who insisted that the Carolina Corps “are more inveterate against people
of their colour, than any other troops,” celebrated the zeal and success that the unit
showed in their adherence to duties such as hunting runaway slaves and policing
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plantations to dissuade slaves from rebelling.115 Of course, further research, and some
common sense reveal that the differences in culture between slaves rendered the men
of the Carolina Corps as distinct from most Caribbean slaves as the British were from their
colonial French adversaries.
This chapter will look at the cultural and ethnic makeup of the Carolina Corps, as
well as the slave populations with whom they most commonly interacted: in South
Carolina, Grenada and Saint Vincent. While individual identities of the men of the Carolina
Corps have mostly disappeared into history, this chapter will show how it is possible to
make deductions about the cultural backgrounds of the men based on well-known data
from the colonies. This will help to explain the complicated position the men of the
Carolina Corps had within British Caribbean society, and how they interacted with
different racial and cultural groups within this society.
While creolization may have occurred to the men of the Carolina Corps in North
America, the unit remained distinct from the creolized societies with whom they
interacted in the Caribbean. Instead, the Corps performed an act of double consciousness:
maintaining their African (or creole) heritage while simultaneously performing Britishness
for their new masters. The Carolina Corps were a great example of the fluidity of identity
that was present in the British Caribbean during this period. Accordingly, their creolization
occurred in a much different way than those of their fellow black West Indians. As such,
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they existed beyond the boundaries of the differing creolized cultures of the British
Caribbean, holding a unique position in the British societies in which they resided.
The first part of the chapter will focus on the ethnic makeup of the men of the
Carolina Corps. While their individual identities remain allusive to scholars, an analysis of
the demographic work of certain historians of the American colonies, including Daniel
Littlefield, Judith Carney, and Peter H. Wood, allows for the making of fact-based
assumptions on the ethnic makeup of this group. A comparison of the known
demographic nature of the British Caribbean will show how the Carolina Corps would
have entered a quite alien world when arriving in the region. This section will thus
examine whether it was the origin or destination that determined the cultural outlook of
the unit.
Exploring the interactions between the Carolina Corps and their enslaved
neighbors on Grenada, their main garrison, shows how the British establishment
attempted to disrupt any interaction between the soldiers of the unit and the plantation
slaves on the island. While this method of interaction control worked to breed animosity
and resentment between the enslaved men of the island and the Corps, it had little effect
in relation to enslaved women. The cultural sensibilities of the free people of color on
Grenada, the majority of whom had migrated to the island from French possessions,
largely kept the Carolina Corps separate from them. Still held outside of white society, the
Carolina Corps thus became truly liminal on Grenada, fitting neatly into none of the legal
or cultural frameworks of British society. While alienating in certain ways, liminality was
not necessarily a bad thing for the soldiers, however, as it allowed them to move between
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the rigid racial and societal structures that existed throughout the British Caribbean in
this era.
The chapter ends by looking at the interactions between the black Caribs of Saint
Vincent and detachment of the Carolina Corps sent there to police them. Within this
dynamic, the Carolina Corps found one of the most similar groups of people to themselves
that the men encountered in the Windward Islands. The Caribs were legally autonomous,
martial, and black. Ethnic mistrust suffused the complex interactions between the Caribs,
the British colonial government on Saint Vincent, and the Carolina Corps. Many of the
later actions of the Carolina Corps drew inspiration from the political maneuvering they
witnessed on Saint Vincent, demonstrating the influence of the Caribs on the unit.
****
South Carolina was the most Caribbean of the mainland American colonies. Not
only was the geography of the colony like that of the Caribbean, but its first permanent
British settlers had arrived from Barbados. The influence of Barbados on South Carolina
was present throughout the early years of the colony’s development.116 Nowhere was
this more evident than in the adoption of its Barbadian economic model, including the
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Barbadian slave code. The rice and indigo plantations that flourished in pre-Revolutionary
South Carolina meant that very quickly the colony had a black majority.117
Evidence suggests that during the colonial era, South Carolina planters were adept
at understanding the ethnicities of the Africans they were purchasing and the skills that
these slaves would possess. Daniel Littlefield was one of the first historians to look in
detail at how South Carolinian planters and thus slave merchants privileged certain
ethnicities of Africans over others. As such, Littlefield noted that certain regions of Africa
were more desirable for slave merchants and their clients than others, based upon
perceptions of passiveness to bondage and physical prowess among others. Littlefield
argued that planters specifically sought slaves familiar with the Carolina staple crops, as
they were eager to increase their yields by using experienced workers. Slaves imported
from Senegambia and the Windward Coast of Africa were the most prized, in both regions
the cultivation of rice was prevalent and performed by those recently enslaved individuals
purchased by merchants for the Carolina market.118
It is thus unsurprising that the largest number of slaves transported from Africa to
South Carolina and Georgia in the twenty years before the start of the Revolutionary War
were from Senegambia, followed by Sierra Leone, with the Windward Coast third on the
list. In fact, almost a third of the slaves imported to these colonies came from Senegambia
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(see Table 2.1). While merchants captured many slaves in the African hinterland, the high
percentage shipped from one region suggests that a large proportion of the cultural
practices retained by the slaves in South Carolina and Georgia would have developed from
a single African region.119
The retention of African culture occurred on the plantations of South Carolina and
Georgia was throughout this period. It is clear from the various regions in which they
originated in Africa that the cultures of enslaved people made them diverse.120 Prior to
1740, most of South Carolinian blacks were African born, and between 1750 and 1775
colonial slave traders imported a further 125,098 slaves into the South Carolina and its
southern neighbor, Georgia.121 While Planters in South Carolina and Georgia, while
predisposed to purchase slaves from specific rice-growing regions of Africa, often could
not wait for ships from these regions to arrive to meet their immediate manpower needs,
and thus transshipped slaves from any colony they could. In many cases, this meant that
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individual or small groups of transshipped slaves found themselves on lowcountry
plantations dominated by a predominate culture practiced by slaves from a single region
of Africa. This led to “social alienation for many captives,” but also led to a more diverse
and, eventually, creolized slave population on certain plantations.122

Table 2.1) Slave ships arriving in South Carolina and Georgia from 1750 to 1775, and their region
of origin in Africa. Data from: slavevoyages.org

Region
of
Embarkation

Slave Number of Slave Ships

Percentage
Imports

Senegambia

118

32.6

Sierra Leone

61

16.8

Windward Coast

43

11.9

Gold Coast

42

11.6

West Central Africa

35

9.6

Other

33

9.1

Bight of Biafra

26

7.2

Bight of Benin

8

2.2

South Eastern Africa

1

0.2
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of

Total

Slave

The methods of creating and running of South Carolina plantations by planters
aided in the creation of new cultures, based on African ones. Most planters subdivided
their vast land holdings, particularly away from the immediate vicinity of urban areas
along the coast. On these smaller lots, worked by smaller groups, slaves could practice
their culture away from the prying eyes of whites.123 The development of the task system
on rice plantations in the colony also meant that slaves had time to not only grow their
own crops but also to practice their cultures in ways that gang worked slaves in other
colonies did not.124 Many slaves, once confined to their subdivision, would very seldom
have interactions with whites, with the odd overseer likely the only one they would see
with any frequency. Most planters lived on larger plantations closer to urban areas and
so the slaves in these areas, with more frequent contact with whites, would experience a
more creolized atmosphere than those away from the coast. Incidentally, it is in
Lowcountry regions along the coast that South Carolina’s famed creole Gullah culture
continues to thrive.
In addition to this, even on larger plantations on which planters themselves
resided, slaves would have little direct contact with whites. This was particularly true
during certain times of the year when planters would escape the sickly climes of their
swampy plantations for the cities of Charlestown or Savannah.125 In these periods, only a
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skeleton crew of whites, normally confined to the overseer and his family, would run the
plantation.
Whites in Southern colonies both feared and nurtured the cultures practiced by
slaves upon plantations. The use of African herbal remedies to cure common ailments
was widespread on plantations. In the early years of the colony, African slaves knew much
more about herbal medicine than their white counterparts. Consequently, many planters
turned to their slaves for such remedies when contagions spread through their
households. Even early white medical practitioners used African botanical knowledge in
their own practice. Alexander Garden, the most well-known physician in South Carolina,
criticized his fellow doctors in 1753 for learning all they knew of the colony’s plant-based
cures from “negro strollers and old women.”126 Despite this, planters were constantly
fearful that their slaves would use their knowledge of botanicals to do them harm. Slave
poisoning was one of the biggest fears of planters and the wider population.127 Thus, a
paradox faced planters: they needed African knowledge of botanicals, yet the same
knowledge could either heal or kill them. Other aspects of slave identity were also subject
to similar suspicion by the white population of the southern colonies.
With the highest proportion of slaves imported from Senegambia in the prerevolution years, it is hardly surprising that this region of Africa produced most runaway
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slaves in South Carolina.128 As most of the rice plantations were in the Lowcountry of
South Carolina and Georgia, and this is was the destination for the vast majority of slaves
of Senegambian heritage due to their knowledge of the crop, it is highly likely a large
number escaped to the British, who occupied the region between 1778 and 1782. Thus,
it is also likely that slaves either from Senegambia or the Windward Coast (including Sierra
Leone), or descended from these cultural groups, made up many of the men of the
Carolina Corps.
As many of the Carolina Corps likely descended from either Senegambia or the
Windward Coast, it is equally likely that most were from the Mande ethnic group. Of this
group, the largest proportion found in South Carolina and Georgia were the Mandinka.129
The Mandinka, though controlling a vast territory in Western Africa, were a divided
people on the issue of religion. Large numbers of those in the eastern areas of the empire,
around modern-day Mali, had converted to Islam from their traditional religions. Muslim
Mandinka tribes frequently raided those who lived in the west of the empire and
maintained their traditional beliefs. Thus, it was these western Mandinka who often
found themselves bound in chains for the New World.130 While creolization certainly
occurred between African ethnic groups upon arrival in South Carolina, Mandinka (and
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more broadly Mande) culture would have been very visible in the colony, and the same
was likely true within the ranks of the Carolina Corps.
In Africa, certain areas of Senegambia were known for their militaristic societies,
and it is thus likely that some of the soldiers of the Carolina Corps had military experience
before the American Revolution. Due to enhanced trade with Europeans, some of these
Mandinka may have even used guns before being enslaved.131 The actions of the slaves
taking up arms in rebellion against their former masters during the Revolution may be
explained, or at least better understood, when it is taken into consideration that
Senegambia had the largest incidence of slave rebellion of all the regions of West
Africa.132 It is probable, therefore, that the ranks of the Carolina Corps may have provided
a familiar military setting for some of the former slaves who were well-versed in military
tactics and proficiencies before they even left Africa.133
Whether largely Mandinka or more creolized, the men of the Carolina Corps were
culturally distinct from the slaves and free blacks they interacted with in the British
Caribbean. The men of the Carolina Corps no doubt received the moniker not only
because of their geographical origins into the British military system, but also because the
unit of men were markedly different from the black peoples of the Caribbean. British
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officers noted this cultural difference early after their arrival to the West Indies. In June
1784, after eighteen months of service in the Caribbean, Major William Chester on Saint
Vincent still referred to the unit as the “American Negroes.”134
The slave importation system of South Carolina and Georgia also contributed to
the ethnic distinctions between the Carolina Corps and those blacks in the Caribbean. The
southern American colonies were part of the intercolonial slave trade between British
possessions within the Greater Caribbean region.135 This trade encouraged the
transshipment of large numbers of slaves from Caribbean islands to South Carolina and
Georgia, along with an even greater number of directly imported Africans. The result was
that, while many Caribbean slaves did arrive in these areas, their numbers were never
great enough to effect changes in the already established slave cultures of the mainland
colonies into which they integrated. This was particularly true because Lowcountry
planters often purchased Caribbean slaves in small numbers.136 However, for the Carolina
Corps, the continued transshipment of slaves between British possessions does provide
an intriguing concept: for a few, service in the Windward Islands meant they were
returning home.
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Most of the men of the Corps had not entered the mainland colonies from the
Caribbean, however, and this meant they were linguistically distinct from the slaves and
freed blacks of the West Indian islands. While few of the men and women transported to
South Carolina and Georgia would have had a knowledge of the English language when
they arrived, necessity to speak a common language would have led to its quick adoption
by most slaves. However, the various ways that Africans retained their identities on
plantations meant that enslaved individuals continued to speak certain African dialects.
The overall result was a linguistic creolization and the creation of the Gullah (South
Carolina) and Geechee (Georgia) dialects. This creole language did not appear overnight,
instead evolving slowly out of the cosmopolitan languages that existed throughout the
region.137 Slaves arriving in the colonies would have learned their first English words in
the form of these pidgin languages. Thus, regardless of whether the men of the Corps had
been born in Africa or within the colonies, most would have had contact with Gullah or
Geechee, and would have had some familiarity with it linguistically.
The speaking of a form of pidgin continued in every British slave colony during the
eighteenth century, but each of the dialects spoken was distinct. 138 Even in British slave
trading posts in Africa, the local slave traders developed their own form of English to
communicate effectively with whites. The variation in pidgin languages came from several
factors, not least the regional origins of the slaves of certain colonies. The languages were
constantly evolving also, changing as the demographics of their geographical regions did
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likewise. The result was that Gullah and Geechee, although linguistically like the pidgin
dialects spoken on the various Windward Islands, was unique to the Carolina Corps in the
region.
The linguistic differences between the Carolina Corps and the other creole peoples
of the Caribbean islands on which they served would no doubt have been an obstacle to
communication with people who were ostensibly like themselves. In the Caribbean, the
Carolina Corps, though based in Grenada, were frequently detached to various other
Windward Islands for short assignments as their services became necessary. This meant
that Corps members would probably have had to learn various regional dialects in a short
amount of time to communicate on a basic level with the black communities on the
islands upon which they were serving. The Carolina Corps did adapt linguistically,
especially on their home base of Grenada, but the group still encountered difficulties due
to the diverse cultural makeup of the Windward Islands (see Table 2.2).
Even having English as a lingua franca would not have solved the communication
issues between the blacks of the Windward Islands and the Carolina Corps. The common
language of the British Empire would certainly mean the two groups, as well as the many
whites who they encountered in day-to-day tasks, would have had a method of
communication. This would have been particularly true in urban areas where more formal
English prevailed; however, on the many plantations of the Windward Islands, where
pidgin dialects thrived, the linguistic barrier would remain. As Table 2.2 illustrates, the
largest importation of slaves to the British Windward Islands came from the Bight of
Biafra, which was itself a linguistically interesting place. In Biafra, Igbo became the
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Table 2.2) Numbers of slave ships arriving in the three main stations in the Windward Islands
where the Carolina Corps served from 1750 to 1783, and their region of origin in Africa. The
“Other” category is given for ships that did not list their region of origin. Slavevoyages.org.

Windward Island

Region of Slave Number of Ships
Embarkation

Percentage
of
Total
Slave
Imports

Grenada

Bight of Biafra

62

23.5

Gold Coast

47

17.8

Windward Coast

34

12.9

Senegambia

31

11.7

Sierra Leone

18

6.8

Barbados

West Central Africa 9

3.4

Bight of Benin

5

1.9

Other

56

21.2

Bight of Biafra

136

20.6

Gold Coast

113

17.1

Senegambia

66

10

Windward Coast

64

9.7

Sierra Leone

48

7.3

West Central Africa 30

4.5

86

Saint Vincent

Bight of Benin

13

1.9

South East Africa

1

0.3

Other

187

28.3

Bight of Biafra

22

32.4

Senegambia

11

16.2

Windward Coast

9

13.2

Sierra Leone

9

13.2

Gold Coast

7

10.3

West Central Africa 2

2.9

Bight of Benin

1

1.5

Other

7

10.3

predominant lingua franca despite the fact that the region had no predominant
centralized empire. Much of the present day Bajan creole language of Barbados has its
origins in the Igbo language, and so it appears that the African dialect remained the
dominant language in at least some West Indian colonies. This differed from the mainland
North American colonies, where creolized languages such as Gullah which was much
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more English-based, were more common.139 This differentiation in localized pidgin
dialects caused the communication problems the Carolina Corps likely faced upon their
arrival in the West Indies.
Without one or two major African cultures dominating West India plantations, the
slave population was easier to creolize then in South Carolina and Georgia, where such
prevalent cultures persisted into the seventeenth century. As Hilary Beckles notes,
“During the eighteenth century, these groups (incl. Ashanti, Ibo, Fanti and Yoruba) rapidly
intermixed, and ethnic divisions quickly became muted.”140 While the Pidgin English
spoken in the islands was like their own Gullah or Geechee dialects, and though they had
likely met Africans from all the regions represented in the Windwards before, the overall
culture was distinct from that of the southern mainland colonies.
****
The Carolina Corps occupied a socially liminal position in the Caribbean because
neither the white nor enslaved populations considered them the same as slaves, but they
obviously were not white. The black troops, entering the Caribbean as freemen and
soldiers, occupied a more intermediary position in the Windwards than they had in the
mainland colonies. On Barbados, the English planters’ decision to use large numbers of
indentured servants during the early periods of colonization aided the creolization of that
island’s population. The English particularly used Irish Catholics as servants, claiming that
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such backbreaking work as creating a cultivated landscape on a tropical island was all such
people were good for.141 Soon, African slaves became the preferred source of labor on
the island, where they worked alongside poor whites before racial slavery dominated. The
result was the widespread interaction, even cohabitation and marriage between poor
whites and black slaves during the foundation era in Barbadian history. Even by the
eighteenth century, poor whites often found themselves living near Barbadian
plantations. Thus, creolization due to direct contact between large numbers of whites and
blacks was greater on Barbados than in either South Carolina or Georgia.
The interactions between the men of the Carolina Corps and the white population
in the West Indies was also considerably different than it had been in the mainland
colonies. The sheer size of South Carolina compared to the Windward Islands, such as
Barbados, meant there could be geographical barriers to socializing between races, with
most poor whites living in urban and upcountry areas rather than near plantations.
Outside of these urban centers, higher property prices driven by the need for plantation
land forced poorer whites out of the rural lowcountry. Colonial charitable organizations
gave the poor whites of South Carolina much greater relief, driven by wealthy elites who
wanted to create a clear socio-economic buffer between the group and slaves.142 In
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addition, indentured servitude was not particularly long-lived in South Carolina, while it
thrived for decades on Barbados. For those who did sign indentures to immigrate to South
Carolina, its size meant those who survived could receive fifty acres of land to sustain
them economically at the end of their contract.143 This was not the case on Barbados,
where many servants on the island found themselves jobless and needing relief at the
end of their indenture period, a position they would pass on to their descendants
throughout the colonial period.144
During his tenure in the West Indies, army surgeon Dr. George Pinckard wrote of
the plight of poor whites on Barbados: “They are descended from European settlers, but
from misfortune, or misconduct, in some of the race, they are reduced to a state far
removed from independence; often, indeed, little superior to the condition of free
negroes.”145 The white elites in South Carolina were more wary of racial integration and
also had the means to avoid it, and thus they kept certain whites poor but separate from
the enslaved population by using their wealth to make race a cultural boundary. Race was
also used as a way of creating social divides between poor whites and blacks in the
Caribbean, although the pocketbooks of the wealthy were wielded much more rarely than
in South Carolina.146
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The muddled racial and ethnic societies of the Caribbean, which allowed the
Carolina Corps to occupy a unique collective space in the region, also created a
complicated dynamic when it came to the unit’s interactions with the free black
population. On Grenada, the Carolina Corps found themselves linguistically and culturally
distinct from this free black population, providing another societal barrier for them to
traverse. While there was a small, well-established free black population on Grenada
when the Carolina Corps arrived in 1784, most of these were of French descent.147 These
free people of color and their former masters made up a large population of Francophone
speakers on the island, which had changed hands between France and Britain three times
in the previous two decades. Few if any of the Carolina Corps had the ability to speak
French before their arrival on the island, and therefore the cultural background of most
of the free people of color on Grenada would have provided a barrier to the unit’s
integration with this group on the island.
The British system of slavery on Grenada freed far fewer slaves than the French
had. Indeed, under British governance from 1783 to 1787, the number of free people of
color on the island fell.148 In 1777, two years before the French captured the island, there
were only 210 free colored inhabitants in Grenada, yet by 1783, when the British regained

147

In 1783, the year before the Carolina Corps arrived on Grenada, 940 of the 1125 free people of color on
the island were of French descent. There were over 25,000 slaves on the island at the time. State of
Grenada, in Mathew to Sydney, 12 April 1788, CO 101-25
148

This was no doubt due to natural decrease in the four years between when the censuses were taken.
The free black population fell from 1125 in 1783 to 1115 in 1787. Mathew to Sydney, 12 April 1788, CO 10125.

91

control, there were five times this number. Therefore, the 300 or so men of the Carolina
Corps, made up almost one-fifth of Grenada’s free black population.
Another barrier to interaction between the free blacks on Grenada was the
property holding status of many of its Francophone members, an economic position
unattainable to most in the Carolina Corps. Grenada was also nearly unique regarding the
positions of authority that free people of color could hold under British rule. An
illustration of the power retained by the group is the conversation that Edward Mathew
had with “Louis La Grenade, a Mulatto of this Colony, of considerable property.” In this
instance, Mathew approached La Grenade, a free black, Francophone plantation owner
in order to employ him as an agent for the crown to recruit his fellow free blacks on
Grenada into the Carolina Corps. Mathew specifically chose La Grenade for the task as
“he has great influence, from his character, property and situation as Captain of a Colored
Company attached to the Saint George’s Regiment.” 149 Despite British wariness of free
blacks, by 1790, the military situation had become such that army officers in the
Caribbean were willing not only to arm them, but also to incorporate them into white
militia regiments.
The Haitian Revolution changed the way the white British population viewed free
people of color on Grenada, but it had very little effect on how they saw the Carolina
Corps. Only eighteen months after Mathew conducted his unsuccessful recruiting mission
with the help of Louis La Grenade, the Grenada Assembly passed “An Act to prevent the
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sudden increase of Free Negroes and Mulattoes,” which regulated the free people of color
on the island while also making it much harder to manumit slaves. The scrutiny of free
blacks on Grenada became so intense in the wake of the violence on Saint Domingue that
in January 1792, the leaders of this group wrote to Edward Mathew to promise their
adherence to the British crown, probably fearing re-enslavement. This was not unique to
free people of color on Grenada, but was witnessed throughout the Caribbean in the wake
of the Haitian revolt. Despite this crackdown on free people of color, the Carolina Corps
escaped what could have been a disastrous situation resulting in their disbandment.
Rather, Mathew expanded the size of the unit in the wake of the Haitian revolt and
recommended making it a full regiment. Part of this could have been due to selfpreservation on the part of Mathew, who may have feared that the Corps would have
revolted upon hearing they were to be disbanded. Nonetheless, The loyal military service
performed by the unit differentiated the men of the Corps in the eyes of its commanders
and the white British population from other free people of color in the region.
Regardless of their communication issues when they first arrived in the Caribbean,
interactions between the free black soldiers of the Corps and the enslaved populace were
frequent. It was also the case that the initial alienation of the Corps due to language and
culture would only have lasted if the men of the unit did not adapt. No doubt after several
years of service in the region, the men of the Corps would have spoken the same pidgin
dialects as the slaves they policed. The frequent encounters of the Corps with enslaved
individuals, both on plantations and in the urban areas of the island, necessitated this
adaptation. It was also common for black men in the service of the military to form
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relationships, both sexual and otherwise, with enslaved women on the islands on which
they served.150
The Carolina Corps had close interactions with enslaved individuals due to the
roles they played in the British military in the Windward Islands, often with mixed results.
Despite the presence of the Carolina Corps’ 300-man strong pioneer and artificer
companies, the derelict state of the fortifications in the Windward Islands meant the
British also rented local slaves to supplement their black labor force. In 1787, acting
governor William Lucas, writing to Whitehall of the need to repair the works above the
principal Grenadian settlement at Saint George, requested “an additional supply of
Negroes if they should be required” to help complete the work.151 The same British Army
engineers who had command over the Carolina Corps would have overseen these hired
slaves, and thus close interaction between the two groups would have been common. It
is also likely that the slaves, whose owners would require compensation in case of injury
or death, received different treatment to the members of the Carolina Corps. 152 It would
not be at all surprising if the slaves resented the status of the Carolina Corps troops and
the variations in the working conditions that existed between the two groups.
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The British commanders actively fostered resentment between the Corps and
enslaved laborers, using it as a tool to keep the two groups from engaging as much as
possible. The easiest way they could do this was to distribute different quantities of
rations and supplies to the two workforces. On Dominica, in 1790, the Adjutant General
of Grenada wrote to his Commissary counterpart on Dominica on this very issue. Upon
hearing that the engineers on Dominica fed the rented slaves the same as the Carolina
Corps, he wrote that Mathew “does not feel himself authorized to shew such evident
partiality to the Colony Negroes of Dominica, as to allow them, and them only, the same
Rations as the Carolina Pioneers, who are to every intent and purpose Soldiers.”153
Mathew ordered the reduction of rations for the hired slaves. Mathew’s orders show the
extent to which Mathew considered the men of the Corps to be British soldiers, differing
entirely from the slaves of the Windward Islands.
The greatest cause of resentment between the Carolina Corps and their enslaved
counterparts was the freedom that the soldiers of the unit had. While being an enlisted
man in the British Army meant an adherence to rules, hard labor, violent discipline for
indiscretions, and the monotony of routine, it was not slavery. At the end of the day, when
hired slaves returned to their plantations or hastily constructed huts near the site where
they worked, the men of the Carolina Corps had leisure time and the money needed to
enjoy it.
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When Guy Carleton originally envisioned the unit in 1782, the men of the Carolina
Corps were to paid sixpence a day.154 The British increased this base salary during the
tenure of the unit in the Caribbean and allowed its supplementation through the
performance of extra fatigue duty. The men of the Carolina Corps had some freedom of
movement at the end of a workday, were given more rations, and received pay for doing
the same work that hired slaves were coerced to do.
As with Mathew’s attempts to keep a noticeable distinction between the men of
the Corps and the general slave population of the Windward Islands, other commanders
tried their best to separate the two groups. The British commanders attempted to
separate the men of the Corps from slaves most frequently by attempting to instill a sense
of pride in the members of the Corps that would induce them to a sense of superiority
over the slaves around them.155 If freedom was not alone a badge of honor, the fact that
the men of the Corps wore the red coats of the British military and carried muskets must
have been a point of pride for them. However, the symbols of their elevated status may
have been a point of honor for the freemen of the Carolina Corps, but they were symbols
of oppression for the plantation slaves that they superintended.
The one group that the British military establishment could not keep the men of
the Carolina Corps from was enslaved women. For all the talk of honor and superiority
that could keep the men of the Corps separate from male slaves, natural feelings overrode
even the strictest orders from commanders. Men from the Corps, living close to a number
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of enslaved women in any of their posts, often sought to form relationships with members
of the opposite sex. Unlike in white British units, where wives of soldiers acted as camp
followers, the British permitted no women to attach themselves to the Carolina Corps
once they arrived in Grenada. Thus, any carnal or romantic relationship between the
enslaved women and the men of the Corps had to be conducted illicitly. In his 1807
account of life in the West Indies, planter Sir William Young was largely dismissive of
concerns regarding the West Indian Regiments, successor to the Carolina Corps. However,
recounting his personal experience, he did suggest “there being no women attached to
these corps, the negro soldiers often intrude upon the plantations.”156 Indeed, it became
a common complaint that the men of the Carolina Corps and later West Indian Regiments
often caused disruption on plantations by impregnating enslaved women or encouraging
them to run away.
The British were not blind to the fact that the armed blacks in their ranks were
involved with enslaved women. In 1796, a colonel of one of the newly formed West Indian
Regiments suggested the importation of women from Africa to marry to the soldiers
“ultimately as a means of economy, their children being trained in the service.”157 It is
clear from such ideas that exposure to the concepts of West Indian plantation slavery
meant British officers began to incorporate them into their understanding of how to
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effectively run black military units. Members of the Corps also solicited the services of the
many black prostitutes who frequented the camps of the British Army. Indeed, the
numbers of prostitutes visiting black units had become so great by 1799 that the President
of the Saint Vincent Assembly suggested the permanent employment of such women in
the camps of the black troops.158 While the attempts of the British to control the sexual
freedom of their black troops were ongoing, the men continued to form relationships that
were more permanent with enslaved women on plantations.
The relationships between black soldiers and enslaved women on plantations,
although officially condemned by the British military, were both a blessing and a curse for
white British society in the Caribbean. On the one hand, the children of enslaved women,
even if they were the product of a liaison with a free-black soldier of the Carolina Corps,
were the property of the plantation owner. Therefore, planters gained more earning
potential through the sexual relationships of their slaves and black soldiers. It may also
have been that free people of color, several of whom owned large plantations on the
islands served by the Carolina Corps, viewed black soldiers more sympathetically. There
was also a predictable benefit for the British military to the intrusion of their black troops
onto plantations. As explained by Sir William Young, the visits of black troops to enslaved
women caused “a growing animosity between them and the [male] slaves.” 159 For the
British, attempting to alienate the slave population from their black troops, soldier-slave
liaisons and relationships must have seemed a blessing. However, this did not allay the
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fears of the planters who saw the dangers of having armed men in close contact with their
male slaves. These planters also feared that “a rising generation of children, born and
remaining slaves, with relation to a soldier-father, might at some time awaken feelings,
and create consequences, endangering the entire colonial system.”160 This stemmed from
the fact that planters feared that armed blacks may spread ideas of freedom and violence
to a slave population that they wished to keep passive. Despite the threats of
recrimination, the black troops of the British Army continued to visit plantations and to
create relationships with the female workers.
****
As socially accepted as the men of the Carolina Corps were, the fact remained that
the British still viewed the men of the unit as anatomically different due to their race. This
difference was not only obvious due to the color of their skin, but also due to the
perceptions that white officers had towards the resilience of black bodies in tropical
climates. As stated in chapter 1, this racial understanding of medicine was critical to the
formation of the Carolina Corps. However, the very biases that gave the men their
freedom would have a catastrophic effect on the unit once it arrived in the Caribbean.
The British lacked basic understanding of the two major tropical diseases that
caused white mortality in the West Indies, the mosquito-borne ailments of malaria and
yellow fever. They understood that black bodies were more resistant to such diseases but
lacked the science to explain the phenomenon. Modern medicine has proven that some
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West Africans are born with sickle-cell trait, a condition that gives a person a stronger
resistance to malaria.161 While disease immunity was certainly a racially stigmatizing
factor in British colonial society, the numbers do suggest that black soldiers were much
less likely to die from tropical diseases than their white counterparts. This was the case
with the Carolina Corps once they arrived in the Windward Islands after the Revolutionary
War (Table 2.3). This was in spite of the British forcing them to work longer hours, and
more strenuously than their white counterparts.
When looking at the numbers of fatalities within the peacetime garrisons of the
Windward Islands it is important to understand the differences between the units that
were present there. The mainstay of the British Caribbean garrisons were the units of
Royal Artillery who manned the coastal fortifications of the various islands. These units,
though numerically small, were stationed in the Caribbean for long stretches of time. As
a result, most underwent the “seasoning” process when first arriving in the region, and
thus had a much lower mortality rate from mosquito-borne diseases than other white
units.162 Also, they were the smallest unit on Grenada, never numbering more than
seventy men.
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Table 2.3) A list of the number of fatalities among troops stationed on Grenada: January 1785 to
January 1786. To put the numbers into context, the Carolina Corps was of comparable to size to
the combined white units on the island during this period.163

Month and Year

Artillery 2nd Battalion, 60th Carolina Corps (Black)
Regiment (white)
4
5

January 1785

Royal
(White)
1

February 1785

0

3

2

March 1785

0

0

0

April 1785

1

4

2

May 1785

0

4

1

June 1785

0

2

2

July 1785

0

3

0

August 1785

0

6

1

Sept. 1785

1

4

1

October 1785

0

1

1

November 1785

0

1

1

December 1785

1

1

0

January 1786

0

0

1

Total

4

33

17
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Of all the British units on Grenada, the ones worst hit by disease were the regular
infantrymen of the 60th Regiment. These men, the remnants of Royal American Regiment,
had been raised in the mainland American colonies during the Revolutionary War, mostly
in regions with lower instances of yellow fever or malaria. Thus, upon reaching the
Caribbean without adequate time to be “seasoned,” they succumbed to tropical illnesses
in droves. The same was true of their replacements, who came from throughout the
British Empire and abroad. It is also important to note that the men of the 60 th Regiment
did not perform the same levels of hard labor on Grenada as the men of the Carolina
Corps did. Therefore, it is likely that most of those who died on the island succumbed to
tropical ailments rather than exhaustion.
The results of the Corps performing fatigue duties were not limited to simply
saving the lives of white troops. Their mere presence, and loyal service, meant the British
had to send fewer white troops to defend the islands. The British high command was no
closer to understanding why, but through their blundering misunderstanding of racial
climatology, they hit on a simple fact: white men did not die in the West Indies if they
were not sent there to begin with. It was an easy equation for the men in London to
explain to Parliament and would be a foundational tool in the creation of the later West
India Regiments.
Whether immune to mosquito-borne diseases or not, the men of the newly
formed Carolina Corps were not resistant to the hard labor and squalid living conditions
they would be subjected to in the British West Indies. In a history of the unit for the
Colonial office, an anonymous author explained the discrepancy in the work between the
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white and black troops on Grenada. They explained that some of the men of the Carolina
Corps had been attached to the white units in his command “to assist in doing the
laborious duties” of the unit.164 This was not an unusual role for blacks in the British Army.
Throughout the colonial period, the British military hired slaves on Caribbean islands to
do such fatigue work on behalf of their white regular units.165 The rationale for having the
Carolina Corps provide most of the hard labor for white units followed the standard
British military doctrine of the time; the author explained the Carolina Corps were “better
able to bear fatigue in that climate.”166 The officer, like Moncrief before him, was clearly
influenced by the racial ideas of British climatological understanding of the time, and the
Carolina Corps paid a heavy price because of it.
Environmental evidence from the South Carolina and Georgia regions between
1750 and 1770, when most of the slaves who would form the Carolina Corps were either
born or arrived into the colony, shows hotter and wetter than usual spring seasons. Such
a climate was the perfect breeding ground for malaria-carrying mosquitos.167 In addition,
the swampy conditions found on the rice and indigo plantations of the southern
lowcountry meant mosquitos were regularly present in the regions. Most slaves would
therefore have been exposed to malaria and yellow fever carrying mosquitos long before
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their evacuation to the Caribbean. The majority of the deaths listed in the regiment were
not the result of these tropical diseases, unlike for their white counterparts. It is more
probable that the British military bias towards hard labor in a savage climate played a role
in their deaths. The men of the Carolina Corps were simply being worked to death.
While Edward Mathew certainly subscribed to the idea that the bodies of his
Carolina Corps were different from those of his white troops, he was pragmatic enough
to know that human bodies can only take so much before total collapse. Like the rest of
his units, the Carolina Corps was given its own surgeon to care for the sick among them.
As well as this, the unit was sometimes removed from Grenada to garrison other islands,
meaning their place as fatigue units was taken by hired slaves.168 Such assignments, while
not periods of leave, would have given the men of the Carolina Corps a short respite from
the torturous fatigue duties they were regularly employed in. Seeing the slow exhaustion
of the men, and the irreplaceable attrition of the unit, Mathew decided to suggest a
change of duty for the men of the Corps in 1790.
Writing to Lord Grenville in the Colonial Office, Mathew suggested he and the
Grenadian Assembly lamented seeing the Corps “applied more to duties of Fatigue, and
laborious Work, than exercised as soldiers.”169 From this point on, Mathew changed the
way he used the men, slowly employing them in more soldierly pursuits, and began to
petition Parliament through the Colonial Office to turn the unit into a full regular
regiment. Part of this was purely utilitarian, as Mathew clearly believed he had the ability
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to train black troops to perform as ably as white ones. Moreover, racism could only
stretch so far in the mind of a military commander who daily saw the suffering of the men
under his command. It seems that at this stage, Mathew, like Moncrief earlier, began to
see the unit as human rather than simply laboring machines and decided to advocate on
their behalf. Unfortunately, the reprieve did not come soon enough to save the nearly
100 men who died because of the inability of their British masters to separate race from
science in the eighteenth century.
****
In October 1790, an advertisement in the New Grenada Gazette, the main weekly
publication in the colony, read: “Deserted from his Majesty’s Troop of Black Dragoons the
12th of July last, William Sawyer, a Private in the said Troop.”170 In its description of the
deserter, the advert notes that Sawyer “speaks the French and English languages
fluently.” Considering that the Carolina Corps had not received new recruits since its
evacuation from Charlestown in 1782, this description provides an insight into the
creolization of the troops. While it is possible that Sawyer knew French before the
Revolutionary War, it is much more likely that he learned the language on Grenada (a
colony so bilingual that the printing of the advertisement took place in both languages).
The desertion of William Sawyer should have been a simple mission for William
Mackrill, the captain in charge of the Carolina Corps’ dragoon company, but it was not.
Sawyer had developed a close connection to the French-speaking district of Grenada,
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known as Marquis. The dragoons were the smallest unit of the Carolina Corps, consisting
of roughly forty men, and so Sawyer’s desertion was obvious to Mackrill. Mackrill knew
Sawyer’s destination enough to publish it in the advert, perhaps because he personally
knew the trooper’s affinity to the area, or because he used threats, bribes, or both to get
the information from one of the other men under his command. Locating Sawyer was not
an easy task, however, and despite the small size of Grenada, the trooper was still in
hiding in October, three months after his original desertion.
Desertion was a rarity among black troops in the British Army, especially when
compared with their white counterparts. While the West India Regiments constituted a
third of the entire British West Indian garrison between 1796 and 1825, only 16 percent
of desertions in the region were by black soldiers. The numbers were equally low in the
Carolina Corps.171 Superficially, the reason so few men deserted was harsh punishment.
Whipping was often a capital punishment in the British Army in the Caribbean, with
sentences of up to 1500 lashes given to deserters, an amount of physical punishment no
man could survive. Another reason may simply have been that the men of the Corps had
once been slaves, and had elevated themselves to a higher position in British colonial
society. Fear of having this freedom removed no doubt stayed many who contemplated
deserting. Sawyer’s at least temporarily successful escape was testament to his previously
cultivated relationships on the French-speaking plantations of Grenada. It would certainly
seem that his assumption of safety at his destination facilitated his decision to run. Most
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black soldiers did not follow Sawyer’s example, however, finding a degree of security and
dignity in crown service that few wished to risk.
While trying, but failing, to stop the Carolina Corps’ immersion in Caribbean slave
cultures, the British also attempted to physically isolate the Corps from white soldiers
during its time in the Windward Islands. On Grenada, the British segregated the Corps
from white troops as much as possible. In the 1792 return of annual expenses for the
Grenada garrison, the military authorities allocated £20 to the “Barracks of Black
Corps.”172 While the Corpsmen would mingle with white troops, the rigid segregation of
races present in the British army of the Caribbean at the time helped limit these
interactions during active duty.
Outside of the controlled confines of Grenada, however, this segregation failed. A
return of the company of pioneers, the largest single body of the unit, showed that in
January 1789, 122 of the 194 men of the Carolina Corps were serving outside of
Grenada.173 The small detachments of Carolina Corps soldiers sent to the various islands
outside of Grenada meant it was impractical for the men to have their own barracks. The
British assigned most of these troops to work as pioneers and laborers for white regular
units on the various British Windward Islands. As a result, most Carolina Corps soldiers
shared barracks with their white counterparts on islands outside of Grenada, leading to
widespread inter-racial communication.
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The British military were not blind to racial interactions in the West Indies and
used Christianity to try to indoctrinate their former slave soldiers into understanding their
new position within colonial society. The British military sought to undermine the
traditional religions of the men, and to “civilize” them with Anglican teachings.174 Another
reason they encouraged Christianity was to create another tangible link between the
black troops and the white men who led them. On Grenada, the Anglican Church baptized
both slaves and free people of color, which was not necessarily the norm on all British
Caribbean islands.
While the British Army certainly attempted to force the issue, many blacks
throughout the post-American Revolution British Atlantic found Christianity
independently of these authoritarian methods. Free blacks in the British Empire often
used religion to advance themselves socially with many using Christian teachings to
express their understanding of their new found liberty.175 For these blacks that came
willingly to Christianity, living within British society helped to facilitate their practice of
the religion. Both Boston King and David George became prominent preachers and civic
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leaders in Nova Scotia, and later Sierra Leone. 176 In the Carolina Corps, a soldier named
Baker became a prominent Methodist preacher among Dominican slaves. Baker achieved
such a level of conversion among the slaves of Dominica that these slaves, in turn,
propagated Christianity on the plantations on which they resided.177 The reverse diaspora
of black Loyalists into the Caribbean at the end of the American Revolutionary War helped
spread Afro-Christianity into the region on a much greater scale than before.178
The men of the Carolina Corps were not mere pawns of the British military system,
and actively used such British machinations as enforced Christianity to raise their status
in British colonial society. For the men, it would have been evident that religion was key
to upward mobility in British society, especially to those soldiers previously exposed to
Christianity on plantations in the mainland American colonies. The soldiers of the Corps,
serving as the police force for plantations in the Windward Islands, may also have helped
to enforce the surface-level crackdown on the practice of traditional African religions
within Caribbean society and observed the distaste that the British superficially had for
such beliefs. As a result, many would likely have kept their personal beliefs hidden to
engage, at least publicly, in the practice of Christianity. They no doubt would have realized
that their freedom only allowed them so much mobility and that more meaningful
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engagement with British society, including the practice of Christianity, would help them
progress as far as white racial prejudice would allow them.
The long exposure to Christianity dictated by British military doctrine did not mean
the religion always replaced the traditional beliefs of the soldiers of the Carolina Corps,
who usually reconciled their former beliefs with new ones. This was not unique to blacks
in the British West Indies but was a staple of slave religion throughout the Atlantic
World.179 In fact, in slave societies, whites often interacted with these creolized religions,
especially when it came to the use of traditional African medications and healing
remedies. This cultural mixing created new religious systems, including Voodoo in Haiti
and Shango in Trinidad.
In public, the practice of Obeah, the alleged traditional African religion of many of
the Carolina Corps troops, was either frowned upon or condemned, but this did not stop
their practicing it in private. The British military did not completely ban the traditional
practices of Obeah, largely because the white officers understood the dangers of
completely forcing the removal of all cultural traditions from their black soldiers. As a
result, the black troops of the British Army practiced a creolized form of religion, based
on their traditional Obeah and imposed Christian beliefs. The British reported that the
Black Rangers, a unit raised only a few years after the Carolina Corps, had “the same
superstition as the rebels, with regard to their amulets of obias making them
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invulnerable.”180 The same situations no doubt occurred with the Carolina Corps
whenever they faced their fellow African descendants in the Windward Islands. While
most creolized religions in the Caribbean formed under Catholic governance, similar
religions also grew on the Anglican islands in the region.181 The creolization of religion was
just one part of the balancing act that the Carolina Corps and the subsequent West Indian
Regiments performed to maintain a transitional position between black and white
Caribbean societies.
****
While the Carolina Corps interacted with enslaved and free blacks across the
Windward Islands, perhaps no more important encounter occurred within the unit than
with the Black Caribs of Saint Vincent. The Black Caribs were a unique society. Descended
from slaves who fled the islands surrounding Saint Vincent and the Indians native to the
island, the Caribs were an astute group who were thoroughly aware of the European
rivalries at play in the Caribbean region. During the American Revolutionary War, the
Caribs “sent their Chief to Comte D’Estaing, then at Martinico, inviting him to an Attack
of the Island.”182 The Caribs of Saint Vincent had been subjects of both French and British

180

Voelz, “Slaves and Soldiers,” 452.

181

Changes to organized religion because of creolization certainly occurred in the Caribbean, where clergy
made changes to traditional Christian doctrine to encompass the wider belief structure of a region
dominated by slavery. Obeahism and Myalism especially affected Christianity in the region. Enslaved
communities did likewise, creolizing different belief structures to create new ones. Sydney W. Mintz,
Caribbean Transformations (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1974), 167-68; Robert F. Thompson, Flash of the
Spirit: African and Afro-American Art and Philosophy (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 17; Sweet, Domingos
Álvares, 59-60.
182

Edmund Lincoln to Lord North, 6 April 1783, CO 260-3.

111

rule, even fighting a prolonged war with the British in the years before the conflict began
on the American mainland.183 The British remained understandably concerned by the
autonomous creole population living on the windward side of Saint Vincent after the
Revolutionary War concluded. The Caribs on Saint Vincent had only recently become a
problem for the British, but the group had occupied the island for over a century before
the British took possession of the island during the Seven Years War. In January 1789,
James Seton, the Governor of Saint Vincent, sent a report to Home Secretary, Lord
Sydney, in which he described the Caribs as “savage People” who were “so extremely
jealous” of British society.184 The British were as afraid of their race and autonomy as they
were ignorant of Carib culture, and thus felt the need to keep a watchful eye on the group.
The reason that the Carolina Corps were in such proximity to the Caribs was the
competing land claims that the group and the British government had for parts of Saint
Vincent. James Seton estimated that some 250 Caribs capable of taking up arms lived in
the area in 1789.185 With the chances of war with France increasing during this period,
Seton was particularly worried about the Caribs making a similar deal with the French as
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they had during the American Revolutionary War, supplying Britain’s colonial adversary
with military aid in exchange for land and commodities. There was another reason why
the British wanted to gain control of the disputed territory on the windward side of Saint
Vincent. Parliament had quickly fixed upon the island as one of the destinations for the
slaveholders of the white loyalist diaspora after the Revolutionary War. About land for
these people, John Graham, the former royal lieutenant governor of Georgia, wrote to
Edmund Lincoln, “I find there are none capable of cultivation, or that would answer the
purpose proposed, excepting the Island of Saint Vincents only.”186 He also made it clear
that the removal of the Caribs would be highly beneficial for this purpose. It was for these
reasons that the Carolina Corps occupied a post at Biabou throughout their tenure in Saint
Vincent.
In asking for the dispatch of a detachment of the Carolina Corps to Saint Vincent,
Lincoln explicitly differentiated the ethnicity of British troops based on physiology. He
wrote to Lord Sydney, the British Home Secretary, that he wished “a considerable part of
the Black Corps would be destined for the service of Saint Vincent, as being now inured
to the climate, & more capable than European Troops of following the Charaibs into their
woody mountains.”187 Unfortunately for him the small garrison he received in 1784 from
Edward Mathew to rebuild the island’s crumbling defenses were hardly capable of
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offensive action against the 3000 to 5000 Caribs who Lincoln estimated lived on the
Windward side of the island.
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Instead, the Carolina Corps began work building a

fortification by the harbor at Biabou, on the border of the contested Carib territory.189
This location meant the Carolina Corps were in frequent communication with the Caribs.
This communication would have a material effect on the men of the Carolina Corps
throughout the rest of its existence.
To modern eyes, it may seem counterintuitive that Edmund Lincoln sent the black
soldiers of the Carolina Corps, who only two years earlier had been slaves, to live near
one of the few fully recognized autonomous black society in the British Caribbean.
However, the racial lens that Lincoln and the entire British military establishment viewed
the Carolina Corps through meant they were the preferred unit to conduct any major
construction project in the Windward Islands. The construction of the key fort at Biabou,
designed to both protect British shipping in the harbor but also suppress any potential
Carib revolt was, therefore, the perfect employment for the Corps. There was another
reason why Lincoln specifically picked the Carolina Corps to be the British unit most
frequently in contact with the Caribs. Requesting a stronger garrison from Edward
Mathew, he specifically wrote that he wanted to counter the threat of the Caribs using
more men of the Carolina Corps “of whom I understand they are extremely afraid,
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knowing they can follow them into their woody mountains better than Regular troops.”190
Thus, for Lincoln, the benefits of the Carolina Corps working on the fort at Biabou
outweighed any disadvantages that could have come from it.
Living close to the Caribs, the men of the Carolina Corps would have had an
opportunity to become familiar with their autonomous culture. A single chief ruled the
Caribs of Saint Vincent, and the group lived in small villages where they worked the land
as farmers. The treaty of 1773, which ceded the northern parts of Saint Vincent to the
group, meant they were not under the direct authority of the British, simply sharing the
island with them. The Carolina Corps would have seen this fully autonomous group and
would have been part of their trading network, as British frontier posts so often were.
This would have shown the soldiers that the Caribs were much more than the “insolent
and restless” people described by Governor James Seton.191
The Caribs were more like the men of the Carolina Corps than their white officers
were or could ever hope to be. In the racialized society of the British Caribbean, both the
Caribs and the soldiers of the Carolina Corps operated in a strange space. Both groups
were legally free, but both found constraints placed on this freedom based on their race
and culture. The Caribs, many of whom had been born in Africa or were first generation
descendants, spoke a strange linguistic mix of French and Arawak-Carib. Some also spoke
English based on the proximity and trade relations the group had with the colonial power.
More in line with the soldiers of the Corps, however, the Carib religion was a creolized
190
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mix of French-imported Catholicism, indigenous Carib spirituality, and traditional African
beliefs.192 Unlike the Corps, the Caribs were under no obligation to conform to the norms
of British colonial society. Thus, some members of the Corps were likely viewed with the
same envy, as the soldiers themselves were by the slaves they often labored alongside.
The rotation of Carolina Corps troops to Saint Vincent exposed a large enough number to
Carib culture to facilitate that society influencing the unit as a whole. At no time did the
detachment of troops on Saint Vincent number less than thirty men, or roughly ten
percent of the entire unit. As well as this, the number increased during periods of greater
tension, or simply at times when the men were more required for labor on the island than
on Grenada.193 The men also rotated between posts and islands by the British military to
keep them from forming too close a connection to the enslaved people they lived beside.
Ironically, this rotation system meant that every soldier of the Corps ended up having
some contact with the Caribs on Saint Vincent, or served alongside someone who had.
This contact soon began to have a detrimental impact on discipline in the Corps’ ranks.
Some members of the Carolina Corps began to desert to Carib territory within
months of their arrival on Saint Vincent. This came as a complete shock to the British
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officers who had thought the Corps completely loyal to the Crown. In August 1784, only
seven months after the arrival of the detachment on the island, the first member of the
Corps deserted to the Caribs.194 With the punishment for desertion to the Caribs almost
certainly the death penalty, the soldier must have weighed up the risks and decided that
life with the Caribs was better than staying with the Corps. This confounded the British
leadership on the island, who believed that the Caribs hated other black groups, their
evidence being a series of Carib raids on white plantations within the disputed territory.
During these raids, the Caribs had destroyed property and killed several slaves. British
officials spoke of the “ill blood thereby occasioned between them & the Negroes.”195
What the British mistook for racial malice against slaves was more likely a form of attrition
warfare adopted by the Caribs, wherein they destroyed all British property to hasten the
Withdrawal of whites from the territory.196 Also in contradiction to these British beliefs,
the Caribs harbored runaway slaves from British plantations, often incorporating them
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Fig. 2.1) A map of Saint Vincent, as the island appeared during the Carolina Corps’ service there.
The black boundary lines mark the mountainous and cultivated lands ceded to the Caribs after
the Carib War in 1773. The red line marks the uncultivated land contested by British settlers and
the Caribs throughout the 1780s. The star marks the fort and port of Biabou, the garrison of the
Carolina Corps. Lines and star added by the author. Byres, John, J. Bayly, and S. Hooper. Plan of
the Island of Saint Vincent laid down by actual survey under the direction of the Honorable the
Commissioners for the Sale of Lands in the Ceded Island. Map. London: S. Hooper, 1776.
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into their own culture. This had been one of the causes of the First Carib War. It also
clearly shows that the perception of plantation slaves as property was not unique to
whites, but existed similarly within the minds of the Caribs who attacked them.
Meanwhile the Caribs treated runaway slaves much more civilly.
The Carolina Corps did not suffer ill effects due to their close geographic proximity
to the Caribs. No open conflict ever broke out between the various groups on Saint
Vincent during the time when the Corps had a detachment there and some soldiers
became enamored with the Carib culture. While only a very small group of Carolina Corps
soldiers took the opportunity of joining the autonomous black community on Saint
Vincent, the interaction of the unit with the Caribs had a profound effect on them and
their service in the West Indies.
****
The Carolina Corps were a truly unique group within British Caribbean society.
They were obviously not white, but neither did they fall into most of the racial
characteristics that the British used to define black society in the region. They were
sometime members of each group, while being alienated from them at other times. The
ethnic makeup of the men, being largely from a single region of Africa or from plantations
influenced by this Rice Coast culture in South Carolina, meant they were ethnically
different from the slaves that they encountered in the Caribbean. Linguistics and culture
kept the Corps separate from the enslaved peoples of the islands where they were
serving, at least when they first arrived. Even though the British tried their best to
exacerbate this separation, the cultural familiarities between the Carolina Corps and their
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enslaved neighbors often became too hard to control. This was especially the case with
women, with whom the Corps created kinship groups. A misreading of the situation on
Saint Vincent by the British in relation to the Caribs also meant that the Carolina Corps
developed relationships with them also.
This chapter has explored the ways in which the Carolina Corps navigated through
the complex racial environment of the British Caribbean. Some of these interactions are
hard to unlock from surviving documents chronicling the unit and the wider British
Caribbean. As a uniquely creolized group in the British Caribbean, the Carolina Corps
retained African identities in certain ways, but also use their learned knowledge of white
British society to progress also in that society. In this way, the Corps’ only major difference
from the creolized slaves they co-existed with was their social standing. The identities of
all groups within the Caribbean, white and black, had become too fluid to tie to any
specific region.
Perhaps more than any other black group in the British Caribbean, the Carolina
Corps were a pure product of a creolized Atlantic society. While the Caribs, obviously a
product of creolization also, stood apart from the British in the Caribbean as an
autonomous entity, the Carolina Corps were a group of creolized men who were actively
engaged with a white society that had taken on aspects of creolization. On the most basic
level, the arming of black men who were former slaves based on ideas of climatology and
the issuing of guaranteed legal rights to them shows how British society in the Caribbean
had begun an understandable shift from metropolitan to creolized thinking. The same can
be seen in the food British people ate, the creolized languages spoken on the islands, and
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the African religious practices used by whites on the islands. O’Shaughnessy writes about
the British Caribbean during this time, “Whites in the British Caribbean were creoles…they
possessed distinctive characteristics in their speech, diet, dress, architecture, values, and
behavior that were peculiar to the Caribbean.”197
The roles that the Corps performed in the West Indies enhanced their integration
within British Caribbean society. As part of the military establishment, they not only
protected the British territories in the region but also safeguarded the institution of
slavery. These both brought them into contact and kept them isolated from the slave
communities they encountered. It was only when they took off their red coats and laid
down their muskets that the men of the Corps could have anything like a natural
interaction with their fellow blacks on the Windward Islands. The very tools brought them
closer to acceptance in white society that alienated them from the black one.
It is important to make clear that the Carolina Corps while performing African
cultural rituals when among the enslaved people of the Windward Islands were likely
performing whichever creolized belief existed in a certain locality. When with their white
commanders and among white society, the men of the Corps reverted to a more British
societal norm. This allowed for the cultural retention of religions such as Obeah, observed
by numerous British officers, while also allowing the men to practice Christianity, at least
publicly. The soldiers of the Carolina Corps were no longer truly African when they left
Charlestown, but a product of Gullah and Geechee culture. Due to their unique position
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in the West Indies, however, the Carolina Corps became culturally adaptive and so could
easily step into the different creolized African cultures practiced by the enslaved peoples
on the different islands where they served. Scholars have long argued about the retention
of African identity within the Atlantic world, yet the Carolina Corps used these retentions
within their creolized existence to flourish in the British Caribbean.
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Chapter 3
“They may always be as much confided in”:
Social Mobility, Loyalty and the Perception of Nationalism; the Carolina
Corps and British Society in the West Indies

On December 11, 1790, something happened in the British Army that had never
occurred before in its illustrious history. That day, Edward Mathew sat down to write Lord
Grenville, the British Secretary of State, regarding the state of the Carolina Corps.
Grenville had asked in a previous letter for an update on the state of the unit, but what
should have been a simple evaluation of the black troops was anything but. The unit had
been declining in usefulness for some years, from “long service, from old age, and from
desease [sic],” as Mathew put it. However, he resisted calls to dissolve the unit, and had
a radical idea for those troops who had served so loyally, but who had reached the end
of their useful lives as soldiers.198 As a quarter of the men were now unable to perform
military service, rather than see them fall into destitution, Mathew suggested a radical

198

Mathew remarked in the letter that 300 men had entered the Caribbean from South Carolina in 1782,
but that number had dropped significantly to some 240 ready for duty. He aired for the first time his desire
to further recruit free blacks to the unit in the same letter. Mathew to Grenville, 11 December 1790, CO
101-31.

123

idea: “on More Mature deliberation, I shall propose some Invalid Establishment, with due
attention to Economy.”199 With the simple suggestion that the men of the Carolina Corps
should receive a pension upon retirement, Mathew elevated them to a financial position
similar to white regular soldiers in the British Army.
Another surprising aspect of Mathew’s petition for a pension for the Carolina
Corps was the fact that the Secretary of State did not immediately dismiss it. Rather, Lord
Grenville wrote back that “Your ideas respecting the disposal of the Invalids belonging to
this Corps will have due consideration, whenever they shall be communicated to me.”200
It is worth noting that while Grenville’s letter contained numerous references to “blacks”
and “negroes,” he did not attach such racial terms to the veterans of the Carolina Corps,
calling them simply invalids, perhaps showing that Mathew’s view of the Corps had also
pervaded the halls of Westminster. Overall, Grenville’s was a surprising response from a
ministry as fiscally conservative as Britain’s in 1790. In the end, the men of the Corps
received their pensions, becoming the first black unit in the British Army to do so and
setting up a system that would continue among free black soldiers in Crown service in the
Caribbean from that point forward.201 The British military establishment, through both
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necessity and expedience, had begun to see the Carolina Corps as soldiers, rather than
simply black men.
It is also worth noting that the men of the Corps received their pensions at a time
when the British needed to ensure their loyalty. The Haitian Revolution had been raging
for two years, and the British faced a stark choice; either disband the unit to ensure they
did not partake in a wider Caribbean revolt, or give the men incentives to remain loyal. In
choosing the latter, the British made the conscious choice to keep the unit intact as a
fighting unit, but also recognized the needs to incentivize later black military service in
some way. The British were forced to employ similar incentives on Cuba during the Seven
Years War, being forced to grant freedom to some slaves to counter a similar offer made
by the Spanish on the island for blacks performing military service.202 Just as the Carolina
Corps needed a specific set of circumstances to be created, so outside circumstances
aided in their achieving certain rights, including their pensions.
As significant as the story of how the Carolina Corps received its pension from the
British military high command is, it is important to understand the actions of those in the
ranks that drove it to fruition. Due to their dispersed location, Edward Mathew would
have received most of his information regarding the Corps from its officers. 203 In turn,
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these officers would have received daily briefings about the rank and file of the unit from
the numerous non-commissioned officers: mostly black soldiers who had risen through
the ranks. As a result, it was largely the reports of black non-commissioned officers that
informed the officers, and eventually Edward Mathew, of the plight of certain members
of the unit. While this does not constitute a direct petition of assistance from the men of
the Carolina Corps to the British military establishment, it does show a tremendous grasp
of the intricacies of the service.
This chapter will explore the ways in which the Carolina Corps interacted with
British society, both civil and military, within the Windward Islands. It will look particularly
at the ways that the Carolina Corps perceived, and were perceived through, the
nationalism of British subjects in the Caribbean. Explaining the power of nationalism,
Benedict Anderson suggested that “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation
that may prevail…the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”204
There was perhaps no greater “imagined community” than the Windward Islands during
the final two decades of the eighteenth century where, despite a diversity in culture and
distance, the people of the British Caribbean clung fiercely to their national identity. The
Carolina Corps certainly entered within this community, but the question is how much of
a part of it did the unit become?

have been able to see only part of the entire force and, due to their often-distant dispositions from
population centers, these interactions would have been mostly sporadic.
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While similarities existed between the lives of slaves and soldiers in the Carolina
Corps, the rights given to the troops elevated their position well beyond what was
attainable by most of those held in bondage. This chapter will argue that the British
military perceived the Carolina Corps as being an integral part of the West Indian
community, while civil leaders were happy to use the troops but never saw them as
anything other than British subjects. These were not advances available to slaves, and
thus while certain conditions between them and the men of the Corps were similar, their
overall experience was very different. For the soldiers’ part, the men of the Carolina Corps
used the systems and protections offered by military service to their full advantage. While
the individual beliefs of the troops regarding their Britishness cannot be assessed using
extant sources, the unit did what it needed to do in order to advance in British Caribbean
society. What was true for colonial Africans in the twentieth century was just as true for
the Carolina Corps in the eighteenth. This chapter will show how the British came to trust
and, in some cases, even admire the men of the Corps due to their apparent adherence
to British sovereign society during their service in the Caribbean. Through their loyal
service, the troops also bolstered British understandings of a new form of imperialism,
one in which subalterns could be used to defend imperial ideals. This would later involve
the widespread recruitment of such groups, and remain the main military tactic of the
British Empire for the rest of its existence.
The soldiers of the unit lived in a unique social positon in the West Indies and the
men of the Corps held a similar station in relation to their national identity. The men wore
the masks of Britishness when it benefitted them, especially through the military system
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on the islands, but could just as easily take them off in private, especially in their
interactions with their fellow black inhabitants. The white settlers of the Caribbean would
have noticed this appropriation, yet still ostracized the unit due to their race. Being a
British subject was different from being white, after all. Perhaps the most interesting
group to analyze relating to this subject are the white officers of the Carolina Corps, who
interacted with the men the most and saw them in their truest form. What they saw must
not have offended or frightened the officers too badly, because almost universally they
supported the retention and later expansion of the unit. By exploring these
entanglements between the Carolina Corps and British Caribbean society, this chapter
will assess the ways in which the unit were treated as, and perceived to be, British subjects
by white elites in the West Indies.
For the purposes of this chapter, being British, or performing Britishness, is the
active engagement, real or perceived, of an individual or group, within British society. In
the case of the Carolina Corps this assessment will include the engagement of the unit
within British society on both a civil and military level. Likewise, this chapter will assess
the Carolina Corps’ engagement with British society both from the point of view of the
British, whose perceptions of the Corps as British was just as important as any actual
affiliation the Corps had to the nation state, and that of the Corps itself. In this way, this
chapter will be able to show both how the British perceived the unit and the actual ways
that the Carolina Corps engaged actively with British society in the West Indies.
The chapter will begin by analyzing the ways that the men of the Carolina Corps
interacted with three different groups of whites: planters, officers outside of the unit, and
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white British regular troops. This began with the initial opposition that the unit faced. It
will then show how certain members of colonial society and the British military used the
unit as a foil to articulate larger grievances towards British administration. Queries and
insults regarding the loyalty of the unit to the Crown often accompanied these attacks on
its character. This section will also look at the legal position that the Corps occupied in
British Caribbean society due to its unique military position in the region.
The focus of the chapter will then turn to how the soldiers of the Carolina Corps
incorporated the ideals of British nationalism and loyalty, so favored by white settlers,
into their public lives to advance within West Indian society. As with so much of the Corps’
existence in the British Caribbean, much of this was a matter of perception among whites
rather than any true account of the units’ emotional attachment to the imperial cause.
This perceived loyalty and nationalism was indicated by the choice of the men to remain
serving in the Corps, or in the case of new recruits from Nova Scotia, to join the unit at
all. The Corps’ integration into British society was facilitated by their increased
interactions with whites, both in the enlisted ranks of the army and in wider West Indian
society. These interactions with white soldiers and civilians will provide the conclusion for
this section of the chapter.
The final section of the chapter shows the impact that the military service of the
Carolina Corps, and the perception of loyalty that accompanied it, had on the British
officers in the Windward Islands. This analysis will show that while calls for the disbanding
of the unit was taking place, particularly in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Haitian
Revolution, the officers of the Corps fought successfully to keep the unit intact. Indeed, it
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will show that through their excellent record of service in the West Indies, the men of the
Carolina Corps impressed their commanders sufficiently that the unit not only survived,
but expanded in numbers even after the events on Saint Domingue. Overall, this chapter
will show that the men of the Corps were aware of all the legal and social rights that being
perceived as a loyal soldier in the King’s army gave them, and that they used these rights
to their full advantage.
****
From the very start of their service in the British military, the Carolina Corps faced
ostracism. In South Carolina, while the military welcomed all recruits to their decimated
ranks in the final year of the war, the main opposition to arming blacks came from loyalist
plantation owners. William Bull, the slave-owning former lieutenant governor of the
province, found the use of black dragoons by the British in 1782 horrifying, due to the
“savage nature” that the black race possessed.205 Men like Bull refused to overlook race
even as Patriot forces were pressing the British into smaller and smaller perimeters
around Charlestown, even though the arming of large numbers of slaves could have been
their salvation.206
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Racial opposition to the arming of blacks was not unique to the British colonies. In
Spanish Mexico, where free colored men had served for decades in the colonial militia,
black troops often faced worse punishments than their white counterparts and verbal
abuse from the white colonial population.207 The biggest cultural split from this was in the
French Caribbean during the Revolutionary Era, as the outnumbered French desperately
raised as many troops as possible to defend their colonial possessions from their imperial
European adversaries. Here, pure pragmatism led the French to abolish slavery to win
over the rebelling slaves on Saint Domingue, with thousands joining the French colors.208
While the British were in just as desperate a situation in South Carolina during the
Revolutionary War, white loyalist opposition meant that it took until late 1781 for the
arming of blacks to begin on a large scale. The Americans facing them were even more
steadfast in their racial convictions, never officially arming slaves south of the Potomac.
The British were very careful in the way they used the men of the Carolina Corps,
often portraying the unit to local plantation owners as little more than governmentowned slaves. Julius Scott described the fear some planters had towards any black who
seemed to exist outside of slavery in the islands: “the persistence of labor mobility called
forth an anguished response from the ruling class.”209 As such, the British kept the unit
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on a tight leash for the benefit of these planters. This had begun in South Carolina, where
most of the unit performed fatigue duties alongside loyalist owned slaves. The unit
engaged in similar tasks after its evacuation to the Caribbean at the end of the
Revolutionary War. This changed, of course, during times of crisis, when the people of the
Greater Caribbean – like white Loyalists in South Carolina – had no problem arming the
Corps. However, during the predominant periods of peace in which the Corps served, the
men were more laborers than warriors.
While the civilian loyalist population may not have been in favor of arming slaves,
the British officers who served in South Carolina saw it as the correct course of action.
While visiting the colony in the winter of 1782, Lord Dunmore, whose plan to arm blacks
in Virginia at the start of the Revolution was laid waste by the ravages of smallpox and
racial animosity of the colony’s planters, argued in favor of the arming of slaves. Dunmore
wanted a force of 10,000 slaves, planning to entice them with a bounty for enlistment
and freedom upon the completion of their service.210 While most other British
commanders were not so ambitious in their schemes to recruit slaves, the raising of the
Carolina Corps occurred during the final years of the conflict.
In the Caribbean, the Carolina Corps faced consistent questioning about their
usefulness and loyalty to the British crown by both white civilians and some remote
members of the British military, many of whom had never seen the Corps in action. Often,
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the criticism aimed towards the men of the Corps had nothing to do with the actions of
the troops. On Dominica, where slave revolts orchestrated by the French planters or
Caribs on the newly acquired British island were never far away, Governor John Orde had
some very strong opinions about the Carolina Corps. In 1786, during a time of unrest on
the island, Lord Sydney, the Secretary of State at the time, wrote to Mathew to suggest
sending a detachment of the Corps to Dominica. Orde suggested he would have already
asked Edward Mathew to send some of his troops to defend the island, “but added to
their being in general lame, infirm … they have lately manifested such a mutinous and
disorderly disposition” so he had decided against the request.211 What is particularly
curious about Orde’s attack on the Carolina Corps was that he had had no first-hand
experience with the men of the unit, which at the time was based only on Grenada and
Saint Vincent. Thus, his fears seem to emanate purely from personal grievances and
underlying white fears of fielding a force of armed black men. Also, Orde is the only person
to mention any form of major disorder within the ranks of the Corps, with neither Mathew
on Grenada or Edmund Lincoln, governor of Saint Vincent, making any such reports.
Finally, Orde’s suggestion that the men of the unit were already lame and infirm by 1786,
within only two years of their arrival in the West Indies contradicts Mathew’s
contemporaneous accounts of the high level of activity performed by the men of the unit.
The truth behind Orde’s open attack against the Carolina Corps had absolutely
nothing to do with the unit itself. For years, Orde had been unhappy with the role that
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Edward Mathew played as commander in chief of British forces in the Windward Islands.
Two years earlier the two men had a quarrel over who had command over the British
military officers on Dominica. The dispute reached such a level that Orde felt it necessary
to write Lord Sydney to assure him that no harm was done to the military establishment
in the region by it.212 This may explain why Orde, who had no experience with the Carolina
Corps, was so hostile to a unit that was really the pet-project of Mathew in the Windward
Islands. It would not be the last time that the Carolina Corps became embroiled in a civilmilitary feud that was not of their making.213
When attacking the Carolina Corps, John Orde decided to question their loyalty,
rather than going after their race. While this may seem surprising it is not when Orde’s
positive position towards the arming of his own slave units on Dominica is considered.
Instead of insulting the unit in a way that might hinder his own schemes towards the
arming of blacks, he decided to raise the specter of disloyalty and mutiny within the Corps.
In addition, he attacked the fact that “as American Negroes” the members of the Corps
were “little calculated to Run over this Rocky Country,” showing his bias in favor of
Caribbean blacks over those from the mainland American colonies.214 Orde therefore
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used the apparent disloyalty of the unit as a method to attack Mathew, and undermine
the credibility of a unit that he had never dealt with first hand.
Ironically, when Orde was eager to get a chance to interact with the unit, Mathew
denied him the opportunity. When a new slave uprising threatened Dominica in 1791,
Orde wrote to the Secretary of State, Lord Grenville, that “I immediately communicated
the News to General Mathew, and repeated the Information at two or three Periods,
begging in each Letter that a Proportion of the Pioneers might be sent to assist the Troops
as none of our Negroes could be depended on.”215 Regardless of whether Mathew
received such pleas from Orde, he refused to dispatch the Carolina Corps to assist him.
Regardless of the ongoing dispute, Orde’s opinion of the Carolina Corps had shifted
entirely in the five years since he wrote his first letter attacking them. He no longer openly
questioned the loyalty of the black troops to the British Crown. In fact, he trusted the
Carolina Corps to remain loyal, asking them to put down a rebellion begun by members
of their own race. Orde, as Mathew had much earlier, now differentiated between the
unit and other blacks in the Windward Islands, and he trusted them to fulfil their soldierly
duty. Perhaps to these officers, more than any other group in the Caribbean, the unit
occupied that low place in British society alongside the white rank and file of the British
Army.
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The geographically small areas where both white and black troops served in the
Caribbean islands meant there was no way to keep the races completely separated. The
British military realized this issue, and even confronted it by insisting that while the races
could serve in a military context with each other, as often occurred when the Carolina
Corps performed fatigue duties for regular white regiments, they were not to interact in
social settings. The most obvious symbols of this strategy in the British Caribbean were
segregated barracks.216 Nonetheless, the freedom granted to the Carolina Corps meant
that their white officers could not completely prohibit the interaction of white and black
soldiers in a social setting, and the most frequent setting for these interactions were the
taverns of the various Caribbean islands.
Rum was both the bane and the salvation of the British Army in the West Indies.
The British used the liquor as a ration, a medicine and a reward to the men of the army,
both black and white, who served in the region. Rum was also the drink of choice of the
servicemen in social settings due to its cheapness, a factor that often led to white troops
becoming addicted to it. The men of the Carolina Corps were as British as any of the white
troops in relation to their consumption of rum. The situation had become so bad by 1787
that Samuel Williams, who governed Grenada while Mathew took leave in England, wrote
to Lord Sydney on the subject. “Your Lordship I am persuaded, will see the Expediency of
keeping the Soldiers as much out of the Town as possible; and the Necessity of depriving
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them of every Opportunity of providing themselves with the new Rum of the Country.”217
The fact that Williams took the step to limit the men of the Carolina Corps from Saint
George, the largest town on Grenada, due to drunkenness shows how “British” the black
soldiers had become regarding their leisure time. The same fears also swirled around the
white troops, among whom alcoholism led to higher rates of mortality, although the idea
of curtailing their freedom of movement was a lot more nuanced.218 One major difference
between the races was that the white officers of the Corps believed their black troops
had a higher tolerance for the liquor than their white counterparts. Roger Buckley
explained the situation thus: “Although rum was served at the mess and canteens…the
black soldier, unlike the white, was not addicted to it.”219 During their service, both black
and white troops partook in each other’s company and the same intoxicating liquors
during their social time. This also shows how the men of the Carolina Corps could use
their perceived Britishness to interact with people of different races to partake in the
most British of activities, drinking. As surreal as it would have seemed to an outsider, by
performing such quintessentially British acts, the Carolina Corps inadvertently
represented itself as British to the white Caribbean population.
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Unfortunately, not all interactions between the men of the Carolina Corps and
their white counterparts were jovial. On Grenada in March 1785, four soldiers of the
white 60th Regiment were court-martialed and found guilty of a capital offence and
sentenced to death. At the very same court session a member of the Carolina Corps was
condemned and suffered a similar fate.220 Whatever the affiliation between the
condemned soldier of the Carolina Corps and the white troops he died next to, he
received the same legal representation as they did. Legal recourse through military courts
was another benefit that the men of the Carolina Corps had over the slaves on the islands
where they served, and further tied them into the fabric of British society.
For all the benefits that came to the men of the Corps due to their military service,
they were far more restrictive than those given to white troops. White regulars lived in
better brick barracks, designed to stop the spread of miasmic diseases via ventilation,
while the black troops lived in wooden structures they built themselves. Ironically, it was
the black troops who built barracks in the West Indies, designing better accommodation
for their white counterparts than they were entitled to use themselves.221 In addition to
better barracks, the white soldiers also earned better pay than black ones. Outside of
regular privileges, white troops were free to live with women in these barracks, with
families of certain soldiers regularly attaching themselves to white units. 222 This was
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something officially forbade for the Carolina Corps, although the men often
circumnavigated the rules by engaging with the opposite sex on plantations, away from
the prying eyes of their officers. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage the men of the Corps
had in comparison to white troops was the manner of work that the men of the different
races performed. The very reason for the creation of the Corps was to provide a fatigue
unit so that white troops could be spared the most strenuous work in the tropical climate
of the West Indies. As such, the men of the Corps performed much harder labor, much
more frequently than their white counterparts did. When placed beside the inherent
racism that pervaded British West Indian society, it is clear to understand why the men of
the Carolina Corps were trapped in liminality during their service in the region.
****
One of the most contentious debates that surrounded the men of the Carolina
Corps was the legal system they fell under. As soldiers, the men of the Corps should have
been subject to British military law. However, the soldiers were not British regulars,
holding only a provincial status. Thus, while in the pay of, and supplied by, the British
government, the Carolina Corps were not full-fledged members of the military
establishment.223 Some colonial governors made the argument that the unit, consisting
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of former slaves, should instead be under the legally administrative regulations of the
colonial police, which in some instances were much stricter on blacks. The debate
between the two groups over the legal standing of black military units continued well
beyond the life-span of the Carolina Corps.224 The various colonial legislatures were
unsuccessful in gaining legal superiority over the Carolina Corps, as the men of the Corps
fell under the jurisdiction of military law throughout their tenure in the West Indies. The
situation was partially resolved in the 1792 mutiny act clarified that any conscript paid as
a soldier must be legally treated as such.225
On Grenada, principal base of the Carolina Corps, the legal situation of the unit
had an easier resolution because Edward Mathew was both commander in chief and
governor of the colony. As such, all Carolina Corps legal incidents, whether judged military
or civil, went to Mathew for final adjudication. While it is unknown whether any Carolina
Corps members ever applied for clemency from Mathew, other slaves and their owners
certainly did. In a 1784 case, two members of the Grenadian legislature recommended
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clemency for a slave convicted of the murder of another enslaved individual, which
Mathew quickly agreed with.226 In this case, as with all royal petitions for clemency,
Mathew had to get final petitions approved by the Secretary of State. The fact that no
such petitions, common in civil jurisdictions, ever made it to Whitehall suggests that
military law largely governed the Carolina Corps.
As with slaves on plantations, the whip dominated the lives of soldiers in the
British military, with the army creating horrific spectacles designed to terrify soldiers from
breaking military codes of conduct. As Roger Buckley describes floggings, “They were
prolonged and emotionally rich rituals of barbaric retribution and salutary terror.”227
Soldiers would march onto the parade ground, or similar open space, form into ranks and
then watch the gory spectacle close-up. In a unit as small as the Carolina Corps, which
never had more than 300 active members in any one place, every soldier would have
known the unfortunate victim of the flogging. By the time of the Carolina Corps’ service
in the Caribbean, the British government had theoretically limited the number of lashes
a condemned man could face but in practice a court-martial could administer any
punishment they saw fit. Sentences of a hundred lashes for trivial offences were common.
Officers could order more, depending on the severity of the crime. The race of the
Carolina Corps, combined with the heightened anxiety present towards blacks in the
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British Caribbean, meant any indiscretion seen as insubordination led to excessive
punishments.228 Thus, the cost of the paranoia of white British society in the West Indies
was often the flesh of black troops.
As awful as the over-zealous flogging of their compatriots must have been to the
men of the Carolina Corps, the British officers of black units found equally degrading ways
to remind the soldiers of the lives in bondage that they had escaped. Some officers rued
the use of violence against black troops, suggesting alternatives to violence when
attempting to enforce British military rules upon the unit. Given that the soldiers of the
Corps differentiated themselves from the slaves they policed in the West Indies by their
military status, British officers often punished the black soldiers by treating those found
guilty of committing indiscretions by removing soldierly privileges. By removing the
weapons of the troops, lessening their rations, and making them perform fatigue duties
like a slave, British officers found they could shame black troops into compliance.229 Of
course, if such non-violent methods failed to achieve the correct result, the officers had
no hesitation resorting to the whip, or even the noose.
****
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While the excellent performance of the Carolina Corps may seem at odds with the
constant threat of violence or dishonor that life within the British military brought, the
soldiers made the choice to accept it. The choice of the runaway slaves from South
Carolina brought with it many hardships, but none were as harsh as their lives under
slavery had been. While the whip continued to dominate their lives, the men of the
Carolina Corps made the conscious decision to choose who was holding it. For all the
dangers and the hardships, the men of the Corps gained much from their service in the
British military: money, a home, food, and that most prized possession of all, freedom.
With their freedom, the men of the Corps could live dignified lives in the British Caribbean,
even into their retirement with the assistance afforded by their pensions. While it is
certainly true that the men of the unit lived lives that mirrored the slaves within the
institution they helped to enforce, the freedom they gained from it gave them choices
that those enslaved plantation workers never enjoyed. This freedom allowed them to
pivot towards a British identity, and thus that of a freeman, in a way that slaves simply
could not. Thus, while slaves may have held a position as British subjects, they could not
access and engage with British society in the ways that the soldiers could because of their
status as freed persons.
The Carolina Corps were perfectly aware of how their superiors viewed them and
thus were very protective of their rights as soldiers. The men knew their rights to food,
accommodation and above all pay, and they knew how to work the system to their
advantage if the need arose. One such example of this was in 1785 when, after being in
the region over a year, the Carolina Corps troops began to vocalize their disapproval at
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their lack of regular pay. The matter became so pressing that Edward Mathew wrote to
London for permission to appoint Hubert Von Hamel as paymaster for the unit to ensure
that the soldiers were given their pay “with the same regularity as any other in His
Majesty’s Service.”230 This incident may have been the basis for John Orde’s criticism of
the unit’s discipline, although the affair never reached the level of severity that he
suggested. After the appointment of Von Hamel the subject of ill-supply never reached
the same heatedness as it did in 1785. By vocalizing their displeasure at their situation,
the men of the Carolina Corps used their collective bargaining power to achieve positive
change.
The men of the Carolina Corps had the opportunity to choose their master in a
way that most blacks in the racialized world of the British Atlantic never did. Some, of
course, wanted neither a planter nor an officer as a master and so chose to desert to the
Maroon colonies or plantations near to their bases.231 However, most did not as the
choice to join the military establishment gave them the ability to do things that would
have been impossible to any enslaved person. The men had adopted the military life as
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much as they had adopted Britain per se, and in doing so had carved out a life that few
would have thought imaginable on their pre-Revolutionary War lowcountry plantations.
****
Perhaps the greatest proof of the way that black men saw the Carolina Corps as
an avenue for social mobility in the British Atlantic took place far from the stifling humidity
of the Caribbean, along the rugged coast of Nova Scotia. By 1791, Edward Mathew
needed black troops to join the dwindling ranks of the Carolina Corps. The government
would not permit him to buy slaves for the purpose and the free black population, their
freedom and lifestyle already secured, also refused to join the unit in adequate numbers.
Therefore, Mathew came up with a novel plan to recruit more men for the Carolina Corps
by sending a party from the unit to find willing soldiers among the largest British free
black population outside of the West Indies, in Nova Scotia. To achieve this end, Mathew
sent a white subaltern and a small number of Carolina Corps soldiers on a recruiting
mission to the rugged British province.232 Mathew clearly believed that the sight of black
men wearing the King’s colors would convince some of the freemen of color in Nova
Scotia to join the unit. In doing so, Mathew may well have sent the first black soldiers ever
on a recruiting mission for the peacetime British Army.
There was a military reason why Mathew wanted to specifically recruit from the
free black population in Nova Scotia. In the same letter to Grenville, Mathew explained
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that the province was home to “a great number of free Negroes, who had been employed
as Pioneers to the Army serving in the southern States of America…at the close of the last
war.”233 While Mathew was incorrect in his geography, as most of the Black Pioneers in
Nova Scotia had served in the middle or northern colonies during the war, he was correct
that a large body of these men now lived in Nova Scotia. The appeal of recruiting men
already trained in the work that the Carolina Corps undertook frequently in the West
Indies was too much for Mathew who, without waiting for confirmation of his plan, sent
the recruiting party north to Nova Scotia.
Upon arriving in Nova Scotia, the recruiting party found a free black population on
the verge of collapse. At Birchtown, the largest free-black community of some 1400
people, the population suffered due to the racial animus transplanted to the region by
white loyalist refugees from America. White planters, many of whom had brought their
slaves with them to Nova Scotia, as well as the general white population, quickly
understood how to take advantage of their black loyalist neighbors. Maya Jasanoff
explains “as former slaves, relatively unused to wage labor, black Loyalists frequently
ended up pressed into work at exceptionally low wages. Many Birchtown blacks became
indentured to whites at Shelburne, working under conditions that replicated their former
positions of slavery.”234 News of the sufferings of the free black population in Nova Scotia
spread all over the British Atlantic. In London, British abolitionists began to devise a
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strategy to send the free blacks to Africa. In the Caribbean, Edward Mathew saw the
suffering of the black Loyalists as a recruitment opportunity. As early as March 1791,
Mathew wrote to Lord Grenville about his plan to raise black troops from the Canadian
coast. In his letter, Mathew explained “I am informed they did not, in general apply
themselves to the cultivation of their lands; that they are at present very needy; gaining
a precarious subsistence as day laborers, and dissatisfied with the long winters of that
climate.”235
Mathew was facing some tough obstacles in his recruitment mission in Nova
Scotia. The British Caribbean as a destination was not an appealing one to many of the
free blacks, who would have known of the conditions of the region and its high mortality
rates. Another nail in the coffin for the plan for widespread recruitment in Nova Scotia
was that although Mathew only wanted experienced veteran pioneers from the
Revolutionary War, aged between 25 and 35, he did not want to bring any family units
down to the Caribbean. This stipulation seriously reduced the potential pool of men who
the recruiting party could target, essentially eliminating married men, those with children,
or those with any close-knit kinship networks. Given the difficulties surrounding the
expedition to Nova Scotia, it is testament to the persuasiveness of the recruiting party
that they managed to convince sixteen enlistees to join the ranks of the Carolina Corps.
While most black Loyalists in Nova Scotia rejected Mathew’s overtures to return
to British service, the sixteen veterans who did join him clearly remembered the positives
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that came with British military service. These sparks of memories would have been
reignited when the recruiting party arrived in Nova Scotia, offering them a return to a life
they knew, and escape from the grim life they were currently living. It is also important
to remember that life in the British Army promised a degree of security that the men
lacked in Nova Scotia. Before their evacuation to the maritime provinces the British
promised the men freedom and land, in truth most only received one partially and one
not at all.236 The result was that most of the free black men in Nova Scotia owned little to
no property in the region and struggled to survive. Life in the British Army, for all its ills,
promised the men food, shelter, and a wage. By talking to the men of the Corps in the
recruiting party, they would have also understood the social position of the unit in the
Caribbean and the potential for advancement above what they could achieve in whitedominated Nova Scotia.
The men who enlisted in the Carolina Corps from Nova Scotia were between the
ages of 24 and 32, meaning it is likely that most were veterans of the Revolutionary War,
which had ended only eight years prior to their enlistment. Even those who had not
actively served the British during the war would have had experience with the British
military, which had granted them their freedom and evacuated them at the end of the
conflict. The men were all from colonies where slavery had flourished, and two had even
been born in Africa before falling victim to the horrors of the slave trade. After fleeing
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bondage only to discover the latent racism that pervaded colonial British society upon
their arrival in Nova Scotia, it is possible that their most dignified moments in the New
World came when they earlier served the British Crown.
The reasons given for the failure of the recruitment expedition by Mathew were
two-fold. Firstly, he blamed the season when the mission took place. He explained that
“the lateness of the season did not allow the Party to try its success in New Brunswick,
where I am informed, there was a probability of our obtaining much greater numbers.”237
The second reason given by Mathew is much more telling, “The superior advantages
offered to this Class of People by the Sierra Leone Company, prevented this attempt from
being so successful as it would otherwise have been.”238 Unfortunately for Mathew and
his recruiting party, they had arrived in Nova Scotia at the exact same time as the Sierra
Leone Company was engaging members of the free black population to journey to
Africa.239 A major problem for Mathew was that his the recruiting party did not have the
support of the leaders of the black community as the Sierra Leone recruiters did. Even
more problematic was the fact that Mathew had very set standards of the type of men
who he wanted to recruit into the unit, the men needed to be physically able, relatively
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Fig. 3.1) The Return of the Nova Scotian recruits to the Carolina Corps. This document gives a rare
individualized glance into the men of the unit. Return of Nova Scotian Recruits, in Edward Mathew
to Henry Dundas, 14 January 1792, CO 101-32.
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young, and preferably skilled in a trade. They also could not use the promise of freedom
that had been so enticing to the first recruits to the unit during the Revolutionary War.
On January 14, 1792, Mathew wrote to Henry Dundas about the recruiting mission
to Nova Scotia and its mixed results. Mathew was downbeat about the success of the
mission. The sixteen men who had agreed to enlist in the Carolina Corps were barely
enough to cover the loss of men that the unit had suffered over the previous two years,
and certainly not enough to sufficiently expand the unit as he wished.240 Thus, from the
point of view of Mathew, the mission was disappointing.
****
The men of the Carolina Corps fostered a perception of loyalty that helped to
ingratiate them within British society, and advanced their position with their white
officers. Indeed, at a time of crisis in 1791, the loyalty that the British believed the Corps
had to the crown, whether real or imagined, saved the unit from destruction. In that year,
an anonymous officer (probably either Mathew or Lt. Col. Nicholls) sent a history of the
Carolina Corps to London explaining the loyalty that the Corps had shown, even at a time
of increased threats from black uprisings within the Caribbean basin. With the specter of
Saint Domingue looming large over the entire region, the commanders of the unit sought
to convince Whitehall that no similarities existed between the Carolina Corps and the
rebellious blacks of that colony. “An objection may be made to the arming of blacks as
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soldiers, but it has no weight,” the report began before concluding that “they may always
be as much confided in, if properly commanded, as any part of the army.”241 Indeed it is
clear by the measures taken by Mathew in Nova Scotia, that he had complete faith in the
loyalty of the Carolina Corps during his time as commander in chief in the Windward
Islands.
The loyalty of the unit to the British crown was key to their absorption within
British society. The men of the Carolina Corps were very careful in their insubordination,
using their position to create tangible benefits, such as in the case of the paymaster,
without ever mutinying. Despite the shortages in basic equipment, food and pay that
dogged the unit throughout its Caribbean service, and despite their employment on many
different missions, they never mutinied. This was not the case with their successors in the
West India Regiments who openly mutinied in 1802 to try and secure their rights as British
soldiers.242 The Corps were often the first unit deployed when a slave uprising seemed
likely. Whenever a runaway slave needed tracking, the unit likewise obliged. Then there
was the mundane but crucial role that the unit had in providing labor for the white units
of the colonies, and the maintenance of fixed fortifications throughout the Windward
Islands. In these roles, the Corps excelled and never questioned their orders. For the white
supremacist planters of the islands, the claim that the Corps were “more inveterate
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against people of their own Colour, than any other Troops,” certainly imbued them with
confidence in the loyalty of the unit.243 The new imperial model that emerged after the
American Revolution, as molded by abolitionists, featured new ideas of British civilization
as a cornerstone.244 As such, the Carolina Corps, as former slaves and loyal subjects,
became emblematic to West Indian planters and white officers of the new identity of
Britishness emerging within the empire.
As news of the Haitian Revolution swept across the plantation islands of the
Caribbean, the Carolina Corps managed to avoid the repercussions that affected most
free people of color on British Caribbean islands. The racial animosity and fear stoked by
the fires of Saint Domingue caused the free blacks of Grenada, most of whom shared the
same French heritage as the revolutionaries, to write a petition to Edward Mathew in his
capacity as governor of the province.245 Fearing potential re-enslavement, the petitioners
insisted that they were writing “at this remarkable Era, to make a renewal of our most
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Solemn and unmutable pledge of Loyalty, to the best of Sovereigns.”246 The Carolina
Corps never experienced any of the open hostility from the Grenadian population that
their fellow free people of color did, at least none written that survives today. The
excellent reputation the unit had established in the years prior to the Haitian Revolution,
as well as the loyalty shown while completing all manner of tasks, served as a shield that
protected the unit from racial repercussions caused by the uprisings in the French
colonies. The situation in the early 1790s also made the British authorities in the
Caribbean give concessions to their black troops to ensure their loyalty, including the
pensions in 1793.
The most prominent example of how their loyalty to the crown aided the Carolina
Corps is the fact that the unit survived as a single entity despite pressures from London,
caused by the outbreak of violence on Saint Domingue, to disband it. Much of the
pressure came from absentee planters, who feared their property in the Windward
Islands was under threat by having an armed black unit patrolling it. 247 The British high
command in London had argued for the utility of splitting the unit while they performed
labor duties throughout the Caribbean. Not only did splitting the unit mean that there
were fewer black troops in any single specific area, reducing the risk of collective action
by the unit, but it also meant they could simply cover more ground. Secretary of State
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Lord Grenville, basing his view on racialized ideas of climatology and fear of the unit as a
united force, argued that the Carolina Corps “should again be distributed to perform the
laborious duties of the (white) Regiments serving in the several Islands.”248 This order
arrived in the West Indies much to the chagrin of Edward Mathew, who at that moment
was preparing for the potential outbreak of hostilities with Spain, France, or both. Indeed,
Mathew, who had seen first-hand the usefulness of the Carolina Corps, objected to
dispersing the unit. He believed that the threat of the Corps rebelling was essentially nil.
After all, Mathew had seen the unit put down slave rebellions on the islands that he
watched over for years to this point. Earlier in 1791, as the plan for the splitting of the
Corps was being finalized in Whitehall, Mathew had written to Grenville that the Corps
would be of more service united “than it could possibly be in it’s late scattered situation,
devoted to the fatigue and servile duties of the Regiments in the different Islands.”249
Always convincing, Mathew implied that the division of the troops would be more likely
to cause a slave rebellion than keeping the Corps united.250
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As usual, Mathew got his way and the Carolina Corps remained as a single unit
until their incorporation into the West India Regiments in 1797. In fact, not only did
Mathew keep the unit together, but he got Parliament to endorse his plan to expand it.
This was not an easy task, however, and it had taken Mathew’s several years and no less
than five letters to Granville and Dundas to accomplish it.251 This expansion of the Corps,
amid the Haitian Revolution, was quite extraordinary and would never have been possible
without the perceived loyalty of the men of the Corps.
While their British officers argued about whether to keep the unit together or not,
the men of the Carolina Corps continued to impress their officers with their martial
prowess. In the same letter in which he appealed to Grenville to keep from disbanding
the unit, Mathew lauded “The progress of the Corps in their military Exercises.”252
Mathew was not the only Caribbean-based British officer to hold a high opinion of the
troops. In a memorial to Henry Dundas, Grenville’s replacement in Whitehall, Lieutenant
Colonel Oliver Nicholls requested consideration as “a proper person, to command the
Carolina black corps.”253 That a 45-year veteran of the British Army petitioned Whitehall
for command of a black unit is telling. While Nicholls’ petition was no doubt induced by
the lack of vacant military postings in the region, the fact that he specifically asked for
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command of the Carolina Corps proves that there was no dramatic stigma associated with
the unit based on their race.254 Another reason that white officers wanted a role in black
units was the fact that some officers found black units easier to control, as these soldiers
often complained much less than white soldiers about the behavior of their officers.
Indeed, there is no proof that the men of the Corps ever lodged any complaints against
their officers, at least none that made it as far as to a court-martial.
****
The question asked by this chapter, namely how British were the Carolina Corps,
creates a false dichotomy. Much like the question of the ethnicity of the Carolina Corps,
the nationalism of the men of the unit was fluid, used strategically to achieve various
goals relating to their integration within British colonial society. The lack of written
documentation from the troops themselves makes an individualized analysis of this
question almost impossible. However, from the wealth of sources generated by and about
the unit, it is clear to see that the men of the Carolina Corps performed Britishness as a
collective throughout their service in the Windward Islands.
Perhaps even more important than the nationalism that the men felt towards the
Empire that had both enslaved and freed them, was the perception of white colonial
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society towards the unit in this regard. The perceived loyalty of the unit was especially
clear in the writings of its white officers who saw their men as being as British as any of
the white troops who served in the West Indies. The fact that the men were under the
jurisdiction of military courts and could petition their officers for official dispensations
reveals just how comparable their standing was to white troops in the eyes of their
commanders. These official privileges that the men negotiated through their actions
included the pensions they received after their retirement from service starting in 1793.
The overall fluidity of identity presented by British Caribbean society in the late
eighteenth century meant that the men of the Carolina Corps could perform Britishness,
and consider themselves British subjects, without abandoning any African retentions they
may have had. The men themselves would have found it possible to be Afro-British, a
category of difference that would have flourished in the racialized world of the British
Caribbean. Such a designation would give whites leave to discriminate freely, while also
accepting the advanced position of the men within black society. Such a position would
also allow the soldiers to engage with society in a truly creolized way. Thus, the men of
the Carolina Corps lived a unique existence in the British Caribbean, not only regarding
their racial identity but their national one also.
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Chapter 4
“A corps of one thousand Men, composed of blacks…would render more
essential service in the Country, than treble the number of Europeans”:
The Carolina Corps and the Creation of the West India Regiments

In March 1795, disaster and liberation came to Grenada. On the night of the
second, the Francophone blacks of the island, led by a free black planter named Julien
Fédon, rose in rebellion against British rule. Fédon based his rebellion on the principles of
the French Revolution, the flames of which licked at the entire Caribbean basin. Historians
who have studied the revolt have tried to disentangle the facts surrounding it, in an
attempt to discover whether it was at its heart a French revolutionary movement, or a
slave rebellion.255 It was likely both, as by the end of the violence, over a year later, slaves
from both Anglophone and Francophone communities on the island had taken part, with
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many falling victim to British retribution upon the island’s reconquest. Not disputed is
that in the early days of the violence, the black rebels killed any white English planter they
came across, including the acting governor of Grenada.256
While the maelstrom of violence swept up the families and kinship networks of
the Carolina Corps on Grenada, the men of the unit escaped the bloodshed. Ironically,
their absence, to join the British force intending to defend the islands of the Caribbean
from French revolutionary incursions, helped to facilitate the uprising on Grenada. Fédon
waited until the removal of the Corps and several other units, which seriously weakened
the Grenada garrison, before setting his plans in motion. When the Corps returned to the
island with the British forces to subdue the rebels in 1796, devastation reigned in Grenada
and disrupted its complex social system. The extent of the disorder that affected slave
family groups is unknown, but considering the violence of the previous year, it is likely
that whole communities were destroyed in the conflagration.
Fédon’s rebellion on Grenada was both a result and one of the catalysts for the
final demise of the Carolina Corps as a fighting force. However, out of the ashes of the
unit came a new idea that changed the course of modern British military history, the
creation of the West India Regiments. Like the rebellion itself, events thousands of miles
away, on the continent of Europe, brought these units into existence. Rebellions such as
Fédon’s, based on French revolutionary principles, erupted throughout the Caribbean,
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highlighting Britain’s need for a new fighting force. Unwittingly, the Carolina Corps
became the very foundation upon which the British wished to base these new units.
This chapter will show how the experience and example of the Carolina Corps was
used by proponents of arming blacks to create the West India Regiments. Explored within
this will be the arguments that raged in London, and throughout the Caribbean, both for
and against the creation of such units. The Carolina Corps often made appearances in
such arguments, used to counter the many apprehensions the racially biased white
leadership in London had towards such a scheme. Analysis of these arguments, as well as
original plans for the new units, will show how critical the Carolina Corps, as a uniquely
situated black military unit in the region, was to the eventual adoption of the plan to
create the regiments.
The importance of the Carolina Corps to the formation of the West India
Regiments is not absent from previous scholarship. In Slaves in Red Coats (1979), a work
about the new military units, Roger Norman Buckley recognized that “The Black Carolina
Corps was a nearby reminder. The importance of this contingent, which was under the
command of regular army officers, was recognized all over the West Indies.”257 Buckley
did not go far enough in his assessment, however, for the Corps was more than a reminder
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of the good service of black troops in the Caribbean, it provided the very model for the
new units.
The scant scholarship that focuses on the Carolina Corps, as well as the larger
corpus on the West India Regiment, has also neglected to explore the plight of the troops
as they became unknowing participants in Britain’s new military enterprise. This chapter
will insert the men of the Carolina Corps back into the narrative by showing how the move
to create the West India Regiments, both geographical and temporal, disrupted the lives
that the soldiers had spent the previous decade building. The creation of the new units
disrupted the lives of the soldiers of the Carolina Corps, increasing their terms of service
with very little tangible benefit. Their status as veteran soldiers becoming more indicative
of their advanced age than of any additional military honors bestowed upon them. Upon
their backs and through their sacrifices, however, the British created a new military
system that would last over a century.
This chapter analyses to examine the several stages in the creation of the West
India Regiments. This structure allows for a deep examination of the reasons for the
creation of the new units, the arguments surrounding them, and the ways that the
Carolina Corps influenced these matters. Of course, the focus of the chapter will be the
role of the Corps in the creation of the West India Regiments and as such, even when not
mentioned, the unit looms over this entire section. This approach will show the
intertwined nature of the units by revealing how the demise of the Corps led directly to
the rise of the later regiments.
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The chapter begins by looking at the physical state of the Corps, and the ways that
the British use of the unit effectively destroyed it in the initial phases of the French
Revolutionary Wars. This section will show that while the British considered the Carolina
Corps too old to function effectively by the start of the conflict, their need for men in the
West Indies forced them to press the unit into service. This section also assesses the
impact of the drastic changes that occurred within the Carolina Corps resulting from the
new war footing. These changes included new white commanding officers, changes in
location, and even the move towards active military action for the entire aging regiment.
These changes tore the unit from the foundations they had laid since arriving in the region
and yet, despite causing new hardships, their loyal service meant the unit survived the
traumas created by the French Revolutionary War.
The second section builds off the first to show how the loyal performance of the
Carolina Corps, and newly raised black units that were modelled on them, caused
Parliament to allow for the formation of the new West India Regiments. The first part of
the section looks at the roles that generals in London, particularly those who had seen
the Corps and other black troops in action, pushed for the creation of these new all-black
regiments. The second part looks at how the white officers of the Carolina Corps were
instrumental in keeping the unit together and in pushing for the expansion of black units
in the region. It will show that the Carolina Corps, through its loyal service and
opinionated white officers, was instrumental in the creation of the West India Regiments.
The final section of this chapter discusses the creation of the West India Regiments
and the Carolina Corps’ incorporation within them. The impact of free men working
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alongside slaves will be discussed, as will the ways that the men of the unit were originally
used upon the units’ creation. While the second section discusses the ways that the Corps
influenced the creation of the West India Regiments, this section will assess their practical
impact during their foundational stages. Overall, this chapter argues that the Carolina
Corps was critical to the foundation of the West India Regiments.
****
In 1793, the British faced a military crisis. On the European continent, the French
had executed their King and embarked on a campaign of conquest that threatened the
stability of the whole of Europe. When France declared war in February, Britain was in a
precarious spot militarily. While it remained the most powerful naval force in the world,
its army was extremely weak, numbering only 40,000 regulars, spread over three
continents.258 With the very real threat of a French invasion of the British mainland, and
a need to prop up their weaker allied nations in Europe, most British troops were retained
on that continent. This meant a deprivation of British manpower from the islands of the
British West Indies. The Colonial Office in London was soon awash with pleas from
planters, both absentee and in the Caribbean, for greater military protection for the
islands.
The threat of a French invasion of the British West Indies was one that sprung up
whenever the two nations went to war. In such conflicts, the islands of the Caribbean

258

By 1793, the British had established Imperial possessions in Europe, North America, and Asia. The army
had always been the weakest of the British military forces, but had suffered from a lack of recruitment
throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 3.

164

changed hands at a dizzying rate, and this had certainly been the case during the last
major struggle, the American Revolutionary War. This time, however, the added fear of
slave insurrection breaking out on islands suffering from shortages of troops, was even
more pressing due to the shadow cast by the massive uprising taking place on Saint
Domingue.
Against this backdrop, the men of the Carolina Corps, now numbering some 200
troops under arms, were on the move.259 By the spring of 1792, Edward Mathew, the
commander who had rated their martial prowess so highly, had returned to England to
restore his health, never again returning to the West Indies. With Mathew’s departure,
not only do historians lose their most valuable source on the progress of the Carolina
Corps, but the unit itself lost its most powerful proponent.
The final returns of the unit from Grenada provide an insight into the aging
soldiers’ duties as they prepared for their relocation. The main work of the pioneers
remained the restoration and repair of the island’s crumbling fortifications. In November
1791, the work on fortifications engaged men from all three companies of the Carolina
Corps, and almost half of the entire unit, but the men of the pioneers made up most of
the black workforce.260 The British land strategy for the defense of the West Indies was
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contingent on the use of these fortifications. It would not be until after the fall of
Napoleon that the British, realizing the cost and inadequacy of such defenses, would
move away from their fixed defense plans in the region.
The returns made just prior to Mathew’s departure in 1792, also show the
different employments of the skilled artificers of the Carolina Corps. The documents are
unique as they are the only ones that break down the different employments of the unit
during their entire service in the West Indies. The return shows that most tasks performed
by the artificers differed little from those of the pioneers. During the same period that
the pioneers were working on the fortifications, the men of the artificers did much of the
labor-intensive work that made such construction activities possible. Many partook in the
same restoration activities, while others took turns as guards of the supply depots, a role
usually reserved for the dragoons.261
As well as displaying the utilitarian nature of the artificers, the skills that
differentiated the unit from the Pioneers were also on display during the same period.
Some artificers worked to construct sentry boxes, while several others served as
waggoneers. It is also interesting to note that in addition to the white surgeon who served
the unit, an artificer named Smart Lacy also worked as a “surgeryman” for the Carolina
Corps. While this role was likely less skilled than that of the white surgeon, it implies that
Lacy had picked up some anatomical skills, showing again how the men of the unit used
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their military service to gain an education that would have been almost impossible to
achieve in their former lives as slaves.262
The final year that the Carolina Corps spent on Grenada was one filled with
sorrow. In October 1792, as the unit prepared to leave the island for the last time, the
veteran commander of the black dragoon company, Captain William Mackrill, died. The
loss of the white officer, only months after Mathew’s departure for England, severely
tested the leadership structure of the unit. The chance for career advancement also led
Mackrill’s subordinates to immediately apply to replace him after his death. One who did
was Lieutenant James Greene, himself a four-year veteran of the black dragoons.263
Greene was not the only officer to press his claim for the vacant leadership position within
the unit. So did James Haverkam, his fellow white lieutenant in the company.264
One of the main reasons why the white officers of the Carolina Corps were so
quick to seek senior leadership positions within the unit was that the colonial office often
passed them over for promotion. There was good reason for this from a British
standpoint, as such promotions from outside of a unit meant the avoidance of such
internal squabbles as that which began after Mackrill’s demise. Nonetheless, the officers
of the Corps, tired of being ignored for higher positions and perhaps nervous that serving
in the only black unit in the West Indies would restrict their wider opportunities in the
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service, had had enough. On May 12, they wrote a memorial to the colonial office in which
they complained about the practice, stating they felt “much injured by every Vacancy in
the Corps being filled up from the Line.”265 In the memorial they made it clear they felt
that the extra fatigue they had to endure at the head of pioneer units meant they were
much more able to fulfill the necessary duties than their regular line infantry
counterparts. Dismissing the petitioners, the colonial office continued their normal
practice by promoting a lieutenant from the 67th Regiment of Foot to lead the dragoons.
Such unified resentment of the military establishment among the small group of officers
within the Carolina Corps likely united them in a similar way to the bonds of kinship that
joined the black troops who they commanded.
When the time came for the Carolina Corps to depart Grenada for the last time,
in mid-May 1793, the white population of the island did not want to see them leave. Not
only was the island becoming short-handed of white regular troops, but the lieutenant
governor complained about the effectiveness of the militia who remained on Grenada. It
was these men who the Colonial Office expected to deal with most external threats, and
certainly all internal conflicts. Nonetheless, Ninian Home, the lieutenant governor of the
island, believed that if the militia on Grenada were to fight for any decent amount of time,
it would “be productive of great inconvenience and discontent” amongst the citizensoldiers.266 Thus, the white Anglophone planters of the island, as well its interim governor,
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protested the departure of the Carolina Corps. In almost a decade of service on the island,
there had been no major slave revolts, and the men had performed admirably, earning
the grudging respect (or at least tolerance) of the white population.
The British establishment on the island was particularly fearful of losing redcoat
troops due to the influx of French refugees in the wake of the French Revolution.267
Adding to the already high Francophone population on the island, both white and black,
the British quickly found themselves in a minority on the island. Ninian Home banned
further French immigrants from entering Grenada, due to the fear of “many evil minded
and ill-disposed persons, who publicly avow principles incompatible of allegiance to
us.”268 Home was terrified the immigrants would start a revolution in favor of French
republican government on the island. His fears came to fruition just over a year later,
when Julien Fédon, a Francophone free black man, led a year-long rebellion against the
British on Grenada.269
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It is unlikely the presence of the Carolina Corps on Grenada would have prevented
the outbreak of Fédon’s Rebellion, but their absence from the island facilitated its early
success. The simple fact is that the number of effective defenders on the island dropped
considerably with the departure of the Carolina Corps. Including the free-colored militia,
of which there were 308, the overall militia numbers for the entire island numbered only
771 men after the departure of the Carolina Corps.270 This meant Home saw his nonregular defense forces fall by a fifth. More importantly, with the militia being a nonconventional, part-time fighting force, the loss of the Carolina Corps meant the loss of the
main fatigue units on Grenada. It is no surprise, therefore, that the fortifications that were
the prime responsibility of the Corps fell into disrepair after their removal from the island.
In one of the several pleading letters Home wrote to Henry Dundas in the Colonial office,
he described the situation thus: “The extent of the Fortifications on Richmond Hill appears
to me to make two Regiments essentially necessary for their protection, and I believe the
works were planned under the idea that this Garrison would be allotted to them. At
present we have not above two hundred and sixty men fit for duty.”271 After the removal
of the Carolina Corps from Grenada, Home simply did not have the manpower to
complete his fortifications, or to guard them with adequately trained troops. The removal
of the Corps thus undermined the entire British strategy for defense of the island.
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Outside of the military disruption caused to Grenada by the departure of the
Carolina Corps in 1793, the effects of the move personally affected the men of the unit.
While the historical record is unclear, it does seem that the small number of Carolina
Corps troops receiving a pension, continued to reside on Grenada after the removal of
the regiment. For the rest of the men, the move from Grenada would have been a painful
reminder of their previous departure from Charlestown, an event that all but the few new
recruits from Nova Scotia had lived through. In the previous decade, the men of the Corps
had created new kinship and familial groups on the islands where they served, particularly
on their main base of Grenada. Now the men of the unit had to endure a second round
of forced separation from their families.
The destination of the Carolina Corps after their departure from Grenada was
Barbados, the new headquarters island for the British military in West Indies. The island,
the farthest east of the Caribbean islands and easiest to reach from the metropole,
became the main garrison of the British Windward Islands in the late 1780s. As such, a
large standing garrison were stationed there, with many new buildings built to protect
the main settlement, Bridgetown, and to house the newly arrived troops.272 The men of
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the Carolina Corps were one of the first choices for the British commanders to work as
pioneers on the garrison’s structures, which were completed by 1793 but needed
constant upkeep.
In January 1793, Henry Dundas sent the official transfer orders to Barbados for the
Carolina Corps and placed the unit under the command of Captain of Royal Engineers
Robert Pringle, specifically “to be employed by him on such Works, and to be stationed
on such Islands, as he shall think most proper.”273 In addition to this, the British were
putting together an expeditionary force on the island for use against the French, led by
Sir John Jarvis and Sir Charles Grey. Although many troops were at retirement age or were
otherwise infirm, the standing of the Carolina Corps within the British Caribbean military
establishment meant they were still considered an important enough unit to take part in
this expedition in 1794.274
The 1794 campaign against the French islands sounded the death knell of the
Carolina Corps as an effective fighting unit. After participating in the British assaults on
Guadeloupe and Martinique, the already weakened Corps was all but destroyed as a
fighting force. The number of infirm, and later pensioned, troops had grown
unsustainably, and not enough free blacks were willing to fill the void left, or at least not
enough to make a substantial difference to the unit’s dwindling roll. A British attempt to
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open the unit to recruitment from the free black French populations of these islands was
as unsuccessful as the same attempt had been on Grenada, and so the numbers of the
unit continued to decline throughout the expedition.275 The result was that by the start
of 1795, when the expedition concluded and the Carolina Corps took up a new station on
Saint Lucia, there were only eighty men fit for duty in the decimated unit.276
Regardless of their lack of active troops, the men of the Carolina Corps continued
to play a crucial role in the protection of the islands where they served. On Saint Lucia,
the men of the Corps faced one of their toughest challenges yet. Outnumbered and not
used to combat operations, excepting the dragoon company that regularly pursued
runaway slaves, the entire Carolina Corps were called upon by the British leadership on
Saint Lucia to defend the island. The engagement is one of the only ones written about in
any detail by their white officers, and so deserves detailed analysis. The action was also
one of the last that the men of the unit would ever fight together as members of the
Carolina Corps.
In January 1795, there was a substantial slave revolt on Saint Lucia, and the
Carolina Corps entered the fray to try and quell it. Whether the unit was on the island
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specifically for this purpose, or whether their arrival on the island was purely
serendipitous is unknown. For the first time since the final days of the Revolutionary War
in South Carolina the entire unit took up arms. What is also clear is that the Carolina Corps,
despite being better armed than the French-led republican slave rebels, failed to quell the
rebellion. Vaughan described the action: “a spirited attempt made by the Black Carolina
Corps to drive them from their station, having failed of success it became necessary to
send Brigadier General Stewart with a strong detachment of His Majesty’s Troops” to end
the uprising.277 The British forces eventually defeated the rebelling slaves in the
mountainous interior of Saint Lucia, albeit without the further use of the Carolina Corps.
As in Saint Vincent, the men of the Carolina Corps faced the slave rebels on Saint
Lucia because of the perceptions of white commanders of their value against other blacks.
Unfortunately for the Corps, the unit was simply too weak to fight a determined enemy.
The slaves were not afraid of the black unit, shown by the fact that they stood their
ground and defeated the Carolina Corps before running in the face of the advance of
white troops sent to relieve their beleaguered black allies. The Corps was also weakened
by the fact that the majority of their number had little or no experience in handling
offensive weaponry and thus, despite gallantly entering the fray, the men of the Pioneer
and Artificer arms of the unit were ineffective. Even before the battle, Vaughan had
remarked to Dundas that the unit was unfit for any service other than as pioneers.278 The
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events on Saint Lucia confirmed his assessment and added to the deteriorating view of
the unit as a useful fighting force in the West Indies.
The Carolina Corps had never come closer to dissolution than at that moment in
early 1795, and the events on Saint Lucia could very well have destroyed it. However,
events had already begun that would change the course of British military history forever,
and that would provide a saving grace for the men of the Corps who were still able to
endure a rigorous army lifestyle. Even as the Carolina Corps were engaging the French
republican forces in Saint Lucia, two other black units inspired by their example had taken
the field. These Black Ranger companies, led by two white officers named Malcolm and
Soter, proved themselves very capable on the battlefield.279 Entering the arena on a path
already blazed by the men of the Carolina Corps, the Black Rangers breathed new life into
the recruitment of blacks by the British in the Caribbean.
The effects of the Carolina Corps on the recruitment of the Black Rangers were
tremendous. While desperation helped to force the British commanders in the West
Indies, particularly Vaughan, to recruit blacks, the step was much more palatable due to
the excellent performance of the Carolina Corps over the preceding decade. The fact the
unit survived disbanding, even in the face of their age and diminishing usefulness to the
cause of the Crown, shows how valuable the British still deemed their service in the
Caribbean. Structurally, the Corps also provided the British with an example of how a
black unit could function. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Black Rangers, although
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lacking an artificer corps, looked remarkably like the Carolina Corps, particularly in its mix
of black troops led by white British regular officers. Thus, even as the fighting value of the
unit decreased, the foundations that they created had already begun to change British
policy. The enormous impact that the Carolina Corps had on the British military
establishment was not confined to the Caribbean basin, however, but also took hold in
the imperial metropole. Indeed, events in Whitehall, influenced not only by present
circumstances but also by the service of the unit, were now beginning to move rapidly,
ensuring the writing of a new chapter for the men of Corps.
****
A simple fact was evident to the British military strategists in Whitehall as the
violence of the French Revolutionary Wars erupted throughout Europe: white men did
not want to join the British Army. For the first time in generations, unemployment among
the poor, the usual fodder for recruiters, was falling to new lows due to the Industrial
Revolution in Britain.280 Similarly, the number of debtors, another previously invaluable
source of military recruits, was also falling. Then there was the simple fact that service in
the British Caribbean was incredibly undesirable to any white soldier who aspired to a life
beyond service in the army. Even for those who did not succumb to the common ailments
of yellow fever and malaria, these tropical maladies often crippled them for the rest of
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their life. At a time when Britain desperately needed troops, the white male population
were simply unwilling to serve.281
Additionally while the British lacked white manpower, the French Army in the
Caribbean had begun to use blacks in large numbers by the time the fighting really began.
For example, at Martinique, which General Charles Grey attacked in March 1794, the
French employed a force that consisted of both white regulars and militia, but also a black
regiment led by a black officer.282 In Grey’s force, only the diminished Carolina Corps
served as soldiers of color for the attackers. In an attritional theatre of war, which prized
numbers of healthy troops above all other considerations, the French got the jump on the
British by tapping into a manpower resource that the British had only begun to toy with.
Even on islands that the British controlled, or seized control of, the revolutionary
egalitarian ideals of the French, including the abolition of slavery, led many slaves to
revolt against their British masters. On Saint Lucia, the men of the Carolina Corps faced
such a rebellion personally, while Fédon’s Rebellion on Grenada was tearing their former
island home asunder.

Similar slave rebellions also occurred on Martinique and

Guadeloupe, erasing the great gains that Grey had made at the start of his lightning
campaign against the French West Indian Empire.
After replacing Charles Grey, Sir John Vaughan assessed the critical situation that
the British Army in the West Indies found itself in and strove to find a quick solution.

281

Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 3.

282

Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 10.

177

Before 1794 had ended, Vaughan had written to the Duke of Portland, the British Home
Secretary, to suggest that “a corps of one thousand Men, composed of blacks and
Mulattoes, and commanded by British officers would render more essential service in the
Country, than treble the number of Europeans.”283 Vaughan hoped to pattern this new
force after the existing model of a British line infantry regiment, and he was sure such a
force would swing the pendulum back in Britain’s favor in the Caribbean.
Superficially, Vaughan’s plan to raise a full-strength black regiment seems similar
to Edward Mathew’s earlier schemes to expand the Carolina Corps, but they were very
different in design. Mathew had very specific ideas about who he wanted to complete the
expansion of the Carolina Corps to full regimental size: black freemen. This is evidenced
both in his attempts to enlist the help of prominent free people of color on Grenada to
help with recruitment, and in his mission to Nova Scotia. Vaughan, however, was much
more practical. Aware of Mathew’s failure to secure enough free people of color to serve
from his own experience in the Caribbean, Vaughan sought to use slaves to fill the ranks
of his new unit.284 Vaughan wished to requisition slaves from each island using a quota
system, with their owners compensated with land grants from newly acquired French
possessions. Unlike the men of the Carolina Corps during the Revolutionary War in
America, the slaves would remain enslaved as property of the British crown.
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Vaughan’s plan, like the earlier efforts of Mathew, ran into domestic opposition
from a metropolitan government of white men who still could not understand the value
of arming slaves. Despite this, the island governments in the British West Indies took
measures into their own hands and quickly raised their own black units to defend
themselves from attack. The success of these units in suppressing further slave revolts did
lend some credence to Vaughan’s plan to raise a black regiment. However, Vaughan had
avenues of support that Mathew did not possess. These avenues flowed from many
directions, and a great deal emerged through the men of the Carolina Corps.
At least one year before Vaughan laid his plan before the Home Secretary,
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Nicolls, seeking command of the Carolina Corps, was setting
forth a similar scheme. Following the ideas set forth by Edward Mathew as early as 1790,
Nicolls argued for the expansion of the Corps to full regimental size. Nicolls wrote to Henry
Dundas describing, “the advantages that might be fairly expected from augmenting the
Black Corps, serving in the Leeward Islands, and forming them, as a Regt.”285 In his letter,
Nicolls explained that he had personally petitioned Dundas in London before his return to
Grenada and that the Home Secretary had been “pleased to say there seemed to be no
objection” to Nicolls taking control of the unit.
Like Vaughan, Nicolls used the war with France as a vehicle to create a full black
infantry regiment in the Caribbean, and like Vaughan he faced initial opposition from the
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Home Secretary in London.286 Nevertheless, the persistent effect of high-ranking British
officers extolling the virtues of black troops amongst the British political leadership
certainly had an effect. From Nicolls’ letter, it is clear he was not only conducting a letter
writing campaign to enlarge and then command the Carolina Corps, but was also visiting
the governmental offices in London to interview the Home Secretary personally on the
subject. In time the effect of this petitioning made the British political elite much more
amenable to the concept of creating a black regiment, even if they were still reluctant to
take concrete steps in practice.287
While the written record does not say so, it is almost certain that Mathew also
used his stay in London to promote his vision for an expanded Carolina Corps. Mathew
made these attempts in London in addition to the several letters he had written to both
Dundas and Granville from Grenada. When Mathew returned to Britain in 1792, he was
not immediately relieved of command over the West Indies garrisons, and he also
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retained the governorship of Grenada.288 As such, fully expecting to return to Grenada
once he regained his health, Mathew would have kept close ties to the island while also
continuing to press his own agenda in the Palace of Westminster. Thus, with military
commanders pushing for a black regiment both at home and abroad, they began to win
support.
The major opposition to the creation of black regiments, as in the earlier case of
the Carolina Corps, came from the powerful lobby of merchants and absentee planters.
This lobby attacked any idea of creating a regiment that would undermine the racial
hierarchy they needed to flourish. Ever since 1775, the planter lobby forcefully rejected
plans to recruit from the black population. During the American Revolutionary War, the
British raised a regiment of free blacks to defend Jamaica but, despite their good conduct,
they were quickly disbanded due to pressure from the planter lobby.289 Stephen Fuller, a
member of the Jamaican lobby, summarized the feeling of many whites towards arming
blacks in the British Caribbean, when he explained that black troops: “are not to be
trusted in a corps composed of themselves only, & the incorporating of them with the
whites will not be endured.”290 This was the main opposition argument to the plans of
Vaughan, Mathew, and Nicolls. However, by 1795, the example of the Carolina Corps had
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undermined both arguments and military necessity was also eroding the complaints of
the planter lobby.
The use of so-called indigenous troops was not a new concept in the British Army
when the West India Regiments began to form in 1795. The British had used enslaved
black troops at times of crisis throughout the decades before the formation of the first
regular units. More importantly, the British experience with local sepoy troops in India
was a major catalyst in the British decision to create black regiments to defend their
Caribbean possessions. The East Indian Company had recruited so many sepoy troops in
their Indian enclaves that the indigenous troops outnumbered the combined forces of
both the British regular army units and the white ones raised by the company itself. 291 In
1757, Calcutta had been captured by Sir Robert Clive with a force comprised of a majority
of sepoy troops, using similar units to those that had existed in the Indian subcontinent
for 250 years.292
The geographical rotation system of service for members of the British Army
during the eighteenth century meant that many of the officers serving in the Caribbean
in 1795 would have had previous experience commanding sepoy troops in India. Perhaps
more importantly, however, the British officials in London were apprised of every
movement in their nation’s Indian enterprise and so knew the worth of using native
troops to bolster their own ranks. It is thus likely that the history of the sepoy troops in
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India helped to sway their opinions when it came to creating the West India Regiments in
1795.
In January 1795, the French sent a large military force to prop up their failing
colonial possessions in the Caribbean, and to try to counterattack the British forces. Again,
Vaughan beseeched Dundas to let him raise black regiments and, in the face of the
possible collapse of the British West Indian Empire, the latter finally relented. On April 17,
Dundas gave Vaughan permission to raise two full, black infantry line regiments.
Vaughan’s victory was a hollow one, however, for within a month of finding out that he
had been successful, he succumbed to a fever and died.293 Ensuring his legacy, however,
was the creation of the first two West India Regiments that had already begun recruiting
as he lay dying.
While it was not the Carolina Corps alone who ensured the success of Vaughan’s
plan, they were incredibly important to it. Had it not been for their excellent service, from
which all proponents of the venture could draw a virtuous example, it is unlikely that
Dundas would have permitted the creation of entire black regiments. For the British to
have done this, without the previous service Carolina Corps to act as a model, would have
been a massive leap into the dark. The Carolina Corps had showed the usefulness of black
units, a usefulness that both complied with British racial ideas of climatology, and that
degraded the strict racial divisions in the region. Men who held the same views as the
Jamaican agent Fuller had their ideas on race destabilized by the ways the men of Corps
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could ingratiate themselves within the fluid racial categories in West Indian society. At a
time when the planters needed red coats, it did not matter the color of the skin of the
men inside them, and their previous experience with the Carolina Corps made this mental
transition easier.
There is no doubt that a mixture of paternalism and ego helped persuade the
Mathew and his fellow officers of the Carolina Corps to keep the unit intact. They no
doubt felt that if they could be so successful with one group, they could replicate their
success on a wider scale. It would equally have been an insult to their abilities to disband
a group they had spent so much time “molding” them into a military unit. After April 1795,
the only query lingering in the minds of these officers was what was to become of them
and their unit with the raising of the West India Regiments? It would not take long for
them to find out.
****

As soon as he received approval from London for the creation of the West Indian
regiments, John Vaughan set to work to try and bring the plan to fruition. The main focus
of opposition towards the regiments now shifted away from London, to the white
minority populations on the British Caribbean islands. Where the West India lobby in
Parliament failed, the white inhabitants of the West Indies determined to succeed. Thus,
British military commanders spent much of the next year trying to win over the very
planters who they needed support from, particularly in the appropriation of slaves to
serve in the new units.
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The first orders to the legislatures and governors of British islands to begin
preparations for the raising of the West India Regiments arrived in the summer of 1795.
One representative order, to the governor of Barbados, read: “One of the main points of
these Instructions is the procuring…a sufficient number of Negroes to act as Pioneers, &
to perform other duties of labour & fatigue in the important Command entrusted to
Major General Abercromby.”294 After Vaughan’s sudden death in 1795, it was Ralph
Abercromby who assumed command of the British forces in the West Indies, and thus the
need to recruit black troops now fell to him.
The British planters in the Caribbean perceived a threat to their property from
external, or internal enemies, and it was this fear that the British officers exploited when
pleading the necessity of the new black units. Barbados, the British choice for the new
main garrison in the Windward Islands, was one of the most critical regions to the new
black units, as this was to be the base for many of the enslaved soldiers. John Knox, a
British officer in garrison, used the strategic necessity argument for the units in a letter to
the island’s governor, George Ricketts, in 1795. Arguing black attrition would be much
lower than that of white British troops, he wrote that he hoped that he “cannot doubt of
meeting every support from the Gentlemen of Barbados in carrying the measure
recommended by the Secretary of State into execution.”295 Unfortunately, such appeals
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for common sense military reforms failed, with planters more willing to resort to base
fears to guide them than the ideas of politicians thousands of miles distant.
The basest of all fears for planters was the threat of servile insurrection, a threat
stoked by the rebellion led by Fédon on Grenada, and not alleviated by the British
government’s new idea to place arms in the hands of slaves. John Alleyne, speaker of the
Barbados House of Assembly, gave voice to the fears of many West Indians relating to the
new push to create the West India Regiments, stating that instead of defending the
islands the new units would “rather endanger the Lives and Fortunes of the Inhabitants,
if not overturning the very Dominion of the Country into that of a foreign Power by the
Event.”296 A similar fate had befallen Saint Vincent during the American Revolutionary
War, when the Black Caribs worked with the French to overthrow British rule on the
island. The assembly also worried about what enslaved individuals the planters of
Barbados would be willing to sell for service within the regiments. They concluded that
the best slaves, those hardest working and loyal, would be retained by planters, while
those who would be sold for military service would, “be those of the worst characters,
villains hardened in Acts of Plunder and such as are become reprobate, without hope of
their being reformed to labour or a life of Honesty, and rife for any species or degree of
mischief, which when formed into a regular Corps and disciplined with fire arms in their
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Hands they can the more effectually perpetrate.”297 As well as their fear of armed blacks,
unlike most British West Indian possessions, Barbados had never been captured by a
foreign power and thus their ideas of necessary protection differed greatly from those
populations on less fortunate islands.
The military officers in the region knew the fears of the planters towards black
units but reasoned against them in letters to Whitehall. In 1796, an officer serving on
Martinique observed, “I know the English Planters are averse to it, because, they say
these Corps may turn against them, but I see no more reason for that, than for the Soldiers
of England turning in favour of the Mob.”298 Such arguments, often written by men who
had fought alongside black troops earlier, were frequently sent to the Home Office at this
crucial stage in the development of the West India Regiments, providing a useful tool for
the government to use against the prolonged resistance of the planters in the West Indies.
The Carolina Corps themselves became the major foil to white resistance to the
plans to create the West India Regiments. Unlike most of the other islands in the
Windwards, Barbados had very little experience with black troops during times of peace.
Still facing strong opposition in 1797, two years after his plans were first approved,
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Abercromby drew the attention of the dissident West Indian legislatures to “the conduct
of the Black Corps serving at St Lucia,” which he described as being “exemplary.”299
By 1797, the formation of the units had begun to take place and white minds
began to change towards support for the new units. The Carolina Corps were at the
forefront of this shift. After serving on Saint Lucia, the unit removed to Barbados. As late
as January, the Barbados Assembly had passed a resolution that forbade the support of
any black troops stationed on the island.300 Such a move was a searing indictment against
the entire West India Regiment enterprise, as the island was to be one of the chief bases
for the new units. However, by April the legislature consented to the stationing of the
black troops on the island.301
There were many reasons why the Barbados assembly changed its opinion on the
stationing of black troops on the island. The changing military situation was one, as was
the greater impetus placed on the recruitment of blacks by Abercromby for his new units,
which would have made the Barbadian’s resistance seem futile as their sister colonies
began complying with the Home Office’s demands. Also, the pro-Parliament governor and
his royal council had been open to the idea from the start, in direct opposition to the
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assembly, and there is a chance that this political situation had become unsustainable by
spring 1797.
The impact of the black troops initially stationed on Barbados also had a concerted
effect in changing hearts and minds. In early 1796, when the first black troops arrived on
the island, the legislature had considered creating a white unit to stand guard over them.
Within only a few months the hostile assembly was reporting that is was “unnecessary to
renew the Act of raising a body of men at the public expence for securing the tranquillity
of the Inhabitants of this Island during the residence here of the Pioneers lately brought
into this Island.”302 Part of the reason why the assembly was so quick to change their mind
was the influx of white regiments that also came to the Barbados garrison. The pioneers
mentioned were likely a contingent from the Carolina Corps and also seemed to have
made a good impression. The lack of negative news stories in local newspapers, the
absence of any court-martial documents relating to these 1796 troops, and the lack of
specificity in angry claims about black units on Barbados by the assembly suggest that the
unit performed its role in a thoroughly unobtrusive way. Thus, the Carolina Corps not only
proved a rhetorical weapon for Abercromby, but also served as a physical foil to the racial
negativity espoused by the Barbados assembly during this period.
****
By the time the West Indian Regiments were finally raised to something like full
strength, in 1797, the Carolina Corps had ceased to exist as a functional unit.
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Nevertheless, the tattered remains of the unit still contained some men of military age
who were too young to receive a pension and healthy enough to remain in the British
service. The commanders of the new units were eager to incorporate of these
experienced troops into them to act as a veteran backbone in what would be a green
regiment.303 The Carolina Corps, as the most veteran black unit then serving in the West
Indies, became a base that the British constructed their new regiments upon.304
The parallels between enslavement and service in the British Army are evident
again based on the experience of the Corps at this late stage of their existence. While
those deemed too old or infirm gained pensions from the military, it was of course their
commanding officers who made that judgment call. A close reading of the unit rolls
through the year’s show that many more members of the unit died in service than
collected their pension. At this late stage, as the British desperately attempted to find
experienced men to build their new black regiments around, the chances of older
members of the Corps receiving a discharge and pension diminished once more. In this
way, the army, like the planters in the West Indies, remained eager to squeeze every
available service from the humans under their control, regardless of their physical
condition.
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The British government and military high command encountered a complex
situation when it came to the Carolina Corps and their incorporation into the new
regiments due to their unique position as free men. The British wish to use slave troops
meant that they began purchasing slaves from West Indian planters and traders in Africa
to such a great extent that by 1800, the government was the largest slaveholder in the
British Caribbean. The Carolina Corps did not fit the slave-centered mold of the new
regiments, and Abercromby worried about what the effects of mixing free black and
enslaved soldiers would be. In November 1797, he recommended to Whitehall that the
Carolina Corps “now serving in the Windward Islands, ought not to be broken, or
incorporated during the War—Such a Measure would be highly prejudicial at present.”305
Instead, the British high command came up with a simple solution that would keep the
men of the Carolina Corps in service, but separated from the main body of new enslaved
troops.
The few surviving members of the Corps who met the requirements of the new
regiments as dictated by the Home Office joined the newly formed First West India
Regiment.306 They were united in the new regiment with the men of several other veteran
black companies from the region, including some of the ranger companies created on the
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Carolina Corps model.307 With such experience within its ranks, it is no surprise that the
unit was given numerical primacy over the rest of the new black British units. Many of the
men in the unit were either free or had actively served alongside free men during their
military careers, lowering the chance for resentment among the men of the regiment. At
its creation, the First West India Regiment was the most “free” of all the new regiments.
While the addition of some slaves was needed to boost the regimental rolls, the unit
remained comprised mostly of free men throughout its early existence, making it unique
among the new force.
While the British were finalizing plans for the First West India Regiment, the
remaining ninety-five men of the Corps, referred to in British returns as the “Carolina
Invalids,” gained a welcome reprieve.308 As part of Abercromby’s 1796 expedition to
relieve Grenada after the brutal rebellion led by Fédon, the men of the unit returned to
the island that they had called home for more than a decade. It is likely that the troops,
many of whom were too old or infirm for strenuous military duties, would have had ample
time to reacquaint themselves with the families they had left a few years before. The fact
that their commanders now considered them “invalids,” yet retained them in the
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Grenada garrison shows again how desperate the British were to keep the veteran unit
for their new military experiment. It also shows that service for members of the Corps, as
for other British Army units, was often a lifelong agreement. By September 1797, still as
an independent unit, the Corps, through death and retirement, had dropped in strength
to only 79, losing 15 percent of their remaining strength in only a year.
In 1798, the Carolina Corps ceased to exist as a unit. After this date, the men of
the Corps who continued to serve the British did so under the guise of the First West
Indian Regiment, a unit that was based on their military example. It is unlikely that the
men of the unit served in the new regiment for very long, and by 1805, none of the men
of the Corps remained among its ranks. The troops served faithfully for over 15 years in
the British Caribbean, and many for years before that during the Revolutionary War. Most
were more Caribbean by the end of their service than they were Carolinian, yet the
moniker stayed with them until the last, differentiating the men from those around them.
After 1798, the men would experience a totally different type of military environment
than they had previously had in the Caribbean. Their unique history and experience is
what stood the men of the Carolina Corps apart from the rest of the British military units
in the Caribbean, and it was this experience that its surviving members took into their
next chapter of life, as foundational members of the First West India Regiment. The British
recognized the vital contribution of the Carolina Corps to the creation of these later units
by placing the Carolina laurel on the crest of the First West India Regiment. For over a
century, the men of the regiment would only have to look at their arm patch or cap badge
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to know the importance that a group of runaway slaves had had on the army of an
empire.309

Fig. 4.1) The crest of the First West India Regiment (left) and the later British West India Regiment.
Both carry the Carolina laurel as a tribute to the Carolina Corps and its role in the creation of the
West India Regiments.

****
While it is highly likely that the British military would have followed their European
rivals by employing black units in the West Indies, due to the military necessity to do so,
the existence of the Carolina Corps hastened the process. Not only did the unit provide a
practical example of how black troops could be utilized in the region, but they also
provided a model for the leadership structure employed in the West India Regiment
throughout its early existence.310 That structure, of white commissioned officers and
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black NCOs, was unique in the peacetime Caribbean to anything other than militia units
and thus was critically important to showing the British high command in London how a
regular unit with a similar composition could function.
The Carolina Corps was more than just a model for the black units created in its
wake. It paved the way also through their interactions with the white populations that
they protected. It is noticeable that while planters on all the islands in the West Indies
were loath to create the West Indian Regiments, there was less resistance on islands that
had already had experience with black troops. Even on these islands, it was the idea of
arming slaves, rather than free men, which caused the most resistance. On Barbados, one
of the most politically powerful of the British territories in the Caribbean, resistance was
especially strong because black troops had never been used there and because the island
had a high number of absentee planters, who rallied against the arming of black troops.
However, there was no such resistance on Grenada, Saint Vincent or Dominica, islands
where the Carolina Corps had been a fixture of the military establishment for years.311 It
is telling that these islanders were much more open to the arming of any blacks, including
slaves, than those on Barbados.
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While the impact of the Carolina Corps on the warming of planters towards the
use of black troops was critical to the creation of the West India Regiments, their impact
on the white officers of the British Army was no less important. Through a mixture of
paternalism and ego, men like Edward Mathew could point with pride to the units that
they felt were the products of their labor and discipline. Indeed, mentally removing the
agency of the men themselves, their officers saw the excellent service of the units as mere
reflections of their own military prowess. This did have the benefit, however, of ensuring
that the officers of the Carolina Corps became some of the loudest proponents for the
creation of the West India Regiments. Their fellow officers also had no problem using the
unit to advance their cause, even if their only knowledge of the unit was through boasts
and hearsay.
Many of the factors that led to the creation of the West India Regiments were the
products of time and chance. If the British had not cut back so sharply on the number of
white troops in the Caribbean after the American Revolutionary War, if the French
Revolution had not occurred, or if the British had been able to recruit more soldiers from
the British lower classes, there simply would not have been a need for the units. And
when the situation warranted the creation of black regiments on a large scale, the
Carolina Corps were critically important to their successful implementation. The Carolina
Corps proved indispensable to the British high command, so much so that it’s remaining
men, even as “invalids,” were mustered into one of the new units. It must have been with
mixed feelings that those men partook in this new enterprise, a venture that secured their
legacy in the annals of British history while also robbing them of their retirement.
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Whatever their feelings, the new members of the West India Regiments had come a long
way since their decision to run to the British lines during the Revolutionary War, a decision
that by 1797 had changed their lives and the very structure of the British Army forever.
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Epilogue
“I have always considered them as freemen.”
In 1807, the British Parliament passed the Slave Trade Act, ending more than 200
years of British trafficking in human beings. As momentous as this piece of legislation was,
a second act had an equally powerful impact on the men in the British Atlantic already
held in bondage. The British Parliament passed mutiny acts every year, to fund the Army,
stipulate changes in policy and reevaluate the codes of conduct for those serving within
its ranks. As such, most have disappeared from the pages of history. The Mutiny Act of
1807, however, ingrained itself in the history of the British military forever as it was the
statute that freed the thousands of men serving in the nation’s West India Regiments.
The mutiny act emancipated all slaves who were currently fighting for the British,
some 8000 men in 1807, solidifying their legal status as free men.312 The Act orchestrated
by far the single biggest emancipation of black slaves in British history up to that point.
As it had been for the men of the Carolina Corps during the Revolutionary War, fighting
for the British Army now became a pathway to freedom for male blacks throughout the
British Caribbean.
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There were various reasons for the passage of the act, with many interconnected
with the passage of the larger slave trade abolition bill. One of the biggest factors in the
passage of the mutiny act was the fact that the slave trade, which provided the majority
of slaves who constituted the fighting force of the West India Regiments, was being
banned.313 It is important to note that the British government, while closing the slave
trade, did allow the military to impress any slaves captured by the Royal Navy from illegal
traders into military service.314 Also, while the act gave legal freedom to slaves serving in
the regiments, the same document also maintained lifelong terms of service for black
troops, compared to seven years of service mandated for new white recruits.315
Nonetheless, the act rang the death knell of the original conceptions of the West India
Regiments, with the number of troops declining significantly in the ensuing years.
Some roots of the Mutiny Act of 1807 are traceable to the service of the Carolina
Corps, and thus the unit was at least partially responsible for gaining the freedom of their
brethren a decade after the regiment ceased to exist. It was Lord Grenville, the very same
man who Edward Mathew had convinced to allow the expansion of the Corps in 1791,
who was Prime Minister when the new mutiny act passed through Parliament. In his own
words regarding the troops of the West Indian Regiment, Grenville “always considered
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them as freemen,” and these thoughts long predated the situation in 1807. 316 Grenville
had been the man who had approved the Corps for pensions. It is thus probable that the
early exposure of Grenville to the use of black troops through the Carolina Corps, with
whose history he had an intimate connection, affected his later opinions and helped sway
his judgment when it came to the passage of the Mutiny Act.
Indeed, the freedoms granted to the men of the West India Regiment were similar
to those that had been applied to the Carolina Corps previously. Except for the lack of
pensions, few of which were ever issued, the basic structure of the emancipation of the
West Indian soldiers was a carbon copy of that granted to the Carolina Corps. The newly
freed men gained the same rights to pay, legal recourse through court-martial, and
freedom of movement (albeit limited) that the men of the Corps received throughout
their service in the West Indies. The two groups also shared many of the same restrictions
based on their race, including harsher punishments, increased fatigue duty, and lifelong
enlistments in the British Army.
The impact of the Carolina Corps on the history of the British military expands well
beyond their limited term of service in British North America and West Indies. It also
transcends the normal racial boundaries, showing the British Caribbean, often
characterized as being racially rigid when compared to other European colonies in the
Caribbean, to have shared the same cultural fluidity found in these settlements. Within
this fluidity, the military status of the Carolina Corps allowed it to create a niche for itself
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in British society that would create cultural ripples for thousands of other blacks, both
free and enslaved, in the West Indies.
Returning to the arguments laid out in the introduction, the impact of the Carolina
Corps on whites in the British establishment is evident throughout their existence. In
Moral Capital, Brown argues that “it was not difficult for British officers to think of blacks,
in some contexts, as British subjects, as more than simply labor or the property of British
colonists.”317 While this predisposition by some officers certainly helped the Carolina
Corps to survive throughout many crisis points, the actions of the soldiers themselves also
forced whites in the Caribbean to confront their rigid views on race. Men such as John
Orde, the governor of Dominica, completely changed their stance on the use of the unit
once they had seen its service to the crown. Meanwhile the population at large had grown
so dependent on the Corps that the British high command used the regiment as an
example to dampen criticism of the plan to create the West India Regiments between
1795 and 1797. Indeed, whatever feelings Lord Grenville had towards black soldiers
before 1782, his experience with the Corps thereafter affected him so much that he
helped to pass the Mutiny Act of 1807 based on principles of freedom first tested through
the Carolina Corps. In this regard, the interactions between white British officials and the
Carolina Corps produced a positive reciprocal relationship for both sides.
The men in charge of the Carolina Corps, whether military or political, were
products of their time, however, and thus the lens of race influenced all their interactions
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with the troops. In the history of the Carolina Corps, misunderstandings over the biology
of black bodies, and ideas about climatology were both a blessing and a curse for the unit.
In South Carolina, fears of smallpox almost destroyed the unit before climatological
beliefs saved them as Charlestown fell. Mischaracterizations about slave cultures also
meant that the Corps were used extensively to dissuade other black groups from revolt,
events that created perceptions of loyalty in the minds of white officers. It is also
important to note that the honor codes, paternalism and egotism that white officers in
the West Indies showed towards black troops also colored the entirety of this group’s
interactions with the Carolina Corps.
The Corps was fortunate to enter the British Atlantic at a moment when
opposition to racial tropes was on the rise due to the push for abolition. At another place
or another time, the unit might never have come into existence. White attitudes and the
moment of imperial crisis that affected the British military during the Revolutionary era
in the West Indies allowed for not only the creation of the unit, but also established the
conditions needed for it to thrive. Within this unique period of British history, it was the
actions of the men themselves that helped to further their own cause and undermine the
rigid racial divides within the British military at the time.
Regarding the socio-cultural interactions with the people of the West Indies, the
unique position of the men in West Indian society allowed for them to engage in complex
interactions with members of every race. Being members of the British military
establishment gave the men access to money and legal status, elevating them above most
blacks in the regions where they served, including, after the outbreak of the Haitian
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Revolution, free blacks. The freedom of movement, no matter how limited, allowed for
interactions with members of the white community that other blacks could only engage
with peripherally. This was especially true when it came to their interactions with white
members of the British military. With blacks, particularly enslaved individuals, the
position of the Carolina Corps in the army affected interactions with the group in
disparate ways. Despite the negativity felt towards the group by some slaves after the
Corps policed the enslaved population, the men of the unit formed kinship ties on
plantations. Also, it was their position as soldiers that allowed the men of the Corps to
form one of their most interesting relationships, with the Caribs of Saint Vincent. Thus,
their exceptional status allowed the group to interact with the different groups of the
British West Indies, partaking in unique contacts that reveal the ways the Corps used the
fluidity of British Caribbean society to their own advantage.
Finally, the impact of the Carolina Corps on the overall British military
establishment is plain to see throughout this study. At every juncture of their career in
the British Army, the Corps were breaking new ground. In South Carolina, the units of
black pioneers and dragoons became the first black land-based units employed in the
region by the British during the Revolutionary War. They were the only black unit
evacuated from the British mainland colonies at the end of the conflict that the army
maintained as a military force, and thus became the first free all-black unit in the British
Army in the West Indies. Throughout their service, they used their positions to create a
blueprint for freedom that became widespread in 1807 with the passage of the mutiny
act. The importance of the unit on the creation of the West India Regiments was
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unquestioned, even by the officers of the British military who placed the Carolina Laurel
on the regimental emblem of the First West India Regiment as a testament to the Corps’
influence. The Carolina Corps exist as not only one of the most under-studied black units
in British military history, but also as one of the most important overall.
There were no parades for the men of the Carolina Corps. No tombstone survives
to any individual soldier of the unit. Most Caribbean historians recognize the contribution
of the unit in simple footnotes or passing remarks. Nevertheless, the shadow cast by the
unit is long, and it survived in the form of the West India Regiments until their disbanding
in the twentieth century. This study has attempted to place the unit back into the
narrative of British military history, bringing the crucial contributions of the Carolina Corps
to the fore in a way that has never been attempted before. Hopefully it will spur further
projects that will shed more light on both the Corps and other forgotten units that were
so fundamental to British policy and strategy during the Revolutionary era in the West
Indies. If the contributions of Carolina Corps are forgotten, there must be countless more
stories to be told. This study thus stands as a testament for 300 former slaves who
changed the military of an empire forever.
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Appendix A
Anon, “Of the Carolina, or Black Corps, serving in the Leeward Islands,” ca.
December 1791

“When His Majesty’s Army was in Carolina, a number of Negroes left their
masters, and attached themselves to it. When the Army was evacuating that province,
several of the Negroes were returned to their masters, but many of them, which had
taken an active part, had made themselves so obnoxious to their former owners, that
dreading the severest punishment, they prayed for protection, and to be permitted to
follow the Army. Their prayer was granted, and some of them were sent to St. Lucia,
where they were employed about the Troops, during the remainder of the war. At the
peace, they were sent with our new garrison to Grenada , where the commander in chief
employed them, some on the Kings works and buildings, some in the Quarter Master
Generals department, a proportion was attached to each Regt. to assist in doing the
laborious duties, and some were kept for Guards, for Orderly’s &c &c &c—they were
taught the use of arms, and on many occasions employed, and in some instances found
more useful, than the other Troops, from being better able to bear fatigue in that climate.
Experience having shewn General Mathew, of what essential service a Corps of that kind
could be made in the West Indies, either in peace or war, under proper regulations, has
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proposed their being augmented, and put under one Officer, as a Reg t, and has thought
fit to recommend Lieutenant Colonel Nicolls of the 45th: Regt: as well qualified for that
command.
The Black Corps at present consists of above Two hundred men, under Three
Captains, with Subaltern & Non Comn officers in proportion. The augmenting of which, in
time of peace, may at first sight appear extraordinary, but when it is considered, that
some of the colonies will not give Negro labour, and others only in equal proportions with
what government furnishes, and that so long as it is necessary to keep a military force in
the West Indies, works and buildings must constantly be carrying on, and that Negroes,
who are Soldiers, work at least as well, as any that can be hired, and at a much less
expence; it is therefore presumed the measure on examination, will prove to be founded
on principles of real utility and Economy. The price of a hired Negro labourer in Grenada
is Three Shillings currency a day, which is about One Shilling and nine pence Stlg. and he
is fed besides.
An objection may be made to the arming of blacks as soldiers, but it has no weight;
as experience shews they are not only to be depended upon, but are more inveterate
against people of their own colour, than any other Troops, and they may always be as
much confided in, if properly commanded, as any part of the Army.
The loss of soldiers in the West Indies, by death, or rendered useless to the service
by the climate, may be moderately Stated at Ten P Ct. P. An: and the expence of one
Recruit is nearly as follows.
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Levy money

£3.13.6

Subce: taken on an average before he joins

6.16.6

Passage

10.0.0
£20.10.0

Every year there are members obliged to be sent home for the recovery of their
health, whose passage home and back to their Regt. is Twenty pounds for each man,
besides the loss of their Military service while absent for their duty; no such expence could
occur for the black corps, and of any part of this waste of men could be prevented, by an
increase of that establishment, it would seem to be, not only a measure of prudence, but
of humanity, for which our government is so remarkable.
The loss of Seasoned Negroes is not estimated at Three P Ct. P. An: and they are
known to be capable of doing more work for a continuance, than Europeans in that
climate.
It is conceived that some Negroes could be Inlisted in Nova Scotia; their passage
from thence to the West Indies, would be attended with a trifling expence, but employing
one of the Island Government Brigs for that purpose. But admitting none could be raised
in that way, and you paid Fifty pounds for each able and Seasoned Negro, for the purpose
of augmenting the Black corps, to double its present member, the difference of saving
between employing them & hiring Negroes to labour, would soon repay their first cost.
And when the Advantage of the great increase of Military ^ force from the black corps, if
properly formed, is considered, either in peace or war, and that they are known to be
more useful in many cases, than an equal number of any other species of Troops in the
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West Indies, these reasons and their various uses taken together, would seem to out
weigh any objections that can be made to their being augmented, and put on a footing
that General Mathew recommends.”
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